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AND IRAQ

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UNITED NATIONS
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LETTER DATED 11 JULY 1969 FROM THE ACTING PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF IRAQ ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from my Government, and further to my letter of 13 May 1969, I regret to advise that there has not been a favourable development in the situation that resulted from the unilateral attempt of the Government of Iran to abrogate the Iraq-Iranian Boundary Treaty of 1937. In conformity with the statement contained in the penultimate paragraph of my above-mentioned letter, my Government has been patiently awaiting any indication that the Iranian Government was prepared to respect its international obligations and effectively substantiate its protestations of good-neighbourly sentiments.

I am distressed, however, to state that very little, if any, has taken place to meet my Government's expectations. On the contrary, Iran still persists in its intransigence, continues its demonstrations of force in acts of aggression in Shatt-al-Arab, violating thereby my country's sovereignty, threatening its security and endangering navigation in the River. It has become increasingly obvious that the Government of Iran is not prepared to listen to the voice of reason and that it is bent on pursuing an aggressive course. It has, apparently, escaped the Iranian Government that the show of force can hardly help an arbitrary denunciation of a binding treaty or give it any semblance of validity. If the Government of Iran was justified in its claims that Iraq had not lived up to its commitments under the Boundary Treaty of 1937, it should have resorted to a neutral judicial body, such as the International Court of Justice in order to obtain a compulsory judicial decision. Article 36 of the Statute of the Court states in paragraph 2 the following:

"The states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning:

"... the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation."

On the part of the Government of Iraq, I am authorized to declare that it is willing and prepared to refer all disputes concerning the application of the Iraqi-Iranian Boundary Treaty of 1937 to the International Court of Justice, and to abide by the Court's decision thereon.

In order to dispel any illusions regarding Iran's obdurate refusal to honour its international obligations, I enclose herewith a brief study of the origins of the present dispute which leaves no shadow of a doubt of Iran's pursuance of a policy of expansion and aggrandizement.

I request that this letter, together with the enclosed factual study and all its annexes and attached maps, be published as a document of the Security Council.

Accept, etc.

(Signed) Adnan RAOUF
Acting Permanent Representative of Iraq
to the United Nations



FACTS CONCERNING THE IRAQI-IRANIAN BOUNDARY

I. PRESENT CRISIS

On 19 April 1969, the Deputy Foreign Minister of Iran in a statement made in the Iranian Senate, declared the "Iraqi-Iranian Boundary Treaty of 1937", of "no legal effect". Iran's denunciation of a valid and binding treaty was based on the allegation that Iraq had refused "to carry out its Treaty obligations in good faith..." and had led "to a situation resulting in the abrogation of the Treaty in its entirety". The government of Iran further alleged that the 1937 Treaty was concluded as a result of colonial pressure on Iran and that as long as "the conditions prevailing in 1937 when the Treaty was signed, have also been changed, the effects and the results emanating from colonialism must also vanish with it". Iran also claimed that the provisions of the Treaty did not observe the rule of equity in international law. At the same time, the government of Iran declared its preparedness to conclude another treaty with Iraq on the basis of "equal sovereign rights in Shatt-al-Arab.⁽¹⁾ This unilateral abrogation of the Treaty was accompanied by demonstrations of force in the forms of massive concentrations of Iranian troops and naval and air force units all along the Iraqi-Iranian borders and particularly in the area of Shatt-al-Arab. Iranian merchant vessels and vessels of other nationalities navigated the River accompanied by various Iranian gunboats and military aircrafts, and persistently refused to observe the regulations designed to ensure safe navigation in Shatt-al-Arab.

The position of the government of Iraq has been that the Iraqi-Iranian Boundary Treaty of 1937 is still valid and binding on both parties. Iran has no legal right to unilaterally and arbitrarily abrogate a treaty that was concluded in accordance with the rules of international law and by the free and explicit consent of two sovereign states. The government of Iraq reiterated its acknowledgment of the navigation rights of Iran in the Shatt-al-Arab which is an Iraqi national river. It also expressed its willingness to resolve any dispute with the government of Iran in accordance with the rules of international law, the principles of the United Nations Charter and the provisions of the 1937 Treaty.⁽²⁾

The following pages provide the basic facts on the origins and the historical background of the present crisis. A careful study of these facts should establish beyond any shadow of a doubt Iran's consistent intransigence motivated by its expansionist designs and its policy of aggrandisement.

(1) S/9190, S/9200 and 9200.Add.1

(2) S/9185, S/9185.Corr.1 and S/9205

II. GEOGRAPHY

Iraq occupies the land of ancient Mesopotamia (between the two rivers). The area (171,000 sq. miles) includes the great depression between the desert on the west and the mountains on the north and northwest, and is bounded by the Arabian Gulf and Kuwait on the south. In contrast to the mountainous belt in the north, the alluvial plain of the twin rivers extends southward and forms the fertile basin known for its ancient civilizations.

Shatt-al-Arab River is formed by the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. It extends from Qurna at the junction of the two rivers to Fao on the Arabian Gulf. The importance of Shatt-al-Arab as a navigable river is restricted to its lower reach from Basrah port to Fao. The total length of Shatt-al-Arab is about 123 miles with an average breadth of 600 yards and, at some points, the River widens to a mile. The lower part of the River along which the Iraqi-Iranian frontier descends is about 85 miles long. (see attached map). The River is Iraq's only access to the sea and it handles considerable trade and shipping.

The estimated amount of silt coming down the River annually is about half a million tons. These deposits would render the River useless with continuous dredging, which is effectively maintained by the Iraqi authorities.⁽³⁾


III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND


The Iraqi-Iranian border issue goes far back into history. Iraq became a part of the Ottoman Empire during the reign of Sultan Salim I (1516-20), and from that time on the boundary question was a recurrent one between the Ottoman Sultans and the Persian Shahs. Iraq as a successor of the Ottoman Empire has inherited the border dispute.

Prior to 1847 Shatt-al-Arab was an inland River running through Ottoman territory and the land surrounding both banks of the River were under unrestricted Ottoman sovereignty. This is clearly shown in the book by Sir Henry Layard, who was a member of the joint mediation commission offered by the British and Russian governments to Turkey and Persia. Among other things, Sir Henry Layard said in reference to the negotiations preliminary to the Treaty of Erzerum of 1847:

"The principal matters in dispute were certain parts of the frontiers between the two States Persia claimed the left bank of the Shatt-al-Arab, or united waters of the Tigris and Euphrates,

(3) Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. 15. pp.228-302; Vol.20, pp.468, Chicago 1944.





from about sixty miles of their junction with the Persian Gulf....The result of my examination of the evidence and maps furnished me was that the claims of Turkey to the left bank of the Shatt-al-Arab and to Muhammera were well founded. Persia had never exercised more than a nominal jurisdiction over the territory in dispute..." (4)

The Treaty of Erzerum of 31 May 1847 was considered the basis for settlement of the border dispute between Persia and the Ottoman Empire. The Treaty consists of nine articles.⁽⁵⁾ The Ottoman Empire in an effort to put an end to the dispute formally ceded to the Persian government the city and port of Muhammera (Khorramshahr), the island of Khizr (Abadan), the anchorage and the land on the eastern (left) bank of Shatt-al-Arab (Article 2), which was part of Iraq. "Iraq occupies most of the geographical region of Mesopotamia, although the eastern bank of Shatt-al-Arab is under the Persian rule".⁽⁶⁾ Freedom of navigation for Persian vessels on Shatt-al-Arab was granted (Article 2, par.3). Negotiations for settling all boundary issues were conducted under the mediation of two great powers, Britain and Russia (Article 4). "The demarcation of boundaries, however, which was to have taken place immediately afterwards, was three times delayed by wars in Europe..."⁽⁷⁾

On 21 December 1911, the Protocol of Tehran was signed by Persia and the Ottoman Empire.⁽⁸⁾ The Protocol was concluded in a desire to avoid any controversy in respect to the Ottoman-Persian frontiers. This Protocol provided the base for negotiations and the procedure for the delimitation of the frontiers. It also provided for the establishment of a commission to meet in Constantinople, entrusted with the task of delimiting the frontier. The work of the commission was based on the clauses of the Treaty of Erzerum. The Protocol also provided that in the case of divergent views on any issue, the question shall be submitted to the Court of Arbitration at the Hague.

(4) Sir Henry Layard, *Early Adventures in Persia, Susiana and Babylonia*, London, John Murray, 1887, Vol.11, pp.431-433.

(5) For text, see Annex I

(6) *Encyclopedia Britannica*, Chicago, 1944, Vol.15, p.292

(7) Majid Khadduri, *Independent Iraq*, London, Oxford University Press, 1951, p.240.

(8) For text, see Annex II.

The Joint Commission met in Tehran in 1912, but did not make substantial progress.

On 4 November 1913, the Constantinople Protocol was concluded between the Ottoman Empire, Persia, Great Britain and Russia, the last two governments acting as mediators. The Protocol provides for the establishment of a Delimitation Commission consisting of commissioners from the four governments (Article 2).⁽⁹⁾

The Delimitation Commission concluded its work in 1914, mainly by reference to geographical features. The proceedings of the meetings of the Commission define the frontiers in detail. The border dispute, therefore, was finally settled by virtue of Article 5 which reads:

"As soon as part of the frontier has been delimited, such part shall be regarded as finally fixed and shall not be liable to subsequent examination or revision".

Article I of the Protocol defined the Shatt-al-Arab frontiers as follows:

"From this point (i.e., from the mouth of the Nahr-Nazaileh canal) the frontier shall follow Shatt-al-Arab as far as the sea, leaving under Ottoman sovereignty the river and all the islands therein..."

A detailed description of the boundary line is embodied in the proceedings of the second meeting of the Delimitation Commission held on 12 January 1914, and reproduced in the Tableau Descriptif de la Line-Frontiere, annexed to the proceedings: "the line is described as following low-water level of the left bank of the Shatt-al-Arab, departing from it only to the extent necessary to leave in Persia the named islands referred to in Article I of the Constantinople Protocol of 1913, and the anchorage of Muhammara."

Therefore, the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire extended over all the River of Shatt-al-Arab and the border line was fixed at the left (eastern) bank of the River. Iran was given the port and anchorage of Muhammara (Khorramshahr) and other islands mentioned in the Protocol. This settlement gave Iran certain territories which were integral parts of Iraq.

(9) For text, see Annex III

The attitude of Iran towards this final settlement was completely reversed after the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I, and the emergence of Iraq. Under international law, Iraq inherited as a successor state the international frontier fixed in accordance with the proceedings of the Delimitation Commission in 1914. Iran, however, disregarded and violated the internationally recognized frontiers. Iran claimed to justify its attitude on the grounds that it did not recognize the validity of the agreements and protocols concluded between Persia and the Ottoman Empire.

The persistent violation of the Iraqi frontiers reached a breaking point in 1934 when Iraq was finally forced to submit a formal complaint to the League of Nations.

IV. IRAQ'S APPEAL TO THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Iraq did its utmost to settle the dispute brought about by Iran's disregard of the internationally established boundary through direct negotiations with Iran. Failing in this, Iraq was left with only one peaceful alternative - an appeal to the Council of the League of Nations.

Iraq's appeal to the League of Nations was in accordance with Article II, paragraph 2 of the League Covenant.

"It is also declared to be the friendly right of each member of the League to bring to the attention of the Assembly or the Council any circumstances whatever affecting international relations which threatens to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends".

In accordance with this "friendly right", the Iraqi government stated its grievances to the Secretary-General in a letter dated 29 November 1934.

The Iraqi position was principally based on juridical inheritance, treaty right and equity.

Iraq asked the League's Council to take up the issue of the Iraqi-Iranian frontier in view of Iran's numerous boundary violations. These violations were grouped under three categories: illegal interference with Shatt-al-Arab navigation; territorial expansion; and the diversion of Gunjan Cham waters.

The violations relating to Shatt-al-Arab consisted of Iranian gunboat interference with normal shipping activities; disregard of rules and by-laws of the Port of Basrah;

blocking the oneway dredged Rooka Channel; and rash seaman-ship. These grave violations have in some instances threatened to block the river and bring the whole Iraqi seaborne trade to a standstill (Shatt-al-Arab being Iraq's only access to the sea).

The letter of the government of Iraq to the Secretary General of the League, dated 29 November 1934, states inter alia:

"The boundary between Iraq and Persia is derived from the Treaty of Erzerum of 1847 and a Protocol signed at Constantinople on 4 November 1913, by the Grand Vizier and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Ottoman Empire and the Ambassador of Persia, on behalf of the two parties and by the Ambassadors of Great Britain and Russia, on behalf of their respective countries in the capacity of mediating Powers. Section V of this Protocol specifically laid down that as soon as any part of the frontier had been delimited by the Delimitation Commission to be set up in accordance with Section II, that part should be held to have been finally fixed and should not be open to either to subsequent examination or to revision. The delimitation of the frontier on the ground provided for in Section II was carried out by this Commission in the year 1914.

In spite of the legal position as outlined above, the Imperial Persian Government has consistently disregarded and violated the boundary so established. A summary of some of the more flagrant acts of aggression, with copies of the relevant correspondence, is attached. As will be seen from this correspondence, the Imperial Persian Government attempts to justify its conduct on the ground that it does not recognize the validity of the boundary and does not consider itself bound by the arrangements by which it was determined. This view the Iraqi government is unable to accept.

The Royal Iraqi Government has hitherto been loth to formulate publicly a complaint against a neighbour and fellow-member of the League of Nations. It has left nothing undone in its endeavour to settle the matters at issue direct with the Imperial Persian government. As will be seen from the correspondence, the numerous conciliatory proposals which it has made, whether for the investigation by joint commission of particular problems affected by the precise alignment of the boundary or for the general examination of all causes of inconvenience to either side arising from that alignment, with a view to eliminating the inconveniences by appropriate administrative arrangements, have been consistently rejected or ignored".

While the Iraqi attitude was principally based on treaty rights and equity, Iran claimed that all international agreements concluded in the past were without binding force. This position was stated in the Iranian memorandum of 8 January 1935, to the League's Council:

"According to the government of Iraq, the boundary was fixed by the Treaty of Erzerum of 1847, and by the Protocol signed at Constantinople on November 1913...The Persian government is of the opinion that the Delimitation Commission of 1914, have no force either in law or in equity to determine the frontier..."(10)

This view was further expounded by the Iranian delegate at the Council with respect to the Treaty of Erzerum. This Treaty was described by him as "null and void" on the pretext that the Iranian envoy delegated to sign the Treaty had exceeded his instructions in accepting the explanatory note of the mediating powers. The facts concerning the explanatory note are as follows: Before the Treaty was signed the Ottoman Empire asked the mediating Powers (Great Britain and Russia) for certain explanations of the text. The two mediating Powers answered in an "Explanatory Note", which was to the satisfaction of the Ottoman Empire and was equally accepted by the Iranian envoy. Therefore, Iran's claim before the League was without foundation.

Furthermore, Iran actively participated in the Delimitation Commission, provided for by Article 3 of the Treaty, from 1849 until 1852 when the Crimean War intervened. Later in 1874 the Turco-Persian Commission met in Constantinople but the progress was interrupted by the Russo-Turkish War. If the Treaty was considered "null and void" by Iran, why did she take an active part in the Delimitation Commission set up by that Treaty?

Iran equally rejected the Protocol of 1913 on the grounds that it was based on the "non-existent" Treaty of Erzerum. In other words, Iran denied the validity of all frontier agreements signed with the Ottoman Government.

Reference to the Permanent Court of International Justice

The debate at the Council came to a juridical impasse. At this juncture, the representative of Great Britain suggested the following:

"...on juridical issues of this nature, the most appropriate procedure may be to seek the opinion of an expert legal body, such as the Permanent Court of International Justice at the Hague."(11)

(10) League of Nations, Official Journal, February 1935, P.217

(11) Ibid., p.123

The representative of Iraq immediately accepted to refer the dispute "to the Permanent Court of International Justice for an advisory opinion".(12)

The Iranian representative, on the other hand, refused to agree to the suggestion.

Direct Negotiations

This juridicial impasse prompted the Rapporteur of the League's Council to use his good offices and urge the two parties to conduct direct negotiations. The Rapporteur's efforts proved successful.

Consequently, the Rapporteur requested the Council for adjournment of the debate. His request was adopted. On 27 April 1936, the Iraqi government asked the Secretary-General of the League for further delay as negotiations were still in progress.(13)

Finally, Iraq asked the Secretary-General on 27 August 1937, to withdraw the Iraqi complaint. The reasons for the withdrawal were stated as follows:

"...the negotiations between Ir and Iran regarding the frontier difference having fortunately resulted in an agreement between the two parties, the existing dispute concerning the boundary has been settled...request the Council to withdraw Iraq's application under Article 11, par. 2, from the agenda of the 98th session of the Council of the League of Nations"(14)

V. BOUNDARY TREATY OF 1937

The direct negotiations which were resumed during 1935-1937 encountered many difficulties and at one stage were about to break down. The Shah finally declared that "he wanted nothing from Iraq more than the deepest line of the river of the Shatt in front of Abadan".(15). Iraq under pressure and unfavourable circumstances, was compelled to surrender part of her sovereignty over Shatt-al-Arab. Although the result was unfavourable to Iraq, it demonstrated nonetheless, Iraq's sincere desire to put an end once and for all to a dispute which had dragged on for years because of Iran's procrastination.

(12) Ibix., p.190

(13) Ibid., June 1936, p.564

(14) Ibid., December 1937, p.494

(15) Majid Khadduri, op. cit., p.245

A boundary treaty was finally concluded between Iraq and Iran on 4 July 1937.⁽¹⁶⁾ Despite the intransigent attitude taken by Iran at the League of Nations, where she questioned the validity of the 1913 Protocol and the Proceedings of the 1914 Commission, the 1937 Boundary Treaty confirmed the validity of the past agreements which Iran had previously declared "null and void".

To this Treaty was annexed a protocol consisting of five articles in order to clarify the matter of the management and administration of Shatt-al-Arab. This protocol was considered an integral part of the Treaty and came into force at the same time as the Treaty.⁽¹⁷⁾

Under this Treaty and the protocol annexed to it, Iran, however, aside from extending her sovereignty over the part of Shatt-al-Arab in front of Abadan, made several other gains. Although Shatt-al-Arab is an inland river in Iraqi territory, Iran was given the right under Article 5 of the Treaty to conclude a convention with Iraq for the maintenance and improvement of the River. Moreover, Iran was granted permission under Paragraph 3 of the protocol for entry of vessels of war belonging to any state to its own harbors. Therefore, it can be safely said that the Treaty, in view of the many concessions made by Iraq, was a net gain to Iran.

Gains for Iran

None of the Treaties concluded between the Ottoman Empire and Persia prior to 1847 referred to Shatt-al-Arab. The reason was very simple: Shatt-al-Arab was recognized to be a national River and the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire on the River and the land surrounding it on both banks.

Iran obtained its first territorial gain by virtue of the Treaty of Erzurum of 1847, whereby the Ottoman government formally recognized "the unrestricted sovereignty of the Persian government over the city and port of Muhammara, the island of Khizr, the anchorage and the land on the eastern bank. That is to say, the left bank of Shatt-al-Arab, which is in the possession of tribes recognized as belonging to Persia". (Article 2).

The fact that the "tribes" referred to in Article 2 of the Treaty were Arab tribes were attested to by Ramazani when discussing the preliminary activities of the Anglo-Persian oil company in procuring the oil concessions in Southern Iran early this century:

"The company also reached an agreement with the Sheikh of Mohammarah (now Khoramshahr), Sheikh Khaz'al,

(16) For text, see Annex IV

in 1909. He was the hereditary Arab ruler of an enormous territory on the eastern side of the Shatt-al-Arab, including Abadan Island which the company had selected as the site for a refinery".(18)

Iran's first gain, therefore, was the possession of the city and port of Muhammara, the island of Khizr (Abadan), the anchorage and the land in the eastern bank of the River. Further, the same article granted Persian vessels "the right to navigate freely without let or hindrance on the Shatt-al-Arab from the mouth of the same to the point of contact of the frontiers of the two parties.


The Ottoman government, however, insisted before finally signing the 1847 Treaty assurances regarding the exact meaning of certain stipulations. These were given in an "Explanatory Note" addressed to the ports by the British and Russian Ambassadors in Constantinople, and as far as the River boundary was concerned, made it clear that the "anchorage of Muhammara" was that in the Karun River just above its confluence with Shatt-al-Arab and not in the Shatt itself.

Nevertheless, Persian claimed at a later stage that the anchorage was on Shatt-al-Arab itself and managed to assert that claim, realising thereby its second gain. It will be recalled in this connection that the demarcation of the frontiers in accordance with the provisions of the Erzurum Treaty was delayed by two wars: The Crimean War (1854-6) and the Anglo-Persian War (1856-7). Further dispute caused other delays in the actual work of demarcation, but negotiations and mediations continued intermittently until they were finally concluded by the Protocol of the Constantinople in 1913. Notwithstanding the assurances of the "explanatory note" of 1848, Persia was awarded the modern anchorage in the Shatt-al-Arab which extended some distance above and below the Karun confluence. This was done on the basis of the situation obtaining in 1913 as it had been agreed upon by the two Parties and the two mediating Powers in 1869.


Needless to say that the third gain achieved by Iran was incorporated in the Treaty of 1937 whereby Iran managed to push the boundary line from the low water mark to the "Thalweg" of the River for a distance of 5 miles opposite Abadan. This is the gain referred to by the Shah of Iran, Riza Pahlevi, when he stated at the time that he "wanted nothing more from Iraq than the Thalweg of the Shatt in front of Abadan", (see attached maps, parts I and II).

(18) Ramazani, Rouhollah K.
 "The Foreign Policy of Iran 1500-1941"
 University Press of Virginia, Charlottesville, 1966,
 p.122

THE MEDIAN LINE
BOUNDARY DELIMITATION COMMISSION
1913-1914





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PART II





ARABIAN GULF

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VI. THE BORDER PRESENT LEGAL STATUS

The 1937 Boundary Treaty between Iraq and Iran establishes the legal status of the present border. The Treaty was signed on 4 July 1937, and came into force with the exchange of the instruments of ratification on 20 June 1938, and registered with the League of Nations on 29 August 1938. It is principally based on "the doctrine of interstate consent" which is the most reliable basis of international law. The renowned American Jurist, Dr. Pitman Potter, states:

"The divergence which seems to be possible between justice and practice as sources of the authority of international law is to be bridged only by means of the doctrine of interstate consent...The express provisions of international agreements declaring the law of nations and incidents of international practice, embody what the states of the world agree constitutes justice in their relations one with another".(19)

With the conclusion of this Treaty, Iraq sincerely hoped that the long dispute had finally come to an end. However, not long after the Treaty came into force, Iran began committing flagrant border violations. Most of the violations were similar to those committed prior to 1934, which had prompted Iraq to seek the help of the international community and submit a complaint to the League of Nations. But, after the conclusion of the Treaty, the violations were more frequent and more extensive in scope than before.

The fact of the matter is that Iraq never denied its obligation under Article 5 of the Treaty, but Iran's attempt to exceed the rights granted to her in accordance with the Treaty of 1937 and her disregard of Iraq's lawful rights prevented the conclusion of a convention. Iran's policy has been not to conclude a convention but to insist on the setting up of a joint commission, which the Treaty did not provide for at all. Moreover, Shatt-al-Arab is an inland River in Iraqi territory -- with two minor exceptions -- hence, Iran cannot claim similar or equal rights of administration, to say nothing of equal sovereignty.

(19) Pitman Potter, An Introduction to the Study of International Organization, New York, Appleton - Century-Crofts, Inc., 1948, P.59

VII. IRAN'S ALLEGATIONS

As may be seen from the above facts, Iran's allegations could be categorized under the following:

- (i) The Treaty of 1937 was concluded under conditions of inequality between Iraq and Iran and that it is a relic of the colonial era;
- (ii) Iraq has failed to fulfill its obligations under the Treaty and the Protocol attached to it;
- (iii) The Shatt-al-Arab River is a boundary River and accordingly should be under the joint sovereignty of both Iraq and Iran.

These allegations have no basis whatever and they are never supported by historical facts nor by the tenets of international law.

1. It is true that the Treaty of 1937 was concluded under conditions of inequality between Iraq and Iran but the facts and the international situation at the time proves that the balance was tipped heavily against Iraq itself in favour of Iran. It shall be recalled that the European political situation had become increasingly alarming since the Nazis accession to power in Germany in 1933, and the Italo-Ethiopian war of 1935. The fear of a world conflagration was looming on the political scene and Great Britain and its allies were desperately trying to contain the axis powers. In order to placate the Iranian monarch at the time, Riza Pahlevi, Great Britain exerted all possible pressure to force the Iraqi government to concede to the Shah's demand to extend the border line opposite Abadan and for a distance of seven km. to the Thalwag line instead of the low water line on the east bank of Shatt-al-Arab. The Iraqi government reluctantly signed the Treaty in face of massive popular opposition. But once the Treaty was concluded, ratified and the instruments of ratifications exchanged, Iraq unswervingly honoured it and never reneged any of its provisions.

It is therefore a travesty of the facts to maintain that Iran rather than Iraq, was the victim of colonialism. It shall be recalled that Iran had been an independent country for several centuries, while Iraq had shed away the shackles of the British Mandate only five years earlier. At any rate, when the Treaty was signed both Iraq and Iran were sovereign members of the League of Nations and Iraq accepted and respected the rule of free consent, which forms a basic tenet of international law in respect of the Treaty.

2. It is equally unjust and untrue to maintain that Iraq had failed to conclude the convention stipulated in Article 5 of the Treaty and has therefore breached the provisions of the Treaty.

Iraq did not deny her obligation under this provision nor the necessity of concluding an agreement covering these matters, but what actually stood in the way of the conclusion of such agreement was Iran's attitude of trying to turn this into a means of claiming rights which have support neither in the Treaty nor in Iran's legal position in Shatt-al-Arab - a means of claiming a right in the administration of Shatt-al-Arab similar to that enjoyed by Iraq. This Iran did through alleging the necessity of setting up a Joint Commission for the administration of Shatt-al-Arab. Needless to say that Iran aimed, once this alleged right of joint administration is established, to make it a basis for future claim of "joint sovereignty" on the River.

The Treaty contains no provision requiring agreement upon the formation of such Commission. Undoubtedly, the principle of good faith in the implementation of agreements by no means lends support to Iran in her allegation, since the entire River -- save two minor exceptions -- is an Iraqi territory. Furthermore, Shatt-al-Arab is a national River flowing in the territory of one state, starting from its head at Qurna down to Khayeen canal south of Basrah. On the basis of this legal position and by way of respect for the good faith in which the agreement should be implemented, Iran cannot possibly have the same authority exercised by Iraq in the administration of Shatt-al-Arab.

Article 5 of the 1937 Treaty never mentioned the establishment of a joint commission for the administration of the River. It only stipulated that the two parties should conclude a convention to regulate navigation in Shatt-al-Arab, including the following:

- a. Maintenance and improvement of navigable channel;
- b. Dredging and pilotage of ships;
- c. Collection of dues;
- d. Health measures;
- e. Measures for preventing smuggling; and
- f. Other questions concerning navigation in the Shatt-al-Arab.

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Had it been the intention to form a joint commission for the administration of the River, Article 5 would have unambiguously stipulated that and enumerated the alleged joint commission's composition, functions and competence. This was not the case. Nor could it be assumed that the intention was implied, as such implication is not recognized by international law, particularly as it categorically violates the principle of the exclusive sovereignty of states over its national territories and waters.

Obviously, all these pretexts and assumptions on the part of the Iranian government were advanced in order to deliberately obstruct the conclusion of the Convention stipulated in Article 5 of the Treaty of 1937. It was a standard practice by Iran in its pursuance of the technique of "Procrastination", to which Ramazani referred to in the chapter on "The Techniques of Iranian Diplomacy":

"Procrastination": This was an old technique and it took many forms. One was withholding or delaying ratification of signed agreements. A treaty on air rights had been signed with Great Britain, in 1925, but its ratification was delayed until Great Britain yielded on the matter of capitulations. The 1921 treaty with Russia was not ratified immediately in order to pressure Russia to withdraw its troops from Iranian soil, to relinquish its support of the Soviet Republic of Gilan, and to expedite the resumption of badly needed trade. In these two instances the desired result was produced. Riza Shah's grave mistake in the end was to apply the technique of procrastination during the Second World War when the vital interests of great powers were at stake. His delaying tactics at that time were partly responsible for the Allied invasion of Iran."⁽²⁰⁾

And even assuming for argument's sake that Iraq did breach the provisions of the Treaty, which is never the case, how could such an alleged breach be considered so serious and important as to give Iran the right to unilaterally denounce that treaty? The navigation in Shatt-al-Arab continued, since the conclusion of the Treaty, for 32 years without any adverse effects, apart from those resulting from Iran's contraventions of the Iraqi rules designed to ensure safe and unhampered navigation in the River.

Had Iraq really breached the Treaty, Iran would have been acting more in accordance with the rules of international law if, instead the abrupt attempt to denounce the Treaty altogether, it had pointed out the breach to the government of Iraq. If the Government of Iraq then rejected the claim, the dispute would become then an international one which should be resolved by peaceful means and through bilateral negotiations. Article 57 of the Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties,

(20) Ramazani, Ibid, p.309

prepared by the International Law Commission and approved unanimously at the United Nations Conferences on the Law of Treaties in 1968 and 1969, in both of which Iran was represented, states the following:

"Suspension of the operation of a treaty under its provisions or by consent of the parties

The operation of a treaty in regard to all the parties or to a particular party may be suspended:

- (a) in conformity with the provisions of the treaty;
- or (b) at any time by consent of all the parties after consultation with the other contracting States".(21)

It has to be remembered in this connection that Iran's invocation of the theory of rebus sic stantibus can hardly be justified in the regard to the Treaty of 1937. This Treaty is a boundary Treaty and, in accordance with the recognized rules of international law, boundary treaties are considered final upon their conclusion, and boundaries cannot change as a result of alleged change of circumstances. Furthermore, the application of this theory in this case would basically negate the principle of pacta sunt servanda, and the principle of free consent which are generally considered the fundamental bases of international law. In this connection we give hereunder the text of Article 62 of the Draft Convention of the Law of Treaties referred to above:

"Fundamental change of circumstances

1. A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with regard to those existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty, and which was not foreseen by the parties, may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from the treaty unless:

a) the existence of those circumstances constituted an essential basis of the consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty; and

b) the effect of the change is radically to transform the extent of obligations still to be performed under the treaty.

2. A fundamental change of circumstances may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty:

a) if the treaty establishes a boundary; or

(21) A/CONF.39/27, p.26

b) if the fundamental change is the result of a breach by the party invoking it either of an obligation under the treaty or of any other international obligation owed to any other party to the treaty.

3. If, under the foregoing paragraph, a party may invoke a fundamental change of circumstances as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty it may also invoke the change as a ground for suspending the operation of the treaty."(22)

3. Iran's third allegation is that Shatt-al-Arab is a boundary River and accordingly should be under the joint sovereignty of both Iraq and Iran. This allegation has no basis in fact or history, as the various international documents cited above from the Erzurum Treaty of 1847 to the Boundary Treaty of 1937 never considered Shatt-al-Arab except as a national River of Iraq, an inseparable part of the Iraqi territory, and subject to the exclusive Iraqi sovereign jurisdiction.

It is noteworthy, in this connection, to state here that there is no binding general principle in International Law for the delimitation of riparian boundaries, except what the parties concerned agree to adopt. Either the thalweg or the median line may be adopted as the mark for riparian boundaries, or, alternatively, the whole River may be agreed to belong to one country in which case the bank of the other country becomes the boundary line. This last method was generally adopted in the demarkation of Iraqi-Iranian boundaries in Shatt-al-Arab. The two parties have accepted that arrangement in deference to time-honoured rights, and solemnly entered into binding agreements endorsing these principles, such as the Erzurum Treaty of 1847 and the Constantinople Protocol of 1913, as well as the Proceedings of the Boundary Commission for the year 1914 and lastly the Iraqi-Iranian Treaty of 1937. This method of demarkation of riparian boundaries is not a novelty as many riparian boundaries the world over have been similarly demarkated.

VIII. CONCLUSIONS

This brief survey of the Iraqi-Iranian frontier question indicates that the problem is old, complicated and a cause of friction both between the Ottoman Empire and Persia and between present-day Iraq and Iran. The many agreements, protocols, treaties and boundary proceedings relative to this issue have not put an end to the problem, largely because of the absence of goodwill on the part of Iran. In fact, these international instruments have served only as palliative agents to prevent the situation from exploding. A few years after the conclusion of each one of

these instruments, new claims would arise on the part of Iran.

Iran's failure to honour its treaty obligations is evident throughout the history of the frontier issue, particularly in recent times. This failure was usually coupled with territorial claims.

Prior to 1847 the left bank of Shatt-al-Arab was under the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire and the port of Muhammarah was established on Ottoman soil. In accordance with the Treaty of Erzerum in 1847, the Ottoman Empire relinquished its sovereignty over Muhammarah, and the Persian borders were moved westward to the left bank of Shatt-al-Arab. Further claims were put forward by Iran, and the Protocol of 1913 met some of them whereby the medium filum aquae was recognized opposite Muhammarah as the border line, and a few islands in Shatt-al-Arab were relinquished to Persia. The additional Iranian claims in the early nineteen thirties prompted Iraq to submit a complaint to the League of Nations, seeking the moral support of the community of nations to curb Iran's desire for territorial aggrandizement. The League's Council urged Iran to enter into negotiations with Iraq, with a view to arriving at a negotiated settlement. Finally, the two parties entered into negotiations, which resulted in the conclusion of the 1937 Boundary Treaty. Under this Treaty Iran made further gains by extending her sovereignty over the section of Shatt-al-Arab opposite Abadan to the Thalweg and some other gains relative to navigation and maintenance of the River.

The gains acquired during the last century have encouraged Iran to put forward more claims with a view to pushing her border westward at her neighbour's expense. Consequently, it is not in Iran's interest to settle the frontier issue once and for all. Firstly, the prospect of territorial gains is always there. Secondly, by keeping the frontier issue alive, it can be manipulated at will whenever the internal situation may require the attention of Iranians to be diverted to artificial external problems.

In the face of all provocations by Iran, however, the government of Iraq categorically rejects any claim of joint sovereignty on Shatt-al-Arab, which is a national River of Iraq. The government of Iraq refuses absolutely to cede any part of its national territory or its national waters.

The government of Iraq, in spite of Iran's allegations, remains motivated by the best of intentions towards Iran and the Iranian people. It reaffirms its willingness to abide by the rules of international law, the principles of

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the United Nations Charter and the provisions of its Boundary Treaty with Iran. In demonstration of its good faith, the government of Iraq declares its willingness and preparedness to refer all disputes concerning the application of the Iraqi-Iranian Boundary Treaty of 1937 to the International Court of Justice and to abide by the Court's decision thereon.

What remains now is that the government of Iran should honour its international obligations and demonstrate its good faith in a similarly convincing manner.

Annex I

Treaty of Erzerum of May 31, 1847

Article 1

The two Mussulman Powers waive the totality of their existing pecuniary claims on one another, provided always that nothing in this arrangement shall affect the provisions made for the settlement of the claims to which Article 4 relates.

Article 2

The Persian Government undertakes to cede to the Ottoman Government all the lowlands -- that is to say, the land in the western part of the province of Zohab; and the Ottoman Government undertakes to cede to the Persian Government the eastern -- that is to say, all the mountainous -- part of the said province, including the Kirind Valley.

The Persian Government abandons all claim to the city and province of Suleimani and formally undertakes not to interfere with or infringe the sovereign rights of the Ottoman Government over the said province.

The Ottoman Government formally recognises the unrestricted sovereignty of the Persian Government over the city and port of Muhammara, the island of Khizr, the Abadan anchorage, and the land on the eastern bank -- that is to say, the left bank -- of the Shatt al-Arab, which are in the possession of tribes recognized as belonging to Persia. Further, Persian vessels shall have the right to navigate freely without let or hindrance on the Shatt al-Arab from the mouth of the same to the point of contact of the frontiers of the two Parties.

Article 3

The two Contracting Parties, having by the present Treaty waived their other territorial claims, undertake forthwith to appoint commissioners and engineers as their respective representatives for the purpose of determining the frontiers between the two States in conformity with the preceding article.

Article 4

Both Parties are agreed as to the appointment forthwith, by both Parties, of commissioners for the purpose of adjudicating and making a fair settlement in

all cases of damage suffered by either Party since the acceptance of the friendly proposals drawn up and communicated by the two Mediating Great Powers in the month of Jemaziyyu-' 1-evvel, 1261, together with all questions of pasturage dues since the year in which the arrears in the payment of the latter began.

Article 5

The Ottoman Government undertakes that the fugitive Persian Princes shall reside at Brussa, and shall not be permitted to leave that place or maintain secret relations with Persia. The two High Contracting Powers further undertake that all the other refugees shall be handed over in conformity with the earlier Treaty of Erzerum.

Article 6

Persian merchants shall pay the Customs dues on their goods, in kind or in cash, according to the current present value of such goods, in the manner specified in the article relating to trade in the Treaty of Erzeum concluded in 1823. No additional charge whatsoever shall be levied over and above the amounts fixed in the said Treaty.

Article 7

The Ottoman Government undertakes to accord the requisite privileges to enable Persian pilgrims, in accordance with the former treaties, to visit the Holy Places in the Ottoman dominions in complete safety and without vexatious treatment of any kind. Further, the Ottoman Government, being desirous of strengthening and consolidating the bonds of friendship and concord which should subsist between the two Mussulman Powers and between their respective subjects, undertakes to adopt such measures as may be most appropriate to ensure the participation, not only of Persian pilgrims, but of all other Persian subjects, in all the said privileges in the Ottoman dominions, in such manner as to protect them from any sort of injustice, molestation, or incivility, whether in respect of their commercial activities or in any other respect.

Furthermore, the Ottoman Government undertakes to recognize Consuls to be appointed by the Persian Government in places in the Ottoman dominions where their presence may be required on account of commercial interests, or for the protection of Persian merchants and other Persian subjects, save only in Mecca the Revered

and Medina the Resplendent, and to respect in the case of the said Consuls all the privileges due in virtue of their official character and accorded to Consuls of other friendly Powers.

The Persian Government, for its part, undertakes to accord reciprocity of treatment in every respect to Consuls to be appointed by the Ottoman Government in places in Persia in which the latter may consider the appointment of Consuls to be necessary, as also to Ottoman merchants and other Ottoman subjects visiting Persia.

Article 8

The two High Contracting Mussulman Powers undertake to adopt and enforce the measures necessary to prevent and punish theft and brigandage on the part of the tribes and peoples settled on the frontier, to which end they will quarter troops in suitable localities. They further undertake to do their duty in respect of all forms of aggressive acts, such as pillage, robbery, or murder, which may occur in their respective territories.

Contested tribes the suzerainty over which is not known shall be left free by the two High Contracting Powers to choose once for all and specify the localities which they will henceforward always inhabit. Tribes the suzerainty over which is known shall be compelled to come within the territory of the State to which they belong.

Article 9

All points or articles of previous treaties, and especially of the Treaty concluded at Erzerum in 1823, which are not specifically amended or annulled by the present Treaty, are hereby reaffirmed in respect of any and all of their provisions, as if they were reproduced in their entirety in the present Treaty.

The two High Contracting Powers agree that, when the texts of this Treaty have been exchanged, they will accept and sign the same, and that the ratifications thereof shall be exchanged, they will accept and sign the same, and that the ratifications thereof shall be exchanged within the space of two months, or earlier.

Annex II

Tehran Protocol of December 21, 1911

The Persian and Ottoman Governments, inspired by a common desire to avoid henceforward any subject of controversy in respect of their common frontiers, having instructed the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Turkish Ambassador at Tehran, respectively, to establish the bases of negotiations and the procedure to be followed for the delimitation of the said frontiers, the undersigned, after discussion, have agreed on the following points:

I. A commission consisting of an equal number of delegates of either Party shall meet as early as possible at Constantinople.

II. The delegates of the two Governments, furnished with all the documents and evidence in support of their claims, shall be instructed to establish the boundary-line separating the two countries in a spirit of sincere impartiality; after which, a technical commission shall have merely to apply the definite delimitation on the spot, on the basis laid down by the former commission.

III. The work of the Joint Commission, which will meet at Constantinople, shall be based on the clauses of the treaty known as the Treaty of Erzerum, concluded in 1847.

IV. Should the delegates of the two Parties fail to agree on the interpretation and application of certain clauses of that treaty, it is agreed that, at the end of a period of six months of negotiation, in order completely to settle the question of the delimitation of the frontiers, all the points on which any divergence exists shall be submitted together to the Hague Court of Arbitration, in order that the entire question may thus be definitely settled.

V. It is understood that neither of the two Parties may adduce the military occupation of the territories in dispute as a legal argument.

Done in duplicate and exchanged in original between the undersigned, acting on behalf of their Governments.

The Imperial Ottoman Embassy, Tehran, December 21, 1911.

(signed) Wossughed-Dowleh (signed) H. Hassib

Annex III

PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE DELIMITATION OF THE TURCO-PERSIAN BOUNDARY SIGNED AT CONSTANTINOPLE ON NOVEMBER 4, 1913.

The undersigned: His Excellency Sir Louis Mallet, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of His Britannic Majesty to His Majesty the Sultan; His Excellency Mirza Mahmud Khan Kajar 'Ahd-i-Shamus Saltaneh, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Shah of Persia to His Majesty the Sultan; His Excellency M. Michel de Giers, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia to His Majesty the Sultan; His Highness Prince Said Halim Pasha, Grand Vizier and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Ottoman Empire; have met for the purpose of recording in the present Protocol the Agreement concluded between their respective Governments with regard to the Turco-Persian boundary.

They began by recapitulating the progress, up to date, of the negotiations recently instituted among them.

The Joint Commission provided for in Article 1 of the Protocol signed at Tehran between the Imperial Ottoman Embassy and the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs with a view to determining the bases for the negotiations relating to the delimitation of the Turco-Persian boundary held eighteen meetings, the first on March 12, and the last on August 9, 1912.

On August 9, 1912, the Imperial Russian Embassy at Constantinople addressed to the Sublime Porte, under No. 264, a note stating that "the Imperial Government considers that too much emphasis cannot be laid on the necessity of putting into effect without delay the explicit stipulations of the Treaty of Erzerum, which are tantamount to the restoration of the status quo of 1848".

The Imperial Embassy at the same time forwarded to the Imperial Ottoman Government a memorandum showing in detail the frontier-line in conformity with the stipulations of the treaties in force.

The Imperial Ottoman Government replied to this communication by a note dated March 18, 1913, No. 30469/47. It stated that "the Sublime Porte, being anxious to comply with the desire expressed by the Imperial Russian Government by eliminating any cause of difference in its cordial relations with the latter, and wishing, further, to demonstrate to the Persian Government its entire good faith in regard to the dispute existing on the subject between the two countries, has decided to accept the line mentioned in the aforesaid note and memorandum of the

Ambassador of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia for the delimitation of the northern part of the Turco-Persian frontier from Serdar Bulak to Bane -- that is to say, down to the 36th parallel of latitude."

Nevertheless, the Imperial Ottoman Government suggested a number of modifications in the line proposed in the memorandum annexed to the note of the Imperial Russian Embassy dated August 9, 1912, No. 264.

The Imperial Ottoman Government also appended to its note "an Explanatory note on the situation of the Zohab boundaries and the arrangement that it would be able to accept in order to reach a final and equitable understanding with the Persian Government on that part of the frontier."

The Imperial Russian Embassy replied by a note dated March 28, 1913, No. 78. It noted the statement "by which the Imperial Ottoman Government recognises as a principle for the delimitation of the Ararat-Bane section the exact sense of Article 3 of the Treaty of 1848, known as the Treaty of Erzerum, as set forth in the note of August 9, 1912, No. 264." As regards the modifications proposed by the Sublime Porte, the Imperial Embassy stated (with a reservation on the question of Egrî-chai) that it could not sufficiently emphasise the necessity of making no change in the line established in its note of August 9, 1912.

As regards the question of Zohab, the Imperial Russian Embassy, while reserving the right to submit its detailed observations concerning that frontier, expressed "its opinion on the whole of the Ottoman draft, which does not seem to it to guarantee sufficiently, for the future, the maintenance of order and peace on the frontiers."

On April 20, 1913, the Russian and British Embassies addressed an identical note to His Highness Prince Said Halim Pasha, accompanied by a memorandum summarising their point of view regarding the delimitation of Zohab and the regions situated south of that district.

This exchange of notes was followed by conversations between Their Excellencies M. de Giers and Sir Gerard Lowther, on the one part, and His Late Highness Mahmud Shefket Pasha, for the other part. The result of these conversations was recorded in an aide-memoire presented by His Excellency the Russian Ambassador to His Highness the Grand Vizier on June 6, 1913, and in

the note from the Sublime Porte addressed on June 26, 1913 No. 34553/95, to the Russian Embassy, and on July 12, 1913, to the British Embassy.

On July 29, 1913, a "declaration" was signed in London by Sir Edward Grey and His Highness Ibrahim Hakky Pasha concerning the demarcation of the southern boundary between Persia and Turkey.

The Imperial Russian Embassy then proceeded to recapitulate the principles of delimitation established in the correspondence concerning the Turco-Persian boundary. It addressed to the Sublime Porte a note dated August 5, 1913, No. 166. An identical note was addressed to the Sublime Porte by the British Embassy on the same date.

The Sublime Porte replied to these communications by identical notes dated September 23, 1913, No. 37063/113.

As a result of the subsequent negotiations, the four plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, Persia, Russia, and Turkey, agreed on the following provisions:

I

It is agreed that the boundary between Persia and Turkey shall be defined as follows:

The boundary in the north shall start from boundary-mark No. XXXVII on the Turco-Russian frontier, situate close to Serdar Bulak, on the crest between Little and Great Ararat. It shall then drop southwards by way of the ridges, leaving on the Persian side the valley of Dambat, Sarnvtch, and the water system of Yarym-Kaya, which rises to the south of Mount Ayubeg. The boundary shall then leave Bulak-bashi, in Persia, and shall continue to follow the highest ridge, the southern extremity of which is situate at about 44°22' longitude and 39°28' latitude. Then, skirting the west side of the marsh which extends to the west of Yarym-Kaya, the boundary shall cross the Sary-Su stream, pass between the villages of Girde-baran (Turkish) and Bazyrgan (Persian), and, ascending to the ridge to the west of Bazyrgan, follow the watershed formed by the Səranlı, Zenduli, Gir-Kelime, Kanly-baba, Geduki-Khasineh, and Deveji ridges.

After Deveji, the line shall cross the valley of Egrichai at the place to be designated by the Delimitation Commission in conformity with the status quo, leaving the villages of Nado and Nifto in Persia.

The ownership of the village of Kyzyl-Kaya (Bellasor) shall be established after an examination of the geographical situation of the village, the western side of the watershed in that region being allocated to Turkey, and the eastern side to Persia.

Should the final boundary line leave outside Ottoman territory a section of the road which passes close to Kyzyl-Kaya and connects the district of Bayazid with the province of Van, it is understood that the Persian Government shall give free passage over this section of the road to the Imperial Ottoman Posts and to travellers and goods, other than military troops and convoys.

The frontier shall then ascend to the ridges forming the watershed: Kyzyl-Ziaret, Sarychimene, Dumnalu, Kara-burga, the hill between the reservoirs of Ayry-chai (Persian) and of Jelli-Gol (Turkish), Avdal-dashi, Reshkan, the hill between Akhurek and Tavra Bevra-begzadan, Gevri-Mahine, Khydyr-baba, Avristan.

As regards Kotur, the Protocol of July 15, 1880, known as the Protocol of Sary-Kamiche, shall be applied in such a way that the village of Kevlik shall remain in Turkey, and the villages of Bilejik, Razi, Gharatil (Haratil), the two Jelliks, and Panamerik, shall remain in Persia.

The frontier following the Mir-Omar ridge shall ascend the mountain of Surava, and, leaving Khanyga on the Turkish side shall pass by way of the watershed formed by the pass of Borush-Khuran, the mountain of Hravil, Beleko, Shinetal, Sardul, Gulambi, Kepper, Bergabend, Peri-Khan, Iskander, Avene, and Kotul. The valley of Bajirga shall remain in Turkey, and the villages of Sartyk and Sero in Persia, and the frontier shall pass from the southern extremity of Kotur over the ridge rising to the west of the Persian village of Behik, and, following the peaks of Seri-Baydost, shall join the crest of Mount Zont.

From Mount Zont the frontier shall follow continuously the watershed between the Persian districts of Tergever, Desht, and Mergever, and the Turkish sanjak of Hakkari -- that is to say, the crests of Shiveh-Shishali, Chil-Chovri, Chel-Berdir, Kuna-Koter, Kazi-beg, Avukh, Mai-Helneh, the mountains to the west of Binar and Delamper; then, leaving on the Persian side the basin emptying by way of Ushnu into the lake of Urumiya, including the sources of the Gadyr river known as Abi-seri-gadyr (the valley of which is situate to the south

of Delamper and to the east of Mount Girdeh), it shall reach the pass of Keleh-Shin.

To the south of Keleh-Shin the frontier shall leave on the Persian side the reservoir of Lavene, including the valley of Chumi-Geli (situate to the east of Zerdegel and to the south-west of Spi-rez), and on the Turkish side the waters of Revnaduz, and shall pass by the following peaks and passes: Siah-Kuh, Zerdegel, Boz, Barzin, Ser-shiva, Kevi-Khoja-Ibrahim. Thence the frontier shall continue to follow towards the south the main chain of Kandil, leaving on the Persian side the basins of the affluents of Kialu on the right side: the streams Purdanan Khydyrava and Talkhatan.

It is understood that the Turkish tribes which are in the habit of spending the summer in the said valleys at the Gadyr and Lavene springs shall still have the use of their pastures under the same conditions as in the past.

Having reached the summit of Seri-Kele-Kelin, the line shall pass over Zinvi-Jasusan and the pass of Bamin, and shall cross the Vezne river near the Purde-Berdan bridge. The Delimitation Commission will have to decide as to the future of the village of Shenieh, on the basis of the general principle of the status quo.

After Purde-Berdan, the frontier shall ascend over the chains of Foka-baba-kyr, Berde-spian, Berde-Abul-Fath and the pass of Kanireh. It shall then follow the watershed formed by Lagav-Ghird, Donleri, the pass of Khan-Ahmed, and the southern extremity of Tepe-Salos. The Frontier will thus pass between the villages of Kandol (Turkish) and Kesh-keshiva and Mazynava (Persian), and reach the course of the Kialu river (the Little Zab).

After joining the course of the Kialu river, the frontier shall follow it upstream, leaving the Persian side the right bank (the Alani-ajem) and on the Turkish side the left bank of that river. Kialu on the left side), the frontier shall follow the course of that river upstream, leaving on the Persian side the villages of Alot, Kivero, etc., and on the Turkish side the district of Alani-Mavont. At the south-western extremity of Mount Balu, the frontier shall leave the course of the Khileh-resh river, and, ascending over the north-west extremity of the Surkey chain, extending to the south of the Khileh-resh river, shall pass over the Surkew ridge, leaving the districts of Siwel and Shive-Kel on the Turkish side.

On reaching the astronomical point of Surkew almost at latitude $35^{\circ}49'$, the frontier shall pass in the direction of the village of Champar-aw, the future of which shall be decided by the Delimitation Commission on the basis of the accepted principle of the status quo. The line shall then ascend over the chain of mountains which form the frontier between the Persian district of Baneh and the Turkish district of Kyzyieja; Galash, Berdi-Kechel, Pusht-Hangajal, Du-bera, Parajal, and Spi-Kana, after which it shall reach the pass of Now-Khuvan. Thence, still following the watershed, the frontier shall turn southwards and then westwards, passing by way of the summits of Vul-Guza, Pushti-Shehidan, Hazar-Mal, Bali-Keder, Keleh-Malik, and Kuhl-Koce-resha, separating the Turkish district of Teretul from the Persian district of Merivan.

From there, the frontier shall follow the course of the Khalil-Abad brook downstream as far as its confluence with the Chami-Kyzylja, and then this last-named river upstream as far as the mouth of its left affluent flowing from the village of Bnava-Suta; it shall follow this Bnava-Suta brook upstream and, by way of the passes of Keli-Naveh-Sar and Keli-Piran, shall reach the pass of Surene, known, it appears, by the name of Chigan (or Chakan).

The main chain of Avroman, extending in the direction north-west-south-east, shall then form the frontier between Persia and the Ottoman district of Shehrisor. On reaching the peak of Kemadjar (south-east of Kala-Selm and north-west of Sheri-Avroman), the frontier shall continue to follow the main ridge as far as its ramification on the western side, rising to the north of the valley of Dere-Vuli, leaving the villages of Khan-Germela and Nowsud on the Persian side. For the remainder of the frontier as far as Sirvan, the Commission shall - by way of exception - delimit the ground, taking into consideration such changes as may have occurred there between the year 1848 and the year 1905.

South of Sirvan, the frontier shall begin close to the mouth of the Cham-Zimkan, shall pass by way of the Beyzel (Bezel) mountain, and shall descend to the Chami-Zerishk watercourse. Next, following the watershed between this last-named watercourse and the river which, rising in the Bend-Bemo, bears, according to the identical map, the name of Pushti-Gherav (Arkhevendu), it shall ascend to the summit of Bend-Bemo.

After following the ridge of Bamu (Bemo), the

frontier on reaching the defile of Derbendi-Dehul (Derbendi-Hur), shall follow the course of the Zengeneh (Abbasan) river as far as the point nearest to the summit of Shevaldir (astronomical point) and situated below the village of Mamyshah. It shall ascend this summit and shall next pass by way of the crests of the hills forming a watershed between the plains of Tileku and Serkaleh, then by way of the chains of Khuli-Baghan, Jebel-Ali-Beg, Bender-Chok-Chermik, Sengler, and Asengueran, as far as the point on the Tengi-Hammam defile situated opposite the northern extremity of the Karawiz mountains.

Thence the frontier shall follow the course of the river Kuretu as far as the village of that name. The future of the village of Kuretu shall be decided by the Delimitation Commission on the basis of the nationality of its inhabitants. Thence the frontier shall pass by way of the road between the villages of Kuretu and Kush-Kurrek, then along the crests of Mounts Kishka and Ak-Dag, and then leaving Kala-Sebzi, in Persia, it shall turn southwards as far as the Ottoman post of Kanibez. Thence it shall follow the course of the Elvend river upstream as far as the point a quarter of an hour's distance downstream from its confluence with the Gilan watercourse; from that point it shall continue as far as the Naft-Su, skirting the Ab-Bakhshan in accordance with the line agreed upon with the late Mahmud Shefket Pasha and shown roughly on the map annexed to the note of the Imperial Russian Embassy dated August 5, 1913, and leaving Naft-Mukataasy to Turkey. Thence, the frontier-line, following the Naft-Deressi, on reaching the point where the Kassri-Shirin road cuts that waterway, shall continue along the mountains of Varbulend, Konerigh-Keleshuvan, and Jebel-Gerebi (the extension of the Jebeli-Hamrinach in).

The Delimitation Commission shall draw up a special agreement for the distribution of the Gengir (Sumar) waters between the parties concerned.

The part of the frontier between Mendeli and the northern point of the line indicated in the declaration made in London on July 29 (Shuaib) between Hakky Pasha and Sir E. Grey not having yet been discussed in detail, the under-signed leave the establishment of that part of the frontier to the Delimitation Commission.

As regards delimitation from the region of Hawizeh as far as the sea, the frontier-line shall start from the place called Um Sheer, where the Khor-el-Duvel divides from the Khor-el-Azem. Um-Sheer is

situate east of the junction of the Khor-el-Muhaisin with the Khor-el-Azem, nine miles north-west of Bisaitin, a place situate at latitude $31^{\circ}43'29''$. From Um-Sheer, the line shall turn south-westwards as far as longitude $47^{\circ}45'$, at the southern extremity of a small lake known also by the name of Azem and situate in the Khor-el-Azem some distance north-west of Shuaib. From this point the line shall continue to the south along the marsh as far as latitude 31° , which it shall follow directly eastwards as far as a point north-east of Kushki-i-Basra, so as to leave this place in Ottoman territory. From this point the line shall go southwards as far as the Khalian canal at a point between the Nahr-Diaiji and the Nahr-Abu'l-Arabid; it shall follow the medium filum aquae of the Khaiyin canal as far as the point where the latter joins the Shatt-al-Arab, at the mouth of the Nahr-Nazailah. From this point the frontier shall follow the course of the Shatt al-Arab as far as the sea, leaving under Ottoman sovereignty the river and all the islands therein, subject to the following conditions and exceptions:

(a) The following shall belong to Persia: (1) the island of Muhalla and the two islands situate between the latter and the left bank of the Shatt al-Arab (Persian bank of Abadan); (2) the four islands between Shetait and Maawiyeh and the two islands opposite Mankuhi which are both dependencies of the island of Abadan; (3) any small islands now existing or that may be formed which are connected at low water with the island of Abadan or with Persian terra firma below Nahr Nazailah.

(b) The modern port and anchorage of Muhammara, above and below the junction of the river Karun with the Shatt al-Arab, shall remain within Persian jurisdiction in conformity with the Treaty of Erzerum; the Ottoman right of usage of this part of the river shall not, however, be affected thereby, nor shall Persian jurisdiction extend to the parts of the river outside the anchorage.

(c) No change shall be made in the existing rights, usages and customs as regards fishing on the Persian bank of the Shatt al-Arab, the word "bank" including also the lands connected with the coast at low water.

(d) Ottoman jurisdiction shall not extend over the parts of the Persian coast that may be temporarily covered by water at high tide or by other accidental causes. Persian jurisdiction, on its side, shall not be exercised over lands that may be temporarily or accidentally uncovered when the water is below the normal low-water level.

(e) The Sheik of Mohammara shall continue to enjoy in conformity with the Ottoman laws his rights of ownership in Ottoman territory.

The frontier-line established in this declaration is shown in red on the map annexed hereto.

The parts of the frontier not detailed in the above-mentioned frontier-line shall be established on the basis of the principle of the status quo, in conformity with the stipulations of Article 3 of the Treaty of Erzerum.

II

The frontier-line shall be delimited on the spot by a Delimitation Commission, consisting of commissioners of the four Governments.

Each Government shall be represented on this Commission by a commissioner and a deputy commissioner. The latter shall take the commissioner's place on the Commission in case of need.

The Delimitation Commission, in the performance of the task devolving upon it, shall comply:

- (1) With the provisions of the present Protocol;
- (2) With the Rules of Procedure of the Delimitation Commission annexed (Annex (A)) to the present Protocol.

IV

In the event of a divergence of opinion in the Commission as to the boundary-line of any part of the frontier, the Ottoman and Persian commissioners shall submit a written statement of their respective points of view within forty-eight hours to the Russian and British commissioners, who shall hold a private meeting and shall give a decision on the questions in dispute and communicate their decision to their Ottoman and Persian colleagues. This decision shall be inserted in the Minutes of the plenary meeting and shall be recognised as binding on all four Governments.

V

As soon as part of the frontier has been delimited, such part shall be regarded as finally fixed and shall not be liable to subsequent examination or revision.

VI

As the work of delimitation proceeds, the Ottoman and Persian Governments shall have the right to establish posts on the frontier.

VII

It is understood that the concession granted by the Convention of May 28, 1901 by the Government of His Imperial Majesty the Shah of Persia to William Knox D'Arcy and now being worked, in conformity with the provisions of Article 9 of the said Convention, by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (Limited), having its registered office at Winchester House, London (the said Convention being referred to hereunder as "the Convention" in the Annex (B) to the present Protocol, shall remain in full and unrestricted force throughout the territories transferred by Persia to Turkey in virtue of the provisions of the present Protocol and of Annex (B) thereto.

VIII

The Ottoman and Persian Governments will distribute among the officials on the frontier a sufficient number of copies of the delimitation map drawn up by the Commission, together with copies of translations of the statement provided for in Article XV of the Commission's Rules of Procedure. It is understood, however, that the French text alone shall be regarded as authentic.

(signed) Louis Mallet, Ehtechamos-Saltaneh Mahmud,
Michel de Giers, Said Halim

Rules of Procedure of the Delimitation Commission

The four commissioners shall enjoy exactly the same rights and the same prerogatives, whatever their personal rank may be.

The commissioners shall act in rotation as Chairman at meetings of the Commission.

The same principle of perfect equality shall apply both to the relations inter se of the deputy commissioners and to the relations of the other members of the Commissions performing similar functions.

II

The original identic map communicated in 1869-70 to the Ottoman and Persian Governments shall serve as a topographical basis for the delimitation.

III

In case of sickness or for any other reason, any commissioner may be represented on the Commission by his deputy. In such cases, the deputy shall enjoy all the rights of the commissioner whom he represents.

IV

The official language of the Commission shall be French.

V

The Commission shall meet once a week, or oftener in case of need, to take note of the work of delimitation carried out on the spot.

Minutes shall be kept of every meeting. Such Minutes shall be read at the beginning of the following meeting and, after having been duly approved by the commissioners, shall be signed by them. These Minutes shall contain a detailed description of each boundary-mark and of the frontier.

The frontier line, as and wher. it is finally delimited, shall be marked on the identic map, which shall be initialled by each commissioner.

VI

The Commission shall make the necessary arrangements for the work of the secretariat, which shall be

responsible for the drafting of the Minutes and for any other work that the Commission may think fit to entrust to it. The members of the secretariat shall be present at the meetings of the Commission.

VII

Copies of the Minutes shall be communicated in due course by the commissioners to their respective Governments.

VIII

The nature of the boundary-marks to be set up shall be decided by the Commission; the cost of their erection shall be divided equally between the Ottoman and Persian Governments. The costs of construction shall be approximately fixed for each stage by the Commission; the sum indicated shall then be paid over, half being paid by the Ottoman and half by the Persian commissioner, and shall be expended under the supervision of the Sub-Commission provided for in Article IX. The Commission shall keep accounts with a view to the final allocation of the costs between the two Governments.

IX

As the position of the boundary-marks is finally fixed, the Commission shall appoint a Sub-Commission to supervise their erection. This Sub-Commission shall be composed of not less than two members selected either from among the commissioners or from among members of the staff. The Sub-Commission shall submit to the Commission a detailed account of its work at the earliest possible date.

This report shall be inserted in the Minutes of the Commission.

The Sub-Commission may be appointed in a permanent capacity.

X

In case of need, other special Sub-Commissions may be appointed by the Commission under the above-mentioned conditions, subject to the approval of their work by the four commissioners in plenary session.

XI

Should the commissioners consider it desirable to reinforce their personal escorts, the Ottoman or

Persian commissioner, as the case may be, shall be responsible for making the necessary representations to the local authorities.

Each commissioner, with his personal escort, shall have the right to cross the frontier without restriction.

XII

The Commission shall decide on its movements by joint agreement. Each commissioner may, however, choose the site for his own camp, on condition that he shall fall in as far as possible with the movements of the Commission.

XIII

The Commission shall have the right to adjourn the delimitation of a part of the frontier temporarily for climatic or other reasons. Decisions to this effect shall be taken by a majority vote.

XIV

As soon as possible after the final completion of the work of the Commission, copies of the map mentioned in Article II, signed by all the commissioners, shall be prepared and distributed as follows: to each of the Governments represented on the Commission, one copy; to the Turkish Embassy and to the Russian and British Ministers at Teheran, one copy each; to the Ambassadors of Great Britain, Persia and Russia at Constantinople, one copy each.

XV

When supplying the above-mentioned frontier map to the four Powers, the commissioners shall submit at the same time a statement giving a detailed description of the frontier; this description shall follow textually that of the Minutes of the Commission and shall bear the signatures of the four commissioners.

(signed) Louis Mallet
Ehtechamos-Saltaneh
Mahmud
Michel de Giers
Said Halim

Annex IV

BOUNDARY TREATY BETWEEN THE KINGDOM OF IRAQ AND THE
EMPIRE OF IRAN

Signed at Teheran, July 4, 1937

His Majesty the King of Iraq, of the one part,

and

His Imperial Majesty the Shainshah of Iran,
of the other part,

Sincerely desirous of strengthening the bonds of brotherly friendship and good understanding between the two States, and of settling definitively the question of the frontier between their two States, have decided to conclude the present Treaty and have to that end appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:

His Majesty the King of Iraq:

His Excellency Dr. Najî-Al-Asîl, Minister for
Foreign Affairs;

His Imperial Majesty the Shahinshah of Iran:

His Excellency Monsieur Enayatollah Samiy,
Minister for Foreign Affairs;

Who, having communicated their full powers,
found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

Article I

The High Contracting Parties are agreed that, subject to the amendment for which Article 2 of the Present Treaty provides, the following documents shall be deemed valid and binding, that is to say:

- (a) The Turco-Persian Delimitation Protocol signed at Constantinople, November 4th, 1913;
- (b) The Minutes of the meetings of the 1914 Frontier Delimitation Commission.

In virtue of the present Article, the frontier between the two States shall be as defined and traced by the Commission afore-said, save in so far as otherwise provided in Article 2 herein-after following.

Article 2

At the extreme point of the island of Shutait (being approximately latitude 30°17'25" North, longitude 48°19'28" East), the frontier shall run perpendicularly from low water mark to the thalweg of the Shatt al-Arab, and shall follow the same as far as a point opposite the present Jetty No. 1 at Abadan (being approximately latitude 30°20'8.4" North, longitude 48°16'13" East). From this point, it shall return to low water mark, and follow the frontier line indicated in the 1914 Minutes.

Article 3

Upon the signature of the present Treaty, the High Contracting Parties shall appoint forthwith a commission to erect frontier marks at the points determined by the commission to which Article 1, paragraph (b), of the present Treaty relates, and to erect such further marks as it shall deem desirable.

The composition of the commission and its programme of work shall be determined by special arrangement between the two High Contracting Parties.

Article 4

The provisions hereinafter following shall apply to the Shatt al-Arab from the point at which the land frontier of the two States enters the said river to the high seas:

(a) The Shatt al-Arab shall remain open on equal terms to the trading vessels of all countries. All dues levied shall be in the nature of payments for services rendered and shall be devoted exclusively to meeting in equitable manner the cost of upkeep, maintenance of navigability or improvement of the navigable channel and the approach to the Shatt al-Arab from the sea, or to expenditure incurred in the interests of navigation. The said dues shall be calculated on the basis of the official tonnage of vessels or their displacement or both.

(b) The Shatt al-Arab shall remain open for the passage of vessels of war and other vessels of the two High Contracting Parties not engaged in trade.

(c) The circumstance that the frontier in the

Shatt al-Arab sometimes follows the low water mark and sometimes the thalweg or medium filum aquae shall not in any way affect the two High Contracting Parties' right of user along the whole length of the river.

Article 5

The two High Contracting Parties, having a common interest in the navigation of the Shatt al-Arab as defined in Article 4 of the present Treaty, undertake to conclude a Convention for the maintenance and improvement of the navigable channel, and for dredging, pilotage, collection of dues, health measures, measures for preventing smuggling, and all other questions concerning navigation in the Shatt al-Arab as defined in Article 4 of the present Treaty.

Article 6

The present Treaty shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged at Baghdad as soon as possible. It shall come into force as from the date of such exchange.

In faith whereof the Plenipotentiaries of the two High Contracting parties have signed the present Treaty.

Done at Tehran, in the Arabic, Persian and French languages; in case of disagreement, the French text shall prevail.

This fourth day of July, one thousand nine hundred and thirty-seven.

NAJI AL ASIL

SAMIY

PROTOCOL

At the moment of signing the Frontier Treaty between Iraq and Iran, the two High Contracting Parties are agreed as follows:

I

The geographical co-ordinates designated approximately in Article 2 of the Treaty aforesaid shall be definitively determined by a commission of experts consisting of an equal number of members appointed by

each of the High Contracting Parties.

The geographical co-ordinates thus definitively determined within the limits fixed in the Article aforesaid shall be recorded in Minutes, the which, after signature by the members of the said commission, shall form an integral part of the Frontier Treaty.

UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY
COUNCIL



Distr.
GENERAL

S/9323/Corr.1
17 July 1969

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 11 JULY 1969 FROM THE ACTING PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF IRAQ ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Corrigendum

Annexes, page 13

Insert "Annex IV" before the title "BOUNDARY TREATY BETWEEN THE KINGDOM OF
IRAQ AND THE EMPIRE OF IRAN".

Annexes, page 21

Add the following paragraphs to the PROTOCOL:

II

The High Contracting Parties undertake to conclude the Convention to which
Article 5 of the Treaty relates within one year from the entry into force of the
Treaty.

In the event of the said Convention not being concluded within the year
despite their utmost efforts, the said time-limit may be extended by the High
Contracting Parties by common accord.

The Imperial Government of Iran agrees that, during the period of one year
to which the first paragraph of the present Article relates or the extension
(if any) of such period, the Royal Government of Iraq shall be responsible as
at present for all questions to be settled under the said Convention. The
Royal Government of Iraq shall notify the Imperial Government of Iran every six
months as to the works executed, dues collected, expenditure incurred or any
other measures undertaken.

III

Permission granted by either of the High Contracting Parties to a vessel of
war or other public service vessel not engaged in trade, belonging to a third

State, to enter its own harbours on the Shatt-al-Arab shall be deemed to have been granted by the other High Contracting Party in such sort that the vessels in question shall be entitled to use the waters of the latter for the purpose of navigating the Shatt-al-Arab.

The High Contracting Party granting such permission shall immediately notify the other High Contracting Party accordingly.

IV

It is clearly understood, without prejudice to the rights of Iran in respect of the Shatt-al-Arab, that nothing in this Treaty shall affect the rights of Iraq and the contractual obligations of the same vis-à-vis the British Government in respect of the Shatt-al-Arab under Article 4 of the Treaty of 30 June 1930, and paragraph 7 of the annex thereto signed on the same date.

V

The present Protocol shall be ratified at the same time as the Frontier Treaty, of which it shall form an annex and integral part. It shall come into force at the same time as the Treaty.

The present Protocol is drawn up in Arabic, Persian and French; in case of difference, the French text shall prevail.

Done at Tehran, in duplicate, the fourth day of July, one thousand nine hundred and thirty seven.

NAJI AL ASIL

SAMIY

EN CLAIR

PRIORITY TEHRAN TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TEL NO 51

23 JANUARY 1970

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ADDS TO FCO TEL NO 51 OF 23 JAN, RFI BAGHDAD, AMMAN, CAIRO, KUWAIT AND BEIRUT.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY NOTE HANDED TO THE IRAQI THIRD SECRETARY ON 22 JANUARY. BEGINS.

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 26 JAN 1970 NEP 3/324/1
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" ACCORDING TO A REPORT RECEIVED FROM THE IMPERIAL EMBASSY AT BAGHDAD, THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE IRAQI REPUBLIC SUBMITTED A NOTE AT 3 A.M. TODAY TO THE EMBASSY IN WHICH UNJUSTIFIED ACCUSATIONS WERE LEVELLED AGAINST THE AMBASSADOR, THE MILITARY ATTACHE, THE ASSISTANT MILITARY ATTACHE AND THE THIRD SECRETARY AND PRESS ATTACHE TO THE EMBASSY.

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THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT HAVE CLAIMED THAT THEY HAVE HAD INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF IRAQ HAVING DEMANDED THAT THEY SHOULD LEAVE IRAQ WITHIN 24 HOURS. THEY HAVE ALSO ANNOUNCED THAT THE IRANIAN CONSULATES IN BAGHDAD, KARBELA AND BASREH BE ALSO CLOSED AND ALL MEMBERS OF THEIR STAFF LEAVE IRAQ WITHIN 24 HOURS. THE IMPERIAL MFA EXPRESS THEIR REGRET FOR THIS UNEXPECTED STEP BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ AND STRONGLY DENY ALL THE UNJUSTIFIED ACCUSATIONS BROUGHT AGAINST THE OFFICIALS OF THE IMPERIAL IRANIAN EMBASSY WHICH ARE PURELY FOR THE CONCEALMENT OF THE TRUTH RELATED TO THE PRESENT CONDITIONS IN IRAQ RESORTING TO CALUMNY AND ACCUSATION AND CONSIDER THEM TO BE AGAINST THE PRINCIPLES OF NORMAL INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS TO WHICH THEY SERIOUSLY PROTEST.

THE MFA FURTHER STATE THAT THE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT ARE OBLIGED TO RULE RECIPROCALLY THAT (AMBASSADOR, MILITARY ATTACHE AND THREE ASSISTANT MILITARY ATTACHES) MUST LEAVE IRAN WITHIN 24 HOURS FROM THE DATE OF THE RECEIPT OF THIS NOTE"

MR. MURRAY

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RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 26 JAN 1970 Neg 3/324/1
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EN CLAIR
ROUTINE TEHRAN
TELEGRAM NO 54

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

24 JANUARY 1970

UNCLASSIFIED

ADDSD TO FCO TEL NO 54 OF 24 JAN, RFI BAGHDAD, AMMAN, CAIRO,
KUWAIT AND BEIRUT.

MY TEL NO 51: ⁽²⁾ IRANO-IRAQI RELATIONS.

PRESS COMMENT IN ENGLISH LANGUAGE AND VERNACULAR PAPERS SO FAR HAS CONCENTRATED ON REJECTING IRAQI ASSERTIONS OF IRANIAN COMPLICITY IN BAGHDAD PLOT, AND ON EMPHASIZING THAT THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT ARE USING THIS AS AN EXCUSE TO CARRY OUT INTERNAL PURGES OF A TYPICALLY VIOLENT NATURE. DISTINCTION IS MADE IN MOST EDITORIALS BETWEEN THE "BLOOD BA'ATH" GROUP OF EXTREMISTS AT THE TOP AND "OUR IRAQI BROTHERS" UNDERNEATH WHO SUFFER AT THEIR HANDS. NO HOPE OF AN IMPROVEMENT IS SEEN, UNLESS THE BA'ATH JUNTA FALL FROM POWER. THE TONE, WHERE NOT SELF-RIGHTEOUS, IS HEAVILY SARCASTIC.

MR. MURRAY

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26 JAN 1970

Cutting dated 19

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
26 JAN 1970

Iraq says Iran massing troops on southern border

BY OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT

BEIRUT, Jan. 25.

IRAQ has accused Iran of concentrating a large number of troops along Iraq's Southern border.

The charge was made yesterday by the Iraqi Information Minister, Mr. Hamid Jebouri, in a speech delivered at the opening session in Cairo of an Arab Information Ministers' meeting.

The Minister said Iran had originally massed troops near Iraq's border after Teheran's unilateral abrogation in April last year of the 33-year-old agreement with Iraq on Shatt Al Arab. These concentrations were increased after a reported attempt last Tuesday in Baghdad to overthrow the Baathist regime was foiled, the Minister said.

Three more Iraqis were executed yesterday, bringing to 44 the number of military men and civilians shot by firing squad or hanged since last Wednesday. The special court set up to try alleged plotters announced that it had completed all cases before it and that it was suspending its hearings until fugitives, still at large in connection with the plot, had been caught.

Minister Jebouri urged the Arab States to stand by Iraq in its present sharp conflict with Iran, and said United States intelligence

had turned Iran into a centre for plots, not only against Iraq, but against all the Arab States. Baghdad had officially accused Iran of supplying "plotters" with arms and funds.

The Iraqi Government is also upset over what it regarded as hostile publicity against Iraq in the British Press and by the BBC. The U.K. Ambassador was yesterday summoned to the Foreign Ministry in Baghdad and told that if "the campaign by British news media against Iraq" continued, this would have serious repercussions on relations between the two countries.

Kurdish move

[Reuter reports from Teheran: Iran has lodged a strong protest with Iraq over the alleged ill-treatment of the Iranian Chargé d'Affairs in Baghdad, the Majlis (Lower House of Parliament) was told to-day. The Chargé, Mr. Majid Mehran, is said to have been stopped by Iraqi security guards who were alleged to have searched him and his car.]

Meanwhile, the Baathist regime has taken the first step in reaching an agreement with insurgents in Northern Iraq to end the Kurdish war.

A decree issued last night by the Revolution Command Council, the highest executive authority, declared an amnesty for all those who participated in Kurdish insurrection. This would include Kurds who had served in the Iraqi army and police force before joining insurgents under Mulla Mustafa Barzani.

The RCC decree also declared that the Government would abide by the agreement reached with the Kurds in June, 1966.

This agreement provided for giving the Kurds the right of self-government in areas in Northern Iraq where they form the majority.

DELEGATIONS IN PARIS

PARIS, Jan. 25.

Two Iraqi delegations, one led by Industry Minister Khaled Maddi el Hashimi, arrived in Paris over the week-end for talks which will include the possible establishment of a truck factory in Iraq by Saviem, heavy duty vehicle subsidiary of Renault.

Some observers said that the Iraqi visits might rekindle opposition claims that France may try to sell Iraq modern weapons to win new trade contracts.

UPI

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Iran / Iran relation file
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Mr. [Signature]

D. I R A NRECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10

19 JAN 1970

~~NEG 3/324/1~~"Radio Iran Courier" on Tehran Propaganda"Radio Iran Courier" in Persian 15.30 GMT 14.1.70

Excerpts from broadcast:

Iranian papers reported a few days ago that a number of feudalists and big landlords who, thanks to the protection of the Shah's regime, were still looting the peasants, have been arrested on charges of collaboration with General Bakhtiar. Since the release of this report by the Security Organisation to the obedient newspapers, the doctored newspapers and radios attacked Bakhtiar, the Iraqi Ba'th Party and the Iraqi Government. Although the Shah promised not to engage in anti-Iraqi propaganda, his subservience to Yankee imperialism again led him to break his promise.

It would probably not have occurred to most Iranian newspaper editors to wage such a widespread anti-communist, anti-Tudeh campaign if the anti-communist experts in the Palace, on the advice of the US Information Service, had not thought of using the opportunity for anti-communist and anti-Tudeh propaganda.

What is the connection between the reported link between Bakhtiar and the feudalists on the one hand and the Tudeh Party and the world communists on the other? This is a pertinent question, because no rational person can possibly believe the drivel that the regime is at present concocting. Nobody with the slightest pang of conscience will take part in this vile campaign.

However, Palace hirelings and paid imperialist agents in the Palace have no use for reason or conscience. The regime's main propaganda weapon today is lies - grotesque and disgraceful lies.

The Shah's propagandists, who are trained puppets of the Yankee imperialists, are also inspired by their masters in this particular matter...

What else can be expected from Yankee imperialist agents in the circumstances? Why should they not exploit the situation for an anti-Tudeh and anti-communist smear campaign, particularly when the Shah is in dire need of imperialist support and is beside himself with trying to please the Yankee and West German imperialists? The Shah wants to prove the extent of his servitude to the Mecca of his high hopes - the White House...

That is why he issues orders for the names of the Tudeh Party, the Iraqi Communist Party and the German Communist Party to be added to the link between Bakhtiar and the feudalists. That is why the 'Tehran Journal', in a disgusting lie about Bakhtiar's so-called co-operation with the Tudeh Party, says that the Iraqi Communist Party expressed support for Bakhtiar. The paper adds that, since the defeat of his conspiracy with the feudalists, Bakhtiar has been trying to form a united front against Iran with the help of foreign elements, including the East German Communist Party and the Confederation of Iranian Students.

You see the extent of the Shah's propaganda ambitions? He wants to kill, not one, but several birds with one stone. Hence the collective attack on the Tudeh Party and the Iraqi and East German Communist Parties. The Tudeh Party and the Iraqi Communist Party have been brought in to make the Shah more popular in Washington's eyes. The East German Communist Party has been thrown in to please the West German militarists...

05.45 GMT (Text of press review) Baghdad radio, the armed forces radio, and Baghdad television last night carried part of the recording of the secret meeting which took place between Davud Taher, the Iranian Embassy Secretary in Baghdad; the criminals Maj. Ahmad Abdullah and Shalman Hasan; the Iranian Embassy translator who holds the rank of Attache, Abd al-Khaliq Abu Shahrizadh; and the zealous nationalist Iraqi leader, Lt-Col. Fadil an-Nahi. The meeting was held at 20.00 on Saturday, 23rd August 1969, to prepare the plot which was buried on the night of 20th January 1970.

The discussion at the meeting dealt with the transportation of arms and their distribution among the plotters; that is, the transport of arms across the border and the handing over to the plotters. The password, which both sides agreed to use on handing over the first shipment, was "Abu Muhammad sends greetings".

It was pointed out at the meeting that the first consignment, consisting of 1,000 machine-guns, would be transported across the border to Baghdad and that the rest would follow. Agreement was reached on how to get the weapons across the border and camouflage the means of transport. The Iranian Embassy Secretary, Taher, asked those at the meeting to provide an expert to test the transmitter to be used in this plot. He also asked them to prepare their own code to facilitate their contacts. Furthermore, he asked that the radio contacts should begin five days before the plot's zero hour so that all would be informed and ready to carry out their role.

The meeting also set a date for the plot and named the person to receive the first payment of the money, 50,000 dinars, to be spent on the plot. The Iranian Secretary demanded that the person to receive the first payment be completely reliable and also demanded that a receipt be provided for the money.

REPUBLIC OF
IRAQ



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27/

STATEMENT OF AN OFFICIAL IRAQI SPOKESMAN REGARDING THE
RECENT PLOT AGAINST THE SECURITY OF IRAQ

An official spokesman of the Government of Iraq declared today that the attempted coup was a reactionary and imperialistic plot led by reactionaries and enemies of the revolution. The elements involved are well known for their strong ties with imperialism, Zionism and oil monopolies.

The spokesman added that American Imperialism has employed its intelligence agencies and all the agencies of the Government of Iran to help the conspirators and give them all necessary material support. However, the alert revolutionary government was very well aware of the conspiracy, and moved in at the precise time when the conspirators were ready to implement their plot, and arrested all of them throughout Iraq.

The spokesman added that a special court was set up to try the conspirators. Those who were convicted were swiftly executed. The Court has acquitted the innocent. He also added that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has decided to close down all Iranian Consulates in Iraq after

the involvement of the Embassy of Iran with the conspirators had been confirmed. The Ministry has also declared the Ambassador of Iran, the Military Attache and his assistant, the Press Attache and the Third Secretary personae non grata and ordered them to leave the country. The Government of Iraq considers the interference of the Embassy of Iran in the internal affairs of Iraq contrary to diplomatic practice and has strongly protested this action.

The spokesman emphasized that the objectives of the conspirators were to overthrow the progressive revolutionary regime, to isolate Iraq from the mainstream of the Arab Revolution and liquidate the Palestine question in accordance with imperialistic designs. He also emphasized that the situation is calm and life is normal throughout the country.

23 January 1970

E. IRANIAN-IRAQI RELATIONS

Iranian Report on the Abdolkhaleq Bushehri Zadeh Case

Tehran home service in Persian 10.30 GMT 28.1.70

Text of Foreign Ministry press statement on 28th January (broadcast from a recording):

You, the gentlemen of the press, are familiar with the recent developments in Iraq, with that country's relations with Iran, and with that country's false accusations and claims concerning Iran's alleged interference in Iraq's internal affairs. During this meeting, which has been called at the request of you gentlemen of the press, I feel it necessary to inform you gentlemen about the disrespectful and undiplomatic behaviour of the Iraqi Government.

As you know, following the delivery of the Iraqi Foreign Ministry Note at 03.00 on 22nd January requesting the departure of HIM Ambassador and four members of the Embassy Staff from Baghdad, Iraqi agents searched the Ambassador's car and his luggage in a Baghdad street in front of the Embassy as he was preparing to leave. The Ambassador and his party were then detained at the airport in a locked room for four hours. After they boarded the aircraft, the Iraqi officials would not let it take off for half an hour.

The Iranian Charge d'Affaires' car, flying the Iranian flag, was stopped in the street leading to the Embassy when the Charge d'Affaires was returning from the airport after seeing the Ambassador off. The car was searched even though the Charge presented his diplomatic card. He was even prevented from going to the Embassy on foot.

Contrary to the international code of conduct, the Iraqi Embassy in Tehran also issued a statement containing unfounded accusations against its host country. The statement was also released to the press. At this meeting, which has been called at your own request, I will inform you of yet another Iraqi Government action which is contrary to the principles of the international code of conduct, diplomatic behaviour and the provisions of the 1961 Vienna Convention. You are of course aware that the Iranian Government has made public all the developments from the beginning.

As is its duty, the Iranian Foreign Ministry has delivered written protests to the Iraqi Government on all the necessary occasions. Another Iranian Foreign Ministry protest Note was delivered to the Iraqi Embassy in Tehran last night concerning the maltreatment of Bushehri Zadeh. The Note was also handed to the Iraqi Foreign Ministry by the Iranian Embassy in Baghdad. The text of the Note is as follows:

With compliments to the Embassy of the Iraqi Republic. HIM's Foreign Ministry respectfully states: The Iranian Embassy Attache in Baghdad, Abdolkhaleq Bushehri Zadeh, who arrived in Tehran today, has submitted a report on the disrespectful and undiplomatic treatment, and maltreatment, he received at the hands of Iraqi Government agents on 22nd January 1970. His report also describes his interrogation by the Vice-Chairman of the Iraqi Republican Command Council, Saddam Husayn at-Tikriti and Teymur Bakhtiar, as well as the way in which he was assaulted and insulted. HIM Foreign Ministry strongly protests at the Iraqi agents' act in detaining, interrogating, insulting and assaulting Abdolkhaleq Bushehri Zadeh, an Iranian Embassy Attache holding a diplomatic position and enjoying diplomatic immunity in accordance with the 1961 Vienna Convention.

In addition, Abdolkhaleq Bushehri Zadeh was again maltreated at Baghdad airport this morning when he was on board an Iranian aircraft, despite the fact that he held an Iraqi exit permit and the Iraqi Foreign Ministry's assurance that he could leave Iraq without any difficulty. An Iraqi airport security officer sought to take Bushehri Zadeh off the aircraft and arrest him. The security officer abandoned his efforts to arrest Bushehri Zadeh because Zadeh refused to leave the aircraft and because of strong protests by the Iranian Charge d'Affaires, who was present at the airport. The aircraft was eventually allowed to take off after an hour and a half, which inconvenienced its passengers of all nationalities.

HIM Foreign Ministry strongly protests at these actions, which are contrary to the accepted international code of conduct and diplomatic behaviour, and holds the Government of the Republic of Iraq responsible for all the dangerous consequences of such acts. With compliments.

[Recorded statement by Zadeh:] At 18.30 on Tuesday, 20th January, I was in a friend's car in Karradah ash-Sharqiyah in Baghdad. As soon as I got out of the car another car following me stopped behind my car and several people, including an officer, got out. They were all armed. They forced me into their car. I protested and produced my diplomatic card, but they disregarded it. I again protested and wanted to know where they were taking me. After about a 13-minute drive, one of the passengers pushed my head forward violently. The car was then stopped. I was blindfolded. We entered a building. I protested all the time and reminded them in vain that I was a diplomat.

We then entered a room and they unblindfolded me. There were seven people in the room, one military and six civilians. They were all armed. As soon as I entered, one of the civilians hit me in the face, with two people hitting me from behind. I again protested without result. They ordered me to remove my clothes. I did so under duress. They took away the contents of my pockets, including my diplomatic card. They ordered me to lean against the wall with my hands supporting my weight. I was in this position for some time. Two people then entered the room. One of them ordered me to get dressed and sit in a corner of the room without moving. This lasted for some time. They then ordered me to move to another corner of the room.

It was probably about 20.00 when two armed civilians came in and took me up to a room one floor above. There were many people in this room, including several military. A man of average build with an olive complexion and heavy moustache was sitting at a vast desk. I was shown a chair to sit on. The man at the desk told me that Iran was planning to stage a coup in Iraq, thinking the Ba'thists were sleeping. He then proceeded to lavish praise on Teymur Bakhtiar. He said: You are an Iranian diplomat and must have information useful to Bakhtiar. He talked for about 15 to 20 minutes. His face was somehow familiar.

When he left the room, another person in the room sat down at the desk. He asked me: Did you recognise the person you just talked to? I said no. He said in Arabic: He is Comrade Saddam Husayn at-Tikriti, the Vice-President. A few minutes later two people entered the room. One of them was tall with an olive complexion and white hair; the other was a short, thin man. As soon as they arrived, everyone in the room stood up. The old man sat in an armchair by the desk. The man at the desk was addressed as Sayyid Nazim. I think he was Nazim Gzar, the Iraqi Head of Intelligence. He asked whether I knew the man who was sitting by the desk. I said I did not. He said: Every Iranian must know General Bakhtiar. This is General Bakhtiar.

At this point, Bakhtiar said: You do not know me? I said no. He then started hurling abuse at me. I protested. He went on insulting me and hit me twice in the face. He told me: You must collaborate with me. I plan to liberate Iran. Your collaboration will be useful to me. The same applies to any Iranian. If you agree to collaborate with me, I will ask the Iraqi Government not to expel you. He resumed his abuse, insulting individuals held sacred by our nation. I said to him: You were once an Iranian general. How can you now insult the monarch? He hit me again.

Under threat of torture, Bakhtiar forced me to promise to collaborate with him. He gave me three pieces of paper and told me to write as he dictated: He gave me his own pen as my pockets had been emptied. The first affidavit I was forced to sign said: To General Teymur Bakhtiar: I was privileged to have an opportunity to meet you. I will offer every kind of co-operation against the Iranian monarchy. He then asked for a file from which he extracted a date, the actual date escapes me at the moment. He told me to write that 1,000 guns had arrived in Iraq from Iran on that date. I refused, but he threatened again. Meanwhile, they brought in the contents of my pockets. I wrote the other documents with my own pen and green ink. I signed the second document on the arrival of 1,000 guns. I then signed a third document on the arrival of 2,000 more guns from Iran. He put the documents in his pocket.

He then told me that he would instruct the Iraqi Foreign Ministry not to expel me. He also promised me sufficient money. At this point, the man at the desk said: For further contact, use telephone number 32966 and ask for Azna. I will speak to you myself. It was now about 23.30. They took me out of the room into a hall and then along a corridor, where many people were standing. I was there until 06.30 the next day, when Nazim ordered a white Mercedes for me. During the drive he told me he was taking me to the Embassy, but I must say nothing at the Embassy. If you speak, he said, the documents will be sent to the Iranian authorities as General Bakhtiar told you. I assured him I would not speak.

It was nearly 07.00 when they dropped me near the Iranian Embassy. I at once went to the Embassy, made a report on the proceedings, put it in an envelope, and took it with a copy of the Qur'an to the Iranian Ambassador's office. I requested him not to take any action because my life was in danger, but they could take any action after I was out of Iraq. He promised to do so. The foregoing happened to me on 20th January.

On 22nd January I went to the airport with two Embassy officers to leave for Iran. The Iraqis would not allow me to leave. Eventually, I was allowed to leave after great efforts by the Iranian Charge d'Affaires, Mehran, and after he had obtained a guarantee. Of course, I do not know the contents of that guarantee. We went to the airport on 26th January to board an Iran Air aircraft, which the Iraqis had already delayed at the airport for two hours. They had even ordered the pilot to disembark. They also wanted to take me off the aircraft but Mehran prevented it, saying: Either he goes, or all of us leave. We eventually arrived at Mehrabad airport in Tehran at 14.30.

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THE TIMES
29 JAN 1970

Cutting dated

19

Iraq said to have seized diplomat

From Our Correspondent

Teheran, Jan. 28

The Second Secretary at the Iranian Embassy in Baghdad was kidnapped and tortured by the Iraq authorities on the eve of the recent attempted coup d'état, it was alleged today in Teheran.

Mr. Abdulkhaliq Bushehrizadeh, who returned from Baghdad two days ago, gave details of his experience to reporters at the Foreign Ministry. The Government has protested about the way he was treated.

He said that he was seized at gunpoint while getting out of his car to buy cigarettes in a street in Baghdad, blindfolded and taken to a building where he was led up to the office of Saddam al-Takriti, a deputy-president of the Revolutionary Command Council.

Mr. Bushehrizadeh said that after being questioned he was tortured.

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
Mr. Hinchcliffe
Mubarrak

Pa
Iraq / Iran. rel.

PM

241.

27 January, 1970



Mr Mahanjan
29/1

Hon Reg.

[Signature]

29/1

With the compliments of

**THE UNITED KINGDOM MISSION
TO THE UNITED NATIONS**

(S. L. Egerton)

**Near Eastern Department,
F.C.O.**

**845 THIRD AVENUE,
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10022**

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8

CYPHER/CAT'A'

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TO TEHRAN

TEL NO. 57

30 JANUARY, 1970

(NED)

CONFIDENTIAL

NEQ 3/324/1

ADDRESSED TO TEHRAN TEL NO. 57 OF 30 JANUARY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO BAGHDAD, CAIRO, AMMAN, BEIRUT, BAHRAIN RESIDENCY, KUWAIT AND WASHINGTON.

IRAQ/IRAN RELATIONS.

THE IRANIAN CHARGE D'AFFAIRES CALLED ON HAYMAN AT HIS OWN REQUEST ON 29 JANUARY TO DRAW ATTENTION TO WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS IRAQ'S POLICY OF HARRASSMENT AND INTIMIDATION OF IRANIAN DIPLOMATS REMAINING IN BAGHDAD FOLLOWING THE EXPULSION OF THE IRANIAN AMBASSADOR, AND FOUR SENIOR MEMBERS OF HIS STAFF. THE MAIN INCIDENTS MIRFAKHRAI REFERRED TO ARE DESCRIBED IN AN AIDE MEMOIRE WHICH HE LEFT WITH HAYMAN (COPY BY BAG). MIRFAKHRAI WAS ALSO AT PAINS TO DENY IRAQI ACCUSATIONS OF IRANIAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE ABORTIVE COUP OF 21 JANUARY WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS QUOTE UNPRECEDENTED, BASELESS AND TOTALLY UNTRUE. UNQUOTE.

2. HAYMAN IN ACCEPTING THE AIDE MEMOIRE TOOK NOTE OF MIRFAKHRAI'S REMARKS AND SAID THAT HE DEPLORED ALL BREACHES OF DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE WHEREVER THEY OCCURRED. ON IRAQ/IRAN RELATIONS GENERALLY HAYMAN SAID HE REGRETTED THE RECENT INCREASE IN TENSION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES ESPECIALLY AT A TIME WHEN A PRACTICAL MODUS VIVENDI APPEARED TO BE IN OPERATION IN THE SHATT AL ARAB AND HE HOPED THAT THE IRANIANS (AND INDEED THE IRAQIS) WOULD DO NOTHING TO WORSEN THE SITUATION AS IT WAS IN EVERYONES INTEREST THAT THE AREA SHOULD REMAIN PEACEFUL. MIRFAKHRAI REPLIED THAT THE IRANIANS HAD REACTED COOLLY AND CALMLY IN THIS CRISIS AND WOULD DO NOTHING TO INCREASE TENSION, AS THEY WISHED TO HAVE GOOD NEIGHBOURLY RELATIONS WITH IRAQ. HE HOPED THAT THE REGIME IN BAGHDAD WOULD NOW ACT SENSIBLY.

STEWART

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ARABIAN DEPT.

P.U.S.D.

I.R.D.

NEWS DEPT.

A.M.T.D.


PROT. AND CONF. DEPT.

CONFIDENTIAL



IMPERIAL
IRANIAN EMBASSY

AIDE-MEMOIRE .



Reg. s.p. 2. P.M.M.

(9)

2/2

On January 20th, 1970, Mr. A. Bushehrizadeh, an Attaché of the Imperial Iranian Embassy in Baghdad, was detained for a few hours in Baghdad by Iraqi officials during which time he was subjected to interrogation and beatings in the presence of Saddam Takriti, Vice-Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, and Teimur Bakhtiar.

Again, on January 26th, when Mr. Bushehrizadeh was on an Iranair plane destined for Tehran, the Iraqi authorities prevented the departure of the plane and tried to remove and detain him by force. It was only as a result of intervention and repeated protests by the Iranian Charge d'Affaires, who was present at the Airport, that the plane carrying passengers of all nationalities who were witness to the whole incident, was permitted to depart after a delay of 90 minutes.

The action of the Iraqi officials in this connection poses serious questions in the light of the following facts :-

1. Being a diplomat and holding a diplomatic passport, Mr. Bushehrizadeh was entitled to diplomatic immunity in accordance with the tenets of international law and the provisions of the Vienna Convention to which the Iraqi Government has also adhered.

Copied to Chancery at:
Tehran, Baghdad, Cairo
Amman, Beirut, Bahrain
Kuwait, + Washington.

Hence /

Hence his detention and illtreatment by the Iraqi authorities are clear violation of the abovementioned tenets and regulations.

2. Since Mr. Bushehrizadeh's departure from Baghdad was known to the Iraqi authorities, who had given him the necessary exit visas, his departure could in no way be considered as having been against Iraqi rules and regulations.

The Imperial Government of Iran has already protested to the Government of Iraq, through its Embassy in Baghdad as well as through the Iraqi Embassy in Tehran, against the actions of the Iraqi authorities as having been contrary to established international conduct and in violation of the provisions of the Vienna Convention. But as the repetition of such incidents is detrimental to the diplomatic relations between all the countries of the world, it is deemed expedient to draw attention to the behaviour of the Iraqi officials which amounts to the violation of international law and principles.

January 29, 1970.

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NEQ 3/224/1

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REGISTRY No. 42
-5 JAN 1970

MRS. /

A.M.T. (3 copies)
Mr. Gallagher

10

TIME FACTOR 10 A.M. BAGHDAD TIME 2/1/1970

OUT TO BAGHDAD TELNO ALLOT 1 OF 1/1 CYPHER/CAT A UNIT 1 BEECHING
IMMEDIATE
OUT TO TEHRAN

CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE BOARD OF TRADE
TELEGRAM NO. ALLOT 1

TO BAGHDAD
1 JANUARY 1970

*Enter a Advice to
Shipsman & Amman
thrust
J 24.*

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NO. ALLOT 1 OF 1 JANUARY REPEATED
FOR INFORMATION TO TEHRAN AND KHORRAMSHAHR.
FROM SHIPPING POLICY DIVISION BOARD OF TRADE.
YOUR TELEGRAM 1054.

2. FURNESS INFORMED OF IRAQI APPROACH RECORDED IN HAWLEY'S
LETTER OF 18TH DECEMBER AND OF PREVIOUS IRAQI REQUESTS ABOUT
NAVIGATION ON THE SHATT AL ARAB. THEY DO NOT REPEAT NOT INTEND
TO INSTRUCT MASTER OF MYSTIC TO FOLLOW IRAQI DIRECTIVES. VESSELS
MOVEMENTS UNDER CONTROL OF ARYA COMPANY OF IRAN WHO INSIST ON
USE OF IRANIAN PILOT AND FLAG.

3. IF APPROACHED, SUGGEST YOU TAKE LINE THAT THIS IS COMMERCIAL
AGREEMENT OVER WHICH HMG HAVE NO CONTROL. WE HAVE IN ANY CASE
NO POWER TO INSTRUCT BRITISH SHIPPING COMPANIES TO MAKE USE OF
PARTICULAR PILOTS OR FLAG EVEN IN RESPECT OF VESSELS DIRECTLY

PARTICULAR PILOTS OR FLAG EVEN IN RESPECT OF VESSELS DIRECTLY UNDER THEIR CONTROL. THE MOST WE CAN DO IS TO ENSURE THAT OWNERS HAVE BEST ADVICE AVAILABLE ON RISKS AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS INVOLVED.

4. IN PRESENT CASE, FURNESS HAVE AGREEMENT WITH ARYA UNDER WHICH ALL MOVEMENTS OF MYSTIC AND ROWANMORE SUBJECT TO CHARTERERS INSTRUCTIONS AND WHILE THEY WISH TO CAUSE NO OFFENCE TO IRAQI AUTHORITIES, FURNESS BOUND TO FOLLOW THESE.

5. FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION, FURNESS STATED FIRMLY THAT THEIR INTERESTS IN IRAN NOT IRAQ. THEY ARE NOT ESPECIALLY WORRIED AT POSSIBILITY OF BLACKLISTING AS THEIR VESSELS HAVE RARELY HAD OCCASION TO USE IRAQI PORTS OVER LAST FEW YEARS.

6. WE ARE INFORMING SHIPOWNERS GENERALLY THROUGH CHAMBER OF SHIPPING OF THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH MIGHT ARISE WHEN VESSELS ON CHARTER TO IRANIAN COMPANIES.

STEWART

CONFIDENTIAL

TOP

COPY

CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE TEHRAN TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TEL. NO. 2



1 JANUARY 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FCO TEL NO 2 OF 1 JANUARY RFI IMMEDIATE TO BAGHDAD

BOARD OF TRADE AND KHORRAMSHAHR.

BAGHDAD TEL TO YOU NO 1054: SS MYSTIC.



FOR BRITISH VESSELS ON CHARTER TO IRANIANS WE CAN EXPECT LATTER TO INSTRUCT MASTERS TO FOLLOW THE CURRENT PRACTICE OF IRANIAN FLAG SHIPS IN THE SHATT, THAT IS, TO FLY THE IRANIAN FLAG, CARRY AN IRANIAN PILOT, AND REFUSE TO SUBMIT TO IRAQI INSPECTION.

2. THE MASTER'S DILEMMA IS THAT IF HE COMPLIES THE IRAQIES MAY BLACK LIST HIS SHIP AND POSSIBLY HIS OWNERS AND LODGE A FORMAL PROTEST IN BAGHDAD (WE HAVE NOT YET SEEN HAWLEY'S LETTER TO TRIPP OF 18 DECEMBER). BUT AS THE ATTITUDES OF THE IRANIAN AND IRAQI AUTHORITIES ON NAVIGATION IN THE SHATT ARE AT PRESENT IRRECONCILABLE THIS DILEMMA SEEMS INESCAPABLE.

3. I RECOMMEND BOARD OF TRADE SHOULD REMIND OWNERS OF PROBLEM BUT STRESS THAT IT IS FOR THEM AND INDIVIDUAL MASTERS TO DECIDE WHAT TO DO IN EACH CASE. TO INTERVENE AS SUGGESTED BY BAGHDAD NECESSARILY INVOLVES TAKING A POSITION ON THE IRANO/IRAQI DISPUTE WHEN OUR INTERESTS ARE TO STAND ASIDE.

F C O PASS IMMEDIATE TO BOARD OF TRADE AND BAGHDAD.

MR. MURRAY

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO BAGHDAD]
[COPIES SENT TO B.O.T.]

FILES:

AVI.M.& T.D.
N.EASTERN D.
MR. GALLAGHER
MR. ARTHUR

DDDDD

CONFIDENTIAL

I have discussed w.
Mr. Hinchcliffe NED,
Mr. Cochlin: BOT &
Mr. Gallagher: BOT Lane
at a reply. P.C. 12-1.

British Embassy,

BAGHDAD.



(21/19)

RECEIVED IN January 1970 REGISTRY No. 10	RECEIVED IN February 1970 REGISTRY No. 10
27 JAN 1970	3 FEB 1970
Q 3/324/1	

Dear Hinchcliffe

s.s. Rowan More

Please refer to Hawley's letter
MORE/R of 18 December, Baghdad telegram
no. 1054 of 31 December to F.C.O., Tehran
telegram no. 2 of 1 January to F.C.O. and
Allot No. 1 of 1 January to Baghdad.

2. I enclose copies of Ministry of
Foreign Affairs Notes No. 6614/6614/4 of
25 May 1969 and of 7 January, 1970.

Yours sincerely
Tony Arnold.

(A. Arnold)

P. R. M. Hinchcliffe, Esq.,
Near Eastern Department,
F.C.O.

c.c. J. K. T. Frost, Esq.,
Shipping Policy Division,
Board of Trade,
John Adam Street,
London, W.C.2.

Reg e hr.
with letter
Parker.

C.A. [Signature]
27/1
9/12



3 See CC,

Copied for Mr.

15 Feb + 20
sq. Tel in + out.

16/1

Translation.

No. 6614/6614/4.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Political Department,

Baghdad, 7 January, 1970.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq presents its compliments to Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy, Baghdad, and, in continuation of the interview between the Director General of the Political Department at the Office of this Ministry and His Excellency the Ambassador on 15 December, 1969, about the contravention by the British vessel ROWAN MORE of navigation regulations and instructions in force in Shatt-el-Arab, has the honour to inform the Embassy that this vessel arrived at the Pilots Station at 1420 Hours on 2 December, 1969, and laid its anchor. It was flying the Iranian flag in its bow. The responsible officer at the Pilots Station asked the Captain of this vessel to fly the Iraqi flag, in lieu of the Iranian flag, and to take an Iraqi pilot. The vessel raised the Iraqi flag together with the Iranian flag but refused to take an Iraqi pilot and claimed that he was awaiting an Iranian pilot from Khorramshahr. The Iraqi Chief Pilot then personally contacted the Captain of the British vessel and informed him that his vessel was cleaving through the national waters of Iraq and asked him to take an Iraqi pilot to take his vessel to the Port of Khorramshahr. The Captain of the vessel refused to take an Iraqi pilot and did not allow the Chief Pilot to go on board the vessel. The Iraqi Ports Administration despatched a telegram of warning to the Captain of the British ship holding him responsible for challenging the regulations for

navigation in force in Shatt-el-Arab and for contravening these regulations.

At 0645 Hours on the 4th of December, 1969, the British vessel in question entered the waters of Shatt-el-Arab without an Iraqi pilot. It crossed the Fao district under the escort of two Iranian military launches, and the Wasiliyah district, while flying the Iranian flag on the front mast and the British flag, in its rear, without an Iraqi pilot, in the direction of Khorramshahr. The Iraqi Ports Administration addressed a telegram of warning to the Captain of this vessel and the Port Director at Khorramshahr for this contravention and held them responsible for contravening the laws and regulations of navigation in Shatt-el-Arab.

At 1625 Hours on the 9th of December, 1969, the above-mentioned British vessel ROWAN MORE left the Port of Khorramshahr and arrived at Abadan where it laid its anchor at Bawarda. It was flying the British flag in its rear and the Iranian flag on the front mast without flying the Iraqi flag and without an Iraqi pilot. The Iraqi Ports Administration addressed a telegram of protest to the Port Director at Khorramshahr for contravening the regulations for navigation in Shatt-el-Arab by guiding this vessel without the knowledge of the Ports Administration.

At 1050 Hours on the 13th of December, 1969, the vessel in question left Bawarda and was escorted by a small Iranian military launch and the Iranian tug "Aslu" without an Iraqi pilot to the direction of the sea. The Iraqi Ports Administration also addressed a telegram of warning to the Captain of the British vessel for carrying out this contravention. It also addressed a telegram of protest to the Port Director at Khorramshahr for the repeated contravention by the Port of Khorramshahr authorities to the laws and regulations of navigation in Shatt-el-Arab.

3/7(80) In drawing the attention of the esteemed Embassy to the contravention by this British vessel of the navigation regulations and instructions in force in Shatt-el-Arab, this Ministry refers to its Note No. 6614/6614/4 of the 25th of May, 1969, about the necessity of British vessels cleaving through the national waters of Iraq in Shatt-el-Arab complying with the regulations and instructions for navigation in force in Shatt-el-Arab, and requests the esteemed Embassy to mediate with the competent British authorities for contacting all British ship lines and owners of vessels proceeding to Ports situated on Shatt-el-Arab and asking them to comply with the regulations and instructions issued by the Iraqi Ports Administration concerning navigation in Shatt-el-Arab.

The Ministry avails itself of this opportunity to express its highest consideration and esteem.



Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy,
Baghdad.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq presents its compliments to the Diplomatic Corps accredited to the Republic of Iraq and has the honor to inform them that the Iranian authorities continue to violate constantly the provisions and texts of the Frontier Treaty concluded between Iraq and Iran in 1937, which is in force and binding on the two countries, and to navigation regulations and instructions in Shatt-el-Arab. These repeated Iranian aggressions, violations and provocations and the non-compliance with the provisions and texts of the Frontier Treaty of 1937 and the navigational regulations and instructions relating to Shatt-el-Arab greatly threaten the safety of navigation in the Shatt-el-Arab and expose the ships plying in this Shatt to grave dangers and are also calculated to increase the tension and to offend the relations.

In communicating the foregoing to the esteemed Diplomatic Corps, this Ministry requests the Corps to be so good as to communicate to their Governments that the ships belonging to them and possessing their nationality plying in the national waters of Shatt-el-Arab must comply with the Iraqi navigational regulations and instructions in force in Shatt-el-Arab and not to contravene such regulations and instructions, since the contravention by ships of these regulations and instructions is calculated to expose to grave dangers navigation in Shatt-el-Arab and the contravening ships.

The Ministry avails itself of this opportunity to express its highest consideration and esteem.

**Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy,
Baghdad.**



The Embassy of the Republic of Iraq presents its compliments to Her Majesty's Foreign and Commonwealth Office and has the honour to draw its attention to the following violation which took place in Shatt-Al-Arab.

A British merchant ship ("Rowan More") flying the Iranian flag anchored at the Pilotage station at 14.20 hours on the 2nd of December, 1969. The officer in charge of the Pilotage Station requested the captain to take down the Iranian flag and fly instead the Iraqi flag and to take aboard an Iraqi pilot. The captain hoisted the Iraqi flag by the side of the Iranian flag but refused to take aboard an Iraqi pilot stating that he was waiting for an Iranian pilot at Kurmshahar. The Iraqi chief pilot then personally informed the captain that his ship was sailing in Iraqi territorial waters and requested him to take aboard an Iraqi pilot to guide his ship to Kurmshahar port. The captain refused this request and prevented the chief pilot from coming aboard the ship. The Iraqi Ports Authority warned the captain by telegraph of the consequences of his violation of the regulation governing navigation in Shatt-Al-Arab.

The captain ignored all these requests and warnings and traversed Iraqi territorial waters in Shatt-Al-Arab flying the Iranian and British flags only and without an Iraqi pilot aboard, escorted by two Iranian patrol boats; these actions constituting a flagrant contradiction and a violation of laws and regulations governing navigation in Shatt-Al-Arab.

The Embassy of the Republic of Iraq requests Her Majesty's Foreign and Commonwealth Office to take all necessary steps to ensure that British ships sailing in Iraqi territorial waters in Shatt-Al-Arab abide by the regulation and rules governing navigation therein.

The Embassy of the Republic of Iraq would appreciate it if Her Majesty's Foreign and Commonwealth Office would contact all maritime companies and owners of ships that sail in Shatt-Al-Arab and impress on them the necessity of conforming and abiding by the regulation and instructions issued by the Iraqi Ports Authority concerning navigation in Shatt-Al-Arab.

The Embassy of the Republic of Iraq avails itself of this opportunity to renew to Her Majesty's Foreign and Commonwealth Office the assurance of its highest consideration.

London, 22nd January, 1970

Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
London S.W.1.



ABK

See Minute
at Folio:
DV. return
9 Minute
BMM
1/2

The Embassy of the Republic of Iraq presents its compliments to Her Majesty's Foreign and Commonwealth Office and has the honour to draw its attention to the following violation which took place in Shatt-Al-Arab.

A British merchant ship ("Rowan More") flying the Iranian flag anchored at the Pilotage station at 14.20 hours on the 2nd of December, 1969. The officer in charge of the Pilotage Station requested the captain to take down the Iranian flag and fly instead the Iraqi flag and to take aboard an Iraqi pilot. The captain hoisted the Iraqi flag by the side of the Iranian flag but refused to take aboard an Iraqi pilot stating that he was waiting for an Iranian pilot at Kurmshahar. The Iraqi chief pilot then personally informed the captain that his ship was sailing in Iraqi territorial waters and requested him to take aboard an Iraqi pilot to guide his ship to Kurmshahar port. The captain refused this request and prevented the chief pilot from coming aboard the ship. The Iraqi Ports Authority warned the captain by telegraph of the consequences of his violation of the regulations governing navigation in Shatt-Al-Arab.

The captain ignored all these requests and warnings and traversed Iraqi territorial waters in Shatt-Al-Arab flying the Iranian and British flags only and without an Iraqi pilot aboard, escorted by two Iranian patrol boats; these actions constituting a flagrant contradiction and a violation of laws and regulations governing navigation in Shatt-Al-Arab.

The Embassy of the Republic of Iraq requests Her Majesty's Foreign and Commonwealth Office to take all necessary steps to ensure that British ships sailing in Iraqi territorial waters in Shatt-Al-Arab abide by the regulation and rules governing navigation therein.

The Embassy of the Republic of Iraq would appreciate it if Her Majesty's Foreign and Commonwealth Office would contact all maritime companies and owners of ships that sail in Shatt-Al-Arab and impress on them the necessity of conforming and abiding by the regulation and instructions issued by the Iraqi Ports Authority concerning navigation in Shatt-Al-Arab.

The Embassy of the Republic of Iraq avails itself of this opportunity to renew to Her Majesty's Foreign and Commonwealth Office the assurance of its highest consideration.

London, 22nd. January, 1970

Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
London S.W.1.

31 JAN 1970

Cutting dated 19

Letters to the Editor

BAGHDAD TRIALS: RELATIONS
BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ*From the Chargé d'Affaires in the Imperial Iranian Embassy*

Sir,—The letter of the Ambassador of Iraq published in The Times of January 26 contains certain charges against Iran to which I should like to reply.

The distinguished Ambassador of Iraq, contrary to well-established norms of behaviour and diplomatic practice, has found it fit to implicate himself, personally, in false accusations and baseless charges against Iran. He must have been carried away by the so-called revolutionary fervour, which has gripped Iraq these days, to have disregarded the embarrassment which his action could bring to the host country.

As I do not wish to complicate any further the Ambassador's predicaments I shall confine my few remarks to the bare essentials, chiefly, for the purpose of providing your readers with the full picture and a proper perspective.

(1) The Iraqi Ambassador suggests that the unrest in his country stems mainly from the fact that "a nationalist and socialist regime" is in power in Iraq. To give this regime a "holy" character he identifies it with the struggle against Israel. From this he concludes that:

"Any wonder that the Iranians, the Americans and the Israelis should join hands in their plot to bring down the Iraqi revolutionary regime!"

Need I say any more on such line of reasoning which so obviously is in want of substance and facts? What I must bring out, however, is the fact that such a propaganda line is designed to sow seeds of dissension, distrust and enmity between Iran and its Arab brothers. But I am convinced that these desperate tactics will deceive no one, and I wonder whether they are in the best interest of the Arab cause.

(2) Recognizing that his allegations will impress no one, the Ambassador has tried to substantiate them by falsehoods and fabrications. As an example, he has reverted to the old Iraqi position that it was by Iran's unilateral action that the 1937 treaty between Iran and Iraq was abrogated.

The fact is, that the 1937 treaty became extinct as a result of a number of factors, mainly, Iraq's failure to live up to its obligations under the treaty, in spite of Iran's persistent efforts to persuade Iraq to honour those obligations.

As for the crisis of last April, it is common knowledge that it started by Iraq's empty threats against Iranian shipping in Shatt-Al-Arab.

A pertinent question that comes to mind in this connexion is the following: What has Iraq done to regain an

inch of territory for the Palestinian Arabs before the April crisis that it has failed to do afterwards?

(3) Has it ever occurred to the Iraqi Ambassador that the unrest in his country, rather than being the work of Iran, represents the people's outright opposition to the reign of terror to which they have been subjected. To distract the people from their plight, the Government of Iraq has now turned its attention to Iran as a scapegoat. The Iraqi Ambassador should know that if the gambit works, it would only have a temporary effect.

In its wake, however, it will deal, as it has already dealt, a heavy blow to the relations between the two countries. Is the short respite gained worth the price paid in terms of deterioration of relations with Iran?

Yours faithfully,

N. MIRFAKHRAL

Imperial Iranian Embassy, 16 Princes Gate, S.W.7, Jan. 30.

Treatment of opposition

From Mr. Kamran Mashayikhi

Sir,—Regarding the letter from the Ambassador of the Republic of Iraq, I must express my horror and indignation at the comments made therein. Not only does the Ambassador dare to defend his country's idea of justice through murder, hanging and torture, but quite calmly promises more of the same "treatment" for any future opposition.

He also attacks your previous commentary as lacking facts and fairness when I have found only honesty and resourcefulness in your ability to grasp the true state of affairs in Iraq.

It appears that the Ambassador's only defence of his government's barbaric and brutal crimes is to accuse you of unfairness and to blame Iran for an attempted revolution that obviously arose because of the intolerable situation. He accuses Iran in order to cover up these crimes and failures. The military dictatorship of Iraq rules with savage force, instils fear and horror, and takes away all human freedoms which is incomprehensible in these times.

Yet Iran, in contrast, has become one of the most progressive countries of the world. It is booming under the dynamic leadership of the Shah. The Shah has achieved remarkable gains for Iran, and he and the Iranian people deserve enthusiastic praise for their efforts and achievements.

To conclude, the Iraqi regime by living off the blood of its people had better expect more plots and eventually its total destruction.

Yours faithfully,

KAMRAN MASHAYIKHI.

86 Ifield Road, S.W.10, Jan. 27.



Letters to the Editor

BAGHDAD TRIALS: LEGALITY OF IRAQI POINT OF VIEW

From the Ambassador of the Republic of Iraq

Sir,—On Monday, January 26, you were kind enough to allow me to respond through your columns to your leader on the abortive coup in Iraq and its consequences. I should like now to reply to the letter of the Chargé d'Affaires of the Imperial Iranian Embassy which you published today.

I shall pass over the introductory paragraph of the letter for obvious reasons of diplomatic behaviour and practice and go on to the other paragraphs which may have some substance for thought and discussion.

In paragraph (1) of his letter, the Chargé d'Affaires of the Imperial Iranian Embassy takes issue with what I referred to as the Israeli-American-Iranian plot to bring down the Iraqi revolutionary regime. The American-Iranian alliance is only too known to need any new affirmation. As to the special relationships between the Iranian government and the Israeli authorities, I will only quote Mr. J. D. F. Jones of the Financial Times on June 3 of last year after a visit to Teheran and Jerusalem. He wrote that "one of the most fascinating and significant relationships on today's international scene is the strange relationship which has developed over the past few years between Iran and Israel". Mr. Jones continues to say that this relationship "could indeed be called an alliance even an axis, although it is rarely acknowledged or discussed".

Do I need to say any more, except perhaps to emphasize that such relationship between Iran and Israel which has been considered as strange by even a foreign observer is not designed to sow seeds of trust and friendliness between Iran and its Arab neighbours. Indeed, further in his letter, the Iranian Chargé d'Affaires wonders about the relations between Iraq and Iran. In this respect I should say that good and neighbourly relations is a two-way street and that conspiratorial activities, unilateral abrogation of international treaties, and interference in the internal affairs of Iraq are not of the nature of activities which can draw a friendly response from our side. The Iraqi authorities have in their possession documents and recordings which implicate beyond a shadow of doubt the Iranian authorities in the last conspiracy to overthrow the present Iraqi regime.

In paragraph (2), the Chargé d'Affaires of the Imperial Iranian

Embassy argues with my statement concerning the unilateral abrogation in April of last year of the 1937 boundary treaty between Iran and Iraq. Here again, I shall only refer to the dialogue between the distinguished former Iranian Ambassador and myself last year through the columns of The Times which gave ample evidence of the seriousness and legality of the Iraqi point of view on this question.

Furthermore, the Iranian Chargé d'Affaires inquires what has Iraq done "to regain an inch of territory for the Palestinian Arabs before the April crisis that it has failed to do afterwards". I should like to say that it is the Palestinian Arab people themselves who will regain their homeland as their inalienable right and their national duty, with the help and assistance of their kith and kin and all fair-minded and peace and freedom-loving peoples of the world.

However, if it took the Arab peoples some time to realize the dimensions and magnitude of the Zionist danger, not only against Palestine but against all the Arab world, it will not be a long time before our Iranian neighbours will realize that this expansionist and aggressive Zionist and Israeli design in the region is not directed against the Arabs alone. They will very soon come to the conclusion, if they have not done so already, that this "strange" and indeed very close Iranian-Israeli relationship is not in the best interests of the Iranian people.

In paragraph (3), the Chargé d'Affaires saw fit to interfere in the internal affairs of my country and, for propaganda purposes, alleged that what he called the "unrest" there represents the people's outright opposition to the regime. I find it extremely difficult not to reciprocate by referring to the present regime in Iran, but I shall leave it to the tens of thousands of Iranian students and others who have escaped terror and oppression and have chosen to live in exile abroad. They have indeed been more than vocal in expressing their attitude towards the regime in Iran, on many occasions and in different parts of the world, as frequently reported in the press in Europe and elsewhere.

Sincerely yours,

KADHIM M. KHALAF,
Ambassador.

Embassy of the Republic of Iraq, 21
Queen's Gate, S.W.7, Jan. 31.

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1/EQ 3/324/1

Reg. P.A.
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(4/4)

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30 JAN 1970
Mrs 1/1

Jean Dorel

BRITISH EMBASSY

TEHRAN

20 January, 1970.

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Rege
Mr Hinchcliffe 28/
AMZ/D/ Jan 1

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The Shatt

You will remember the exchange of telegrams about the passage of the "S.S. Mystic" up the Shatt which rests with our telegram No. 2 and Board of Trade telegram No. Allot 1, both of 1 January. I think I should report an interesting Iranian reaction in the aftermath of this incident.

2. When our Naval Attache paid a routine call on Admiral Rassai, the Commander in Chief of the Iranian Navy, on 17 January, Rassai greeted him with enthusiasm and said that he was glad that the British were on the side of the Iranians. He had evidently been told that both the "Rowanmore" and the "Mystic" had been up the Shatt al-Arab flying British flags and carrying Iranian pilots. He said he was delighted at this evidence of British agreement that the Shatt should be an international waterway. He went on to say that U.S. and German ships had also flown the Iranian flag and carried Iranian pilots in the Shatt; all he wanted now was that a Russian ship should follow suit and he would then know that the Iranians had the world on their side.

3. The Naval Attache pointed out that the British ships were at the time under charter to Arya but Admiral Rassai said this did not matter; the important thing was that British ships had taken an Iranian pilot.

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Jan

Pa RUM
SR

(J. S. Champion)

D. J. Makinson, Esq.,
Near Eastern Department,
F.C.O.

cc: Chancery, Baghdad.

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BRITISH EMBASSY

TEHRAN

29 January, 1970.

(3/5)

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
- 5 FEB 1970

NEQ 3324 1

Dear Peter,

Iran/Iraq Relations

In my telegram No. 52 of 23 January (repeated to all except Bahrain), I said that I would be surprised if the Iranian Government took the initiative in stepping up the quarrel between the two countries. Since the mutual expulsion of Ambassadors on 22 January, there have in fact been no further developments in Tehran worth reporting by telegram, but the tension generated by last week's events has not yet lifted and it may be useful to record here how the Iranians have reacted so far.

2. As was the case in the April crisis, the absence of the Shah abroad made it difficult for the Government to formulate any very definite policy, and they have done little except deny all Iraqi accusations in a tone of righteous indignation. At the weekend, the vestigial Iraqi Embassy here took the unusual step of circulating a note to all the newspapers accusing the Iranian Government (as well as the "imperialists", Zionists and Americans) of plotting against Iraq's revolutionary progress. This note was published in the Tehran press on Monday (accompanied by much vaunting of Iran's freedom of the press compared with Iraq) and elicited a vigorous protest from the Foreign Ministry which was published in Tuesday's papers. The Foreign Ministry had previously issued two notes protesting against the treatment meted out to the departing Iranian Ambassador in Baghdad, who was said to have been searched on the way to the airport "against all the principles of diplomatic etiquette", and against the treatment of the remaining Iranian Charge d'Affaires. (By contrast, the Iranians took great care to make the departure of the Iraqi Ambassador from Tehran a civilized affair with the Ambassador even being kissed by the Head of the relevant Department of the M.F.A.; this did not, however, prevent the Ambassador claiming he had been maltreated when he arrived in Baghdad.)

3. A further note was published and circulated to all Embassies by the Foreign Ministry yesterday, protesting against Iraqi treatment of the Iranian Second Secretary in Baghdad, Abdolkhaleq Bushehrizadeh, who was allegedly kidnapped and tortured in front of Bakhtiar and Saddam Takriti on the evening of 20 January in a successful effort to obtain a confession that the Iranians had aided the plotters, especially with arms. Bushehrizadeh was "exhibited" to a press conference consisting of Iranian journalists

J. P. Tripp, Esq.,
Near Eastern Department,
F.C.O.

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only held in the Foreign Ministry yesterday, having got out of Baghdad on 27 January, despite attempts by the Iraqi authorities to drag him off the plane. He claimed that Bakhtiar had offered him money and asylum in Iraq if he would cooperate in Bakhtiar's plotting against the Shah. This story will naturally make good weekend reading for the Iranian public, but if examined closely it does nothing to dispell Iraqi charges of Iranian complicity in the attempted coup.

4. Meanwhile in the Majles, the Foreign Ministry's Parliamentary Under-Secretary has assured the Deputies, who were very critical of Iraqi "barbarism", (as were the Senators), that the Iraqi accusations of an attempted Iranian coup were entirely fanciful. He told them that the Government had taken all necessary measures and would do "whatever is dictated by circumstances" to cope with the crisis.

5. On the military side, these measures have amounted to a certain increase in troop movements, especially among the 1st Army, and the re-establishment of a military command structure in Khorramshahr. But there are no signs of a concentration on the Iraqi border - the Iranians are probably aware that the Iraqi Army are too occupied elsewhere to be themselves massing on the other side of the border. As regards the Air Force, we gather that there was a noticable quickening of the pulse in the Air Defence Command a few days before the crisis began and there was apparently a full alert at the Vahdati airbase on Tuesday, 20 January. This is interesting as the only overt indication we have received that the Iranians were anticipating something. As soon as the crisis started, the Iranian Navy took their usual defensive measures and moved their three minesweepers normally kept at Khorramshahr, two of which have since been at Bandar Shapur. But traffic in the Shatt is proceeding as usual and there has so far been no problem over pilotage. The Air Force now appear to have deployed eight F5s to Tabriz and hospitals in the South and in Tehran have been put on an emergency basis in case of casualties. None of this strikes me as being very "significant" in military terms, but General Djam told me earlier this week that the crisis had kept him working flat out for all hours of the day and night; and that the Shah's absence had added to his problems.

6. Rumours have begun in the press of renewed Iraqi persecution of the Irano-Shia minority and it has been reported that the Iraqi authorities have taken strict measures against Ayatollah Hakim, the Shia leader in Najaf. But there has been no official confirmation of these rumours and I would guess that the Government is not particularly anxious to stir popular feeling up too far, even though this might divert attention from the Iraqi accusations. The celebration of the seventh anniversary of the White Revolution on Monday generated a fair amount of nationalist feeling: but there have been no public demands for reprisals against Iraq. British press and radio comments on the Baghdad "bloodbath" have been well received, as has an article in Der Spiegel attributing the crisis to Bakhtiar's machinations. It is perhaps worth noting that there has been no mention whatsoever of the Kurdish situation in any of the newspapers.

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7. In this stalemate situation, I still would not expect any worsening of the crisis in the near future unless the Majles insists on a hue and cry or the Iraqis step up persecution of the Irano-Shia minority. One cannot avoid the impression that the Government would like this embarrassing episode forgotten as soon as possible. But it is equally improbable that the situation will improve and the Government will almost certainly keep on pointing to the state of affairs in Iraq as a justification for increased defence expenditure.

Yours ever

Donald

(D. F. Murray)

Copies to: Chanceries at Baghdad
Amman
Beirut
Cairo
Kuwait
Bahrain Residency.

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EN CLAIR

PRIORITY ANKARA TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TEL NO.212

4 FEBRUARY 1970

UNCLASSIFIED

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 -5 FEB 1970 NEQ 3/324/1
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ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO. 212 OF 4 FEB REPEATED FOR INFO
TO BAGHDAD, TEHERAN, AND HQB FNE (DEFENCE COMMEN PSE PASS
HQB FNE)

IRAQ - IRAN RELATIONS.

THE IRAQI MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR, GENERAL AMMASH, UNEXPECTEDLY
ARRIVED IN ANKARA ON 3 FEBRUARY.

2. COMMENTING ON THE VISIT THE TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTRY
SPOKESMAN STATED.

' TURKEY AND IRAQ ARE NEIGHBOURS. WE MAINTAIN GOOD NEIGHBOURLY
RELATIONS WITH IRAQ. WITH GENERAL AMMASH WE SHALL REVIEW THE
MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM, THE RELATIONS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES
AND IRAQ'S RELATIONS WITH HER OTHER NEIGHBOURS. WE BELIEVE THAT
THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT WILL ASK TURKEY TO MEDIATE IN HER CONFLICT
WITH IRAN '.

Pa Han
Mr.

SIR R. SARELL

[PASSED TO M.O.D.].

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I.P.D.
NEWS DEPT
M.O.D. (INTERNAL)

19

E. IRANIAN-IRAQI RELATIONS

Iraqi Complaint of Iranian "Military Provocations"

Baghdad home service in Arabic 17.00 GMT 2.2.70

Text of report:

The Iraqi News Agency has learned that Foreign Minister Abd al-Karim ash-Shaykhli this morning received separately the Turkish Ambassador and the Soviet Charge d'Affaires in Baghdad and asked them to convey to their Governments the Iraqi Government's view on the continuous, large-scale Iranian military provocations and concentrations on the Iraqi borders, particularly since the role of the Iranian Government in the imperialist-reactionary plot against the revolutionary Iraqi regime has become evident.

INA adds that Foreign Minister Shaykhli has affirmed that the Iraqi Government position is characterised by patience and self-restraint and by refraining from involvement in side issues. These side issues are designed to obstruct Iraq's progress and preoccupy it so as to prevent Iraq from taking part in the fateful Arab battle of Palestine against Israel and Zionist and imperialist forces.

INA has also learned that the Iraqi Foreign Ministry Under Secretary has received the Pakistan Ambassador in Baghdad to explain the Iraqi Government's view and ask the Ambassador to convey that view to his Government.

[Note: In the same bulletin Baghdad radio reported that Nimat an-Nimat, Foreign Ministry Under Secretary, had seen heads of Arab diplomatic missions and given them similar information on Iranian "military provocations". The radio added that the Iraqi Foreign Ministry had also notified the UN Secretary-General of Iranian "concentrations and threats".]

Baghdad Report of Arrests in Iran

Baghdad home service in Arabic 11.30 GMT 2.2.70

Text of report:

Reports from Tehran indicate that the Shah's authorities have made a number of arrests, including 300 Iranian officers and soldiers on the pretext of disobeying orders issued by Gen. Kazimi to the naval forces on the night of the abortive plot against Iraq.

The reports also say that the Shah's Government has recently completed the construction of the (?Kashaneh-e No) settlement between Mohammareh [Khórramshahr] and Ahwaz and the Behruz mountain settlement between Abadan and Mohammareh under the supervision of Zionist engineers.

A few days ago American Intelligence completed building a radar station in Abol Khan near the (?Azrishot) base, another radar station in Mohammareh (?Sentab) and a radio station for Abadan in the Amirabad area.

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- 6 FEB 1970	
NRQ 3	324/1

BRITISH EMBASSY,
KUWAIT.

(3/5)

4 February, 1970

Dear Department,

Iran/Iraq Relations

Please refer to your telegram No. 57 to Tehran about the Iranian Charge d'Affaires's complaints against the Iraqi Government. The Iranian Embassy here have sent us a copy of a Note sent to the Kuwaitis complaining against Iraqi breaches of diplomatic immunity, which we assume to be similar to that handed to Mr. Hayman. We are not therefore sending you a copy.

Yours ever,

Chancery

Near Eastern Department,
F.C.O.

cc Chancery, Baghdad
Tehran


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Mr Mahan
Ambassador
Raz & Co. 10/2

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2 CC
PERMANENT MISSION OF IRAN
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
777 THIRD AVENUE
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10017



U.C.S.
NEO (RM)
Channing
at
Baghdad
Cairo
Tehran
London
Beirut

The Permanent Representative of Iran to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Permanent Representative and Observers to the United Nations and has the honour to enclose herewith for their information, an unofficial translation of a note dated 28 January 1970 which was handed over simultaneously to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq in Baghdad and the Charge d'Affaires of Iraq in Tehran.

29 January 1970
2.7

28 January 1970

Mr. Abdul Khalegh Boushehri-Zadeh, an attache of the Iranian Embassy in Baghdad who arrived in Tehran today has submitted a report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the effect that on January 20, 1970 the Iraqi authorities, contrary to the international rules and practices, had arrested and kept him in detention for several hours during which he was beaten and insulted while being questioned in the presence of Mr. Saddam Hossain Al-Takriti, Deputy President of the Revolutionary Command Council and Taymour Bakhtiar. (1)

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs cannot but protest in the strongest terms against the arrest, detention, interrogation and beating of a diplomatic member of the Iranian Embassy in Baghdad who was entitled to diplomatic immunities as stipulated in the Vienna Convention of 1961 to which the Government of the Republic of Iraq has acceded. Furthermore, on his departure from Baghdad Airport, Mr. Boushehri-Zadeh was, once again, ill-treated by the Iraqi authorities; although he had an exit visa and his date of departure had been duly notified by the Charge d'Affaires of the Iranian Embassy to the Chief of Protocol of the Iraqi Foreign Office and the latter had given the assurance that Mr. Boushehri would be able to leave Iraq without any difficulties, while on board an Iranian airliner, an Iraqi officer attempted to remove him forcefully from the plane and put him under arrest. Faced with Mr. Boushehri-Zadeh's refusal to disembark accompanied with a strong protest by the Iranian Charge d'Affaires who was at the Airport, the Iraqi officer finally allowed him to proceed.

(1) An Iranian criminal fugitive presently living in Baghdad.

However, it took one and a half hours before the Iranian airliner was allowed to take off, and this caused great inconvenience to all passengers who were of different nationalities.

The Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs deems it necessary to protest against such behaviour on the part of the Iraqi authorities as it is in contravention of the established international rules and practices and holds the Government of the Republic of Iraq responsible for such premeditated incidents, the consequences of which would have to be borne by that Government.

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PRIORITY BAGHDAD

REGISTRY No. 10

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 105 FEB 1970

4 FEBRUARY 1970

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103 324 1

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELNO 102 OF 4 FEBRUARY RFI TEHRAN BAHRAIN
RESIDENCY KUWAIT BEIRUT CAIRO UKMIS NEW YORK AND MOSCOW.

ON 2 FEBRUARY THE TURKISH PAKISTANI AND SOVIET AMBASSADORS AND
(IN A SEPARATE GROUP) AMBASSADORS OF ARAB COUNTRIES WERE SUMMONED BY
THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, GIVEN AN ACCOUNT OF IRANIAN
MILITARY PROVOCATIONS FOLLOWING THE RECENT ABORTIVE COUP AND TOLD
THAT A REPORT HAD BEEN SENT TO THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL.

2. OTHER AMBASSADORS WERE NOT SUMMONED- BUT ON 3 FEBRUARY A SIMILAR
EXERCISE WAS CONDUCTED BY THE DIRECTOR OF MILITARY OPERATIONS IN
RESPECT OF SERVICE ATTACHES, INCLUDING MY OWN.

3. COLONEL MUHAMMAD ALI SAID, AFTER DEPLORING THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE
IRANIAN SERVICE ATTACHES IN THE RECENT PLOT, DREW ATTENTION TO THE
CALMNESS AND MODERATION DISPLAYED BY THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT IN THE
FACE OF CURRENT PROVOCATIONS. THUS

(A) DESPITE IRANIAN COMPLICITY IN THE PLOT, THEY HAD NOT SEVERED
RELATIONS.

(B) IRAN HAD SINCE THEN QUOTE CONCENTRATED THE WHOLE OF HER
STRIKE FORCE UNQUOTE ON THE IRAQI BORDERS. IRAQ HAD NOT
RESPONDED SIMILARLY.

/(C) THERE HAD

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-2-

(C) THERE HAD BEEN A MARKED INCREASE IN IRANIAN VIOLATIONS OF IRAQI AIR SPACE AND TERRITORIAL WATERS. AGAIN IRAQ HAD NOT REACTED.

4. THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE , ON WHOSE BEHALF THE D M O WAS SPEAKING, ASKED THE ASSEMBLED ATTACHES TO REPORT THIS SITUATION TO THEIR GOVERNMENTS. AS LAST YEAR, AT THE TIME OF THE SHATT AL ARAB CRISIS, THE IRAQIS DID NOT WANT A WAR BUT WERE BEING SADLY PROVOKED.

5. COLONEL MUHAMMAD ALI SAID, AS HAS BEEN DISCLOSED IN THE IRAQI PRESS, PLAYED A MAJOR PART IN THE PENETRATION AND CONTROL OF THE RECENT PLOT.

FCO PASS POSTS IN PREAMBLE.

MR. BALFOUR PAUL

[Reprinted as requested]

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Rg

With the compliments of
(S.L. Egerton)
**THE UNITED KINGDOM MISSION
TO THE UNITED NATIONS**

la. PNM
6/2

**845 THIRD AVENUE,
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10022**

3 February, 1970

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PRIORITY ANKARA

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO. 213


4 FEBRUARY 1970

23

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ADDRESSED TO FCO TELNO 213 OF 4 FEB RFI ROUTINE TO BAGHDAD,
TEHRAN AND HQ BFNE (DEF'COMMEN PASS)



IRAQ -IRAN RELATIONS.

M I P T. FOREIGN MINISTRY HAVE CONFIRMED TO US THAT GENERAL AMMASH'S
VISIT TOOK THEM COMPLETELY BY SURPRISE. THEY HAD THREE HRS NOTICE
OF IT.

2. THE LAST SENTENCE OF THE SPOKESMAN'S STATEMENT IS NO DOUBT
TRUE BUT WE DOUBT WHETHER TURKEY WILL BE PREPARED TO TAKE ON ANY
FORMAL MEDIATION.

FCO PASS ROUTINE BAGHDAD, AND MOD COMMEN FOR HQBFNE.

SIR R. SARELL

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/
/SENT TO D.C.C./

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EN CLAIR

PRIORITY ANKARA TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELNO. 228 5 FEBRUARY 1970

UNCLASSIFIED

18

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 - 6 FEB 1970 NeQ 3/324/1

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELNO 228 DATED 5 FEB
R.F.I. TO BAGHDAD, TEHRAN, HQBFNE.
(DEFENCE COMMEN PASS HQBFNE).

MY TELNO 212: IRAQ - IRAN RELATIONS.

AFTER DISCUSSIONS WITH THE TURKISH PRESIDENT AND PRIME
MINISTER, THE IRAQI MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR LEFT ANKARA
ON 4 FEBRUARY. SPEAKING TO THE PRESS BEFORE DEPARTURE,
HE SAID THAT TURKEY WOULD TAKE THE NECESSARY ACTION ON THE
IRAQI-IRAN CONFLICT "WHETHER OR NOT WE ASK HER TO" BECAUSE
OF HER FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH BOTH IRAQ AND IRAN.

2. "SOURCES" ARE QUOTED AS STATING THAT GENERAL AMMASH
HAD ASKED TURKEY TO USE HER INFLUENCE WITH IRAN IN
CONNECTION WITH THE SHATT-AL-ARAB ISSUE AND THAT TURKEY HAD
AGREED TO HELP.

ACCORDING TO THE PRESS, THERE WAS ALSO DISCUSSION OF RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS OVER THE KURDS IN IRAQ.

SIR R. SARELL

[SENT TO D.C.C.]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N.E.D.

S.E.D.

I.P.D.

NEWS DEPT

MOD INTERNAL

By [signature]

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CYPHER CAT A

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25

PRIORITY BAGHDAD

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 105

6 FEBRUARY 1970

TOP COPY

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RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 - 6 FEB 1970 NEQ 3/324/1

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELNO 105/6 FEBRUARY R F I ANKARA
RAWALPINDI AND TEHRAN.

ANKARA TELNO 212 TO FCO (NOT TO RAWALPINDI)
IRAQ / IRAN RELATIONS.

ALTHOUGH AMMASH'S OWN OFFICIAL ACCOUNT ON RETURN FROM HIS
MISSION TO ANKARA UNCONVINCINGLY RELATED IT TO THE PROMOTION
OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION, HE TOLD MY TURKISH COLLEAGUE THAT
HE BELIEVED HE HAD PERSUADED THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT TO
BRING PRESSURE ON THE IRANIANS TO CALL OFF THEIR MILITARY
THREATS AND PROVOCATIONS (SEE MY TELNO 192.)

2. JAWARI, MINISTER OF STATE FOR PRESIDENTIAL AFFAIRS,
AND BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN SIMULTANEOUSLY SENT TO PAKISTAN PRES-
UMABLY WITH A SIMILAR BRIEF.

FCO PASS ANKARA TEHRAN AND RAWALPINDI.

MR. BALFOUR PAUL

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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I.P.D.
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M.O.D.(INT.)

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9/2.

EN CLAIR


PRIORITY ANKARA TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TEL NO.233
UNCLASSIFIED

6 FEBRUARY 1970

26
TOP COPY

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELNO 233 DATED 18/2/70 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION
TO TEHRAN, BAGHDAD AND HQBFNE (DEFENCE COMMEN PSE
PASS HQBFNE).



MYTELNO 228.

IRAQ-IRAN.

SECRETARY GENERAL OF TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTRY, ORHAN ERALP, LEFT
BY AIR FOR TEHRAN ON EVENING OF 5 FEB.

2. ACCORDING TO ONE NEWSPAPER, HE WILL GO ON FROM TEHRAN
TO BAGHDAD "IF NECESSARY".

SIR R.SARELL

PM
10h

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION:

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S. EUR. DEPT
I.P.D.
NEWS DEPT
M.O.D. (INTERNAL)

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PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO. 266

06 FEBRUARY 1970.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

ADDRESSED TO F.C.O. TELEGRAM NO. 266 DATED 06 FEBRUARY, 1970,  
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO BAHRAIN RESIDENCY, BAHRAIN AGENCY,  
TEHRAN, UKMIS GENEVA, KUWAIT, BAGHDAD, AND SAVING TO WASHINGTON,  
CAIRO, AND JEDDA.

FOR ATTENTION SATURDAY.

IRAQ/IRAN.

MY IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING TELEGRAM.

|                                                              |
|--------------------------------------------------------------|
| RECEIVED IN<br>REGISTRY N. 10<br>- 9 FEB 1970<br>NEQ 3/324/4 |
|--------------------------------------------------------------|

BUNCHE SAID THAT IT WAS PARTICULARLY UNFORTUNATE THAT  
RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN WERE SO BAD AT THIS PARTICULAR  
STAGE. THE IRAQI ACTING PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE HAD CALLED ON  
U THANT YESTERDAY AND HAD HANDED HIM A FORMAL NOTE COMPLAINING  
THAT THE IRANIANS WERE MASSING TROOPS ON THE IRAQI FRONTIER.  
HE HAD OBLIQUELY SUGGESTED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT MIGHT ASK FOR U  
THANT'S GOOD OFFICES OVER THIS PROBLEM, AND HAD INDIRECTLY  
MENTIONED A U.N. OBSERVER MISSION. HE DID NOT REPLY WHEN U THANT  
ASKED HIM STRAIGHT OUT WHETHER HE WAS IN FACT REQUESTING GOOD  
OFFICES. VAKIL HAD EARLIER CALLED ON U THANT TO SHOW HIM AN AGENCY  
REPORT THAT THE IRAQ GOVERNMENT HAD DECIDED TO ASK FOR THE  
SECRETARY-GENERAL'S GOOD OFFICES OVER THIS PROBLEM. THE IRAQI  
HAD AGREED THAT U THANT SHOULD GIVE A COPY OF HIS NOTE TO VAKIL.

F.C.O. PLEASE PASS PRIORITY TO BAHRAIN RESIDENCY, BAHRAIN AGENCY,  
TEHRAN, UKMIS GENEVA, KUWAIT, BAGHDAD, AND SAVING TO CAIRO, JEDDA.

LORD CARADON

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION:

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CYPHER/CAT A

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PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO. 266

06 FEBRUARY 1970.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

ADDRESSED TO F.C.O. TELEGRAM NO. 266 DATED 06 FEBRUARY, 1970,  
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO BAHRAIN RESIDENCY, BAHRAIN AGENCY,  
TEHRAN, UKMIS GENEVA, KUWAIT, BAGHDAD, AND SAVING TO WASHINGTON,  
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FOR ATTENTION SATURDAY.

IRAQ/IRAN.

MY IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING TELEGRAM.

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HAD AGREED THAT U THANT SHOULD GIVE A COPY OF HIS NOTE TO VAKIL.

F.C.O. PLEASE PASS PRIORITY TO BAHRAIN RESIDENCY, BAHRAIN AGENCY,  
TEHRAN, UKMIS GENEVA, KUWAIT, BAGHDAD, AND SAVING TO CAIRO, JEDDA.

LORD CARADON

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION:

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P.U.S.D.  
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NOV 11 1970  
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28

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No. 10  
- 9 FEB 1970  
NLQ3/324/1



BRITISH EMBASSY,  
DJAKARTA,

3 February, 1970.

Iran / Iran

*this is becoming a bore.*

*By epe*

*Am  
9/2*

Dear Department,

You may perhaps be interested to see the enclosed Circular Note and its attached statement, sent by the Iranian Embassy to all foreign missions in Djakarta.

Yours ever,

Chancery.

*Be*

Near Eastern Department,  
F.C.O.

c.c. + Enclosures.

Chanceries:-

Teheran,

Bagdad.





IMPERIAL EMBASSY OF IRAN  
DJAKARTA

Rec'd 3/2 (3)

897

No.: 1156

The Imperial Embassy of Iran presents its compliments to all Diplomatic, Consular and United Nations Missions in Djakarta and has the honour to enclose the attached circular in order to give clarifications regarding the recent developments between Iran and Iraq, and in future will not hesitate to give further facts in this respect.

The Imperial Embassy of Iran avails itself of this opportunity to renew to all Diplomatic, Consular and the United Nations Missions in Djakarta the assurances of its highest consideration.

Djakarta, 28th January 1970

All Diplomatic, Consular and  
United Nations Missions

D j a k a r t a





IMPERIAL EMBASSY OF IRAN  
D J A K A R T A

The Government of Iraq in the mass execution carried out in Iraq, falsely and without any ground has accused some foreign countries including the Imperial Government of Iran. The Ambassador of Iran with the Military Attache, his assistant, Press Attache and the Third Secretary of the Embassy of Iran in Iraq were declared non grata and asked to leave Iraq.

At the airport of Baghdad not only the Ambassador of Iran and his staff were denied the use of VIP room, the departure of the plane of the Imperial Embassy was delayed for hours and all this time they were kept in the general departure lounge of the airport standing, and when they finally departed, they were accorded a treatment contrary to all the International and diplomatic norms practised all the world over.

Whereas the Imperial Government of Iran in spite of all these discourtesies, did not declare the Ambassador of Iraq and the staff of their Embassy as persona non grata and accorded them any treatment contrary to International practice, but on the reciprocal basis asked them to leave Iran. The Chief of the First Political Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran was assigned to see them off and entertain them in the special VIP room at the airport in Teheran. All the diplomatic and International norms were followed in this respect.

Unfortunately it is to be added that the Embassy of Iraq in Teheran again resorted to an attitude contrary to courtesy, and on the 26th January published a statement in the morning issue of the papers in Teheran repeating the false, illogical and baseless accusation of the Government of Iraq and stated that American Colonialism employed its communication apparatus and the Imperial Government of Iran and all its apparatus to assist and supply the needs of the Iraqi plotters, and the aim of the plotters was to overthrow the revolutionary regime in Iraq and the exclusion of Iraq from the Union of Arab countries, and the settlement of Palestine question.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran, the same day in Teheran and Baghdad, strongly protested against the re-occurrence of these shameless false accusations and the publication of their statement in Iran (the accreditaire country), and strongly rejected these baseless statements as a move contradictory to International practice and diplomatic courtesy. The Imperial Government of Iran has further stated that it will preserve all its rights and the course of action it might take in this respect.

Djakarta, 28th January 1970



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Registry  
No. NEQ 3/324/1

~~FAIR~~  
DRAFT

WHITE MINUTE

Type 1 + 2

29

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~Top Secret.~~  
~~Secret.~~  
Confidential  
~~Restricted.~~  
~~Unclassified.~~

To:—

Mr. Burrows  
Legal Counsellor.

From  
Mr. Hinojiffé

Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

Iraq/Iran Relations

The Note from the Iraqi Embassy (Folio 13) refers to <sup>an incident</sup> ~~instances~~ described by Mr. Howley in his letter of 18 December at Folio 190 in File NEQ 3/324/1 attached.

2. You have seen earlier papers on the Shatt Al Arab dispute and you <sup>have</sup> previously considered the question of our attitude on the legality of the 1937 Treaty between Iraq and Iran. Iraq insists the Treaty is still fully in force while Iran, for various reasons, has declared that it is <sup>now</sup> ~~new~~ <sup>NULL AND</sup> void (see, for instance, Folio 39).

We concluded in April 1969, as we did in 1959, under similar circumstances that in the absence of any new situation there was not much justification for the Iranian claim that Iraqi failure to observe all the provisions of the 1937 Treaty gave the Iranians the right to denounce it unilaterally (folios 46 and 55).

3. The immediate problem is how to react to the Iraqi Note. It has not <sup>yet</sup> been acknowledged as I was not sure <sup>IS CORRECT PRACTICE (FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF COMITING HMG)</sup> ~~whether it has~~ <sup>whether it has</sup> ~~been~~ <sup>been</sup> taken notice of <sup>a</sup> ~~the~~ Note addressed to HMG about a vessel, admittedly British owned and registered, which was under an obligation by the terms of her Charter to obey the instructions of the Iranian company who had hired her (ALLOT telegram No.1 and Tehran Telegram No.2 of 1 January).

CONFIDENTIAL

/4.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

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FLAG 'A'  
6/2  
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FLAG 'C'

FLAG 'D' & 'E'

FLAG 'F' & 'G'



CONFIDENTIAL

4. The Iraqis have asked us to "take all necessary steps to ensure that British ships sailing in Iraqi territorial waters in Shatt Al Arab abide by the regulations and rules governing navigation therein" We have been ~~very~~ careful to avoid taking sides in this dispute and accordingly have been ~~most~~ cautious in our advice to ship owners which we would not like <sup>to have</sup> interpreted <sup>(BY EITHER THE IRANIAN OR THE IRAQI)</sup> as being biased in the favour of one side or the other. During the past few months <sup>(ALTHOUGH</sup> the recent marked deterioration in Iraq/Iran relations arising out of Iraqi allegations that Iranians were involved in the recent abortive coup in Baghdad may have changed the situation.) <sup>a</sup> modus vivendi has been in operation in the Shatt ~~Al Arab~~ on the vexed question of flags and pilotage whereby Iranian vessels and those on charter to Iran fly the Iranian flag and take on Iranian pilots <sup>and</sup> ~~on~~ all other ships fly the Iraqi flag and make use of the services of the Iraqi pilots. This seems to have worked well <sup>and</sup> ~~when~~ there have been no serious incidents.

5. I would welcome your advice ~~(and that of~~ ~~Protocol and Conference Department)~~ on how (if at all) we should <sup>Respond</sup> ~~react~~ to the Iraqi Note. If we pass <sup>to</sup> on advice to British shipowners ~~as~~ requested by the Iraqis in paragraph 5 of their Note and subsequently tell the Iraqis that we were doing so, would we not <sup>be regarded as accepting that the</sup> ~~by our~~ implication at any rate, ~~excepting that~~ Iraqi case <sup>on</sup> ~~when~~ navigation and other issues in the Shatt Al Arab was the correct one? If we do reply to the Note would we be correct in saying that as the vessel concerned was on charter to an Iranian company at the time and was therefore under the control of that

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN



CONFIDENTIAL

company <sup>then</sup> ~~that~~ any complaints concerning  
infringements of the Iraqi regulations should  
be addressed to the Iranian authorities and  
not to Her Majesty's Government.

6. I have consulted ~~AMTD~~ who agree that these  
points should be put to you.

7. I attach to ~~terms~~ <sup>on given</sup> but a 1937 Treaty ~~and~~  
in a Research Department Memorandum on the subject.

A

Protocol & Conference Report  
attached on Page 3. I must believe you

✓  
FLAG 'H'

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

CONFIDENTIAL



30

Mr Hinchcliffe

# Turkey intervenes in Iran-Iraq dispute

From Our Correspondent

Teheran, Feb. 6

A cloak of silence has been thrown over the visit to Teheran of Mr. Orhan Eralp, Secretary-General of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, who arrived by air from Ankara last night on what is believed to be a mission of mediation between Iran and Iraq. A brief announcement this afternoon said only that he had come for a short stay.

Mr. Eralp had a working lunch with Mr. Ardeshir Zahedi, the Iranian Foreign Minister, and is believed to have given him a report on the visit to Ankara on Tuesday of General Saleh Mahdi Ammash, the Iraqi Minister of the Interior, who brought a message from the Iraqi President to the Turkish President.

The message is thought to have included Iraq's complaints against Iran and its terms for agreement. The subjects covered are likely to have included the dispute over the Shatt al Arab waterway, and the war in Iraqi Kurdistan, which the Iraqi Government is trying to end. Iraq has accused Iran of giving aid to the Kurdish rebels.

Mr. Eralp said this morning: "There is no question of mediation. We thought it our duty to keep the Iranian Government informed of the visit of Ammash to Ankara."

This is the first time Turkey is believed to have intervened in the dispute between Iran and Iraq. Turkey has a joint border with both countries and is, like Iran, also a member of the Central Treaty Organization (Cento). But Turkey's interest in the dispute is believed to be connected with Iraq's reported offer of some form of autonomy to the Kurds. Turkey, like Iran, has a large Kurdish population.

According to some sources, the Iraqi Government as a gesture to Mulla Mustafa Barzani, the Kurdish rebel leader, has sacrificed Jalal Talabani, the leader of the Kurdish pro-Government faction, who is believed either to be under arrest or to have been sent abroad.

Our Ankara Correspondent writes: Turkey is engaged in diplomatic activity to prevent an armed clash between Iraq and Iran.

General Ammash is reported to have informed the Turkish Government that war between Iran and Iraq is "imminent" and to have asked the Turkish Government to use "friendly influence" on Iran to prevent a clash.

The Foreign Ministry spokesman, in Ankara, said here that Mr. Eralp will convey the Iraqi view over the Shatt al Arab dispute to Iran. It is understood that later he might go to Iraq to convey the Iranians' viewpoint. The spokesman was careful to avoid defining Turkey's effort as mediation, but this was understood to be a possibility for the future.

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No. 10  
11 FEB 1970  
NEQ 3/324/1

Ryza  
PMM  
10/2



IN VIEW OF OUR PREVIOUS ATTENTION WITH BOTH THESE COMMISSIONS  
OUR ONLY TO THE TO RESOLVE THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THEM AND HAVE  
DIFFICULTY AND TENSION. WE FEEL IT IS  
THE ONLY REGION LEFT  
COMPLAINED. THAT THE ONE + OTHER FOR THE FIRST ADDED FIRE TO  
BORDER CHIEF NIGEL FOR ONE OF COMMISSION IN THE BUREAU SITUATION  
RENEGA BOINDED ONE TO LOOKING OFFICERS HAVE THE BUREAU-BOYD  
BE COMPLETED AS A-LEVELING ON THE BUREAU. TO HAVE. BE THE  
THAT HAVE IT STEVE THAT HAVE A-LEVELING AND BOYD COMTD IN NO WAY  
BSC DISPUTE 3: LOOKING ONLY TO BUREAU

RE BSC NOV 1952 WAS ON CRD

BUREAU-BOYD SERVICES  
COMMISSION TO BE THE GOOD OFFICERS TO RESOLVE TENSION AFFECTING  
INDIVIDUAL MINISTERS THE BUREAU COMMISSIONS HAVE ASKED THE LOOKING  
BUREAU COMMISSIONS ABOUT VARIOUS THINGS IN VARIOUS. THROUGH THE  
HAD DECIDED TO BRING OFFICERS OF THE BUREAU AND SETTLED  
EVENLY SAID THAT THE LOOKING COMMISSIONS ON ITS OWN INITIATIVE  
BSC DISPUTE 5: BUREAU REQUEST FOR GOOD OFFICERS

*See Barton Dep-*

115

*D St (West)*

BEFORE LEAVING LONDON HE SAID HIS VISIT HAD NOT BEEN  
RETURNED HOME TODAY.  
BUREAU BOYD SAID HIS VISIT WITH BUREAU COMMISSIONS OFFICERS AND  
CLERKS (BOYD) LOOKING FOR THE BUREAU SECRETARY GENERAL  
BSC BUREAU-BOYD DISPUTE: NOT MEDIATING: SAID LOOKING OFFICIAL

WEND B

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| VR03/254/1  |
| 1952 NOV 10 |
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Mr. Hinchcliffe  
Mr. Mahan

Reg. sta.  
Iraq / Iran  
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NBBBC B

B20 IRAQ-IRAN DISPUTE: NOT MEDIATING, SAYS TURKISH OFFICIAL  
(TEHRAN RADIO) TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTRY SECRETARY GENERAL  
ORHAN ERALP ENDED HIS TALKS WITH IRANIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND  
RETURNED HOME TODAY.

BEFORE LEAVING TEHRAN HE SAID HIS VISIT HAD NOT BEEN  
CONCERNED WITH MEDIATING BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ. IT HAD CONCERNED  
IRAQI INTERIOR MINISTER AMMASH'S TALKS IN ANKARA LAST WEEK.  
AMMASH HAD EXPRESSED HIS GOVERNMENT'S VIEWS ABOUT THE BORDER  
CRISIS AND OTHER ISSUES AFFECTING IRANIAN-IRAQI RELATIONS. HE  
HAD ALSO POINTED OUT IN ANKARA THAT THE PRESENT TENSION ON THE  
IRANIAN-IRAQI BORDER MIGHT INTENSIFY THE CRISIS IN THE REGION.

MF BBC MON 1420 9/2 JW (KY)

B20 DISPUTE 2: IRAQI REQUEST FOR GOOD OFFICES

ERALP SAID THAT THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT, ON ITS OWN INITIATIVE,  
HAD DECIDED TO BRIEF OFFICIALS OF THE FRIENDLY AND ALLIED  
IRANIAN GOVERNMENT ABOUT AMMASH'S TALKS IN ANKARA. THROUGH ITS  
INTERIOR MINISTER THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT HAD ASKED THE TURKISH  
GOVERNMENT TO USE ITS GOOD OFFICES TO REDUCE TENSION AFFECTING  
IRANIAN-IRAQI RELATIONS.

MF BBC MON 1423 9/2 JW (KY)


B20 DISPUTE 3: TURKEY'S DUTY TO SEEK HARMONY

ERALP MADE IT CLEAR THAT WHAT AMMASH HAD SAID COULD IN NO WAY  
BE CONSTRUED AS A WARNING OR AN ULTIMATUM TO IRAN. HE HAD  
MERELY POINTED OUT TO TURKISH OFFICIALS THAT THE IRANIAN-IRAQI  
BORDER CRISIS MIGHT GET OUT OF CONTROL IF THE PRESENT SITUATION  
CONTINUED. ERALP WENT ON: +TURKEY, FOR ITS PART, WOULD LIKE TO  
SEE OUR REGION FULL OF C

ONFLICTS AND TENSION. WE FEEL IT IS  
OUR DUTY TO TRY TO RESOLVE THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ  
IN VIEW OF OUR FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH BOTH THESE COUNTRIES.+

END BBC MON 1425 9/2JW (KY)





IMPERIAL  
IRANIAN EMBASSY

*Mr. Mahdavi Jan 16/2*  
*for info & Pa.*

*32*

*Mr. Finckh Jan 16/2*

AIDE-MEMOIRE .

*Mr. Mirfakhari left this  
with me to-day. I agreed  
that interference with staff of  
diplomatic missions was  
inexcusable*

*J.P.3*  
*16.2*

Mr. Ali Beladi, a member of the  
Administrative Staff of the Imperial Iranian  
Embassy in Baghdad, was detained on the 22nd  
January, 1970 by Iraqi officials for almost twelve  
hours, during which time he was subjected to  
interrogations, beatings and coercion. After  
this incident the Imperial Iranian Embassy in  
Baghdad decided that Mr. Beladi should return to  
Iran, but the officials of the Iraqi Government  
created great difficulties for his departure from  
Iraq.

Although Mr. Beladi's Identification Card  
was issued by the Foreign Ministry in Baghdad and  
duly signed and sealed by the appropriate authorities  
of the Ministry, the said officials refused to  
recognise the Card, claiming that it was forged.

The mistreatment of Mr. Beladi by the Iraqi  
officials is yet another example of their disregard  
for the recognised principles of international  
practices and conduct.

London,  
16th February, 1970.



Cutting dated 14 FEB 1970

10

33

# IRAN AND IRAQ

*From the Chargé d'Affaires in the Imperial Iranian Embassy*

Sir,—His Excellency the Ambassador of the Republic of Iraq has once again availed himself of your columns (February 2) to give vent to the same old views which he has repeatedly expressed in your paper on the relations with Iran. I must say that I feel compelled to seek your indulgence for a response, hoping, at the same time, that it may bring to an end this prolonged exchange.

The Ambassador of the Republic of Iraq has advanced a rather curious syllogism with the following premises and conclusion:—

Firstly, he states that "the American Iranian alliance is only too known to need affirmation". Here, he is right. It is indeed an open and well known fact that the United States and Iran are allies, and no attempt has ever been made to hide it.

Secondly, quoting the biased views expressed in a newspaper article, he tries to establish that Iran and Israel are allies or have "strange" relations. The accuracy of such an assertion leaves a great deal to be desired. For an allegation as serious as "strange relations between Iran and Israel" one would have expected that the Ambassador of the Republic of Iraq would have more solid ground to stand on than merely the slanted views contained in an article.

Finally, on the strength of such premises, he arrives at his conclusion, charging Iran with conspiracy to overthrow the Government of Iraq.

If this curious syllogism did not involve a serious slander against Iran leading to a deterioration of relations between two neighbours, one would have discarded it, with amusement, as an exercise in sophistry. Under the circumstances, however, we cannot remain silent when the public might be misled by such gross misrepresentation of facts. We owe it to your readers to provide them with the full picture.

The picture that the world has of Iraq, today, is one of mass murder and oppression under a fascistic regime—as evidenced by the recent executions. Among those executed were people who had just been released from jail. Is it any wonder, therefore, that the main preoccupation of the present Government of Iraq during the short period of time since its coming to power, should have been a struggle for survival?

At a time when unrest and instability are the order of the day in Iraq, it is only natural that the Government of Iraq should be in a desperate mood. To cling to the idea of creating a foreign bogey in the hope that, out of fear, the Iraqi people might rally behind it, is an old gimmick.

As it would be extremely difficult to incite fear of Iran among our Iraqi

brothers, they have, in addition, brought the Americans into the picture, to give it a maximum air of gravity. But I wonder whether the Iraqi people, who have been fed the same propaganda line over and over again during recent years, would be much moved even by such allegations.

The Ambassador of the Republic of Iraq while professing that "good and neighbourly relations is a two-way street" proceeds to level groundless charges against Iran of "conspiratorial activities, unilateral abrogation of international treaties, and interference in the internal affairs of Iraq. . . ." Despite the fact that we have, on every occasion and most recently in my last letter to The Times, shown that these accusations don't have a leg to stand on, the Iraqi Government persists in its illusions.

If, in fact, the Government of Iraq was serious in its professions of good neighbourliness, it would have responded to the many overtures by Iran for consolidating good neighbourly and friendly relations with her, which is the cornerstone of Iran's policy not only towards Iraq but, as it has been proved, towards all her other neighbours.

Yours faithfully,

N. MIRFAKHRAI, Chargé d'Affaires, a.i.

Imperial Iranian Embassy, Feb. 8.

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No. 10  
10 FEB 1970

NEP 3/324/1

PM 18/1

Reg 2 p.a.

Jan 1970



CONFIDENTIAL

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treat  
PMM

Dear Peter,



BRITISH EMBASSY,  
TEHRAN.

12 February 1970

Pa PMM w/v

(34)

182

Mr. P. M. ...  
my ...  
Reg & Co.

Iran/Iraq Relations

Since my letter (3/5) of 29 January, the crisis in Iran/Iraq relations has continued unabated, but it has been difficult to get at the Iranians' real thinking and much (though not all) of the present letter is based on public comment.

2. Both the Foreign Minister himself and the morning papers have kept up a barrage of criticism against "the blood-soaked Baathists", and another press conference was held yesterday at the M.F.A. to exhibit a locally employed member of the Iranian Embassy in Baghdad who had allegedly escaped to Tehran after being tortured by the Iraqi authorities. The mass media have reacted strongly to every new move by the Iraqis (e.g. a report that the Iraqi Government had asked the U.N. Secretary-General to intervene was dismissed as yet another Baathist red-herring designed to divert Iraqi public attention from their own domestic plight); the Iraqi Foreign Ministry's briefing of the Arab and other envoys in Baghdad about "the aggressive Iranian military build-up on the Iraqi frontiers" drew the retort from the Tehran press that there had been no military build-up in recent months, since the Iraqis themselves increased their border forces last year. There was a similar reaction to Radio Baghdad's claim that the Iranian authorities were evicting border villages and setting up Jewish "kibbutzim" in their place. Meanwhile, Zahedi has kept up the steam with a series of luncheons for Senators, M.Ps and journalists, at the most recent of which he accused the Iraqi Government of having deliberately stirred up the current crisis only to prolong its own life, and warned that Iran "will answer fire with fire".

3. This tough talk of Zahedi's has undoubtedly succeeded in diverting attention from the facts of the attempted coup, and has forestalled calls for stronger action from the Majlis, who have supported the Government throughout. Moreover, as I forecast at the end of my letter of 29 January, the continuing tension has also helped the Government to justify increased provision for defence expenditure in next year's Budget. In his Budget speech last Sunday, in which he announced an increase of \$165 million in national defence costs, the Prime Minister made pointed references to the "new threat to the western frontiers of our country" and accused the Iraqis of concentrating troops along Iran's border in order to justify their lack of active participation in the war with Israel.

4. However, the four-day visit to Tehran of Mr. Orhan Eralp, the Secretary-General of the Turkish Foreign Ministry (from 5 - 9 February) has, I think, had some beneficial effects. Although Eralp himself and the Turkish Embassy here both insisted that no question of mediation was involved, and that

J. P. Tripp, Esq.,  
Near Eastern Department,  
F.C.O.

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visit was merely intended to inform the Iranians about General Ammash's sudden appearance in Ankara, the Iranian press immediately started to speculate about a possible peace plan. According to one (notoriously unreliable) journalist, Eralp brought with him an Iraqi proposal including the following five points: immediate normalisation of frontier conditions, cessation of the propaganda war, negotiations at Ambassadorial level in Ankara, re-exchange of Ambassadors between Baghdad and Tehran, and reopening of negotiations on the Shatt al-Arab. According to the same source, the Iranians gave Eralp a "conditional but positive" reply, the conditions probably including an Iraqi apology and the repatriation of General Bakhtiar. The Turkish Embassy has denied these stories; Eralp himself declined to express his own Government's views about the issue, and merely said on his departure that the Iranians' views would be passed on to General Ammash through diplomatic channels. According to Khalatbari, the Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister, Eralp was told that Iran was ready to start negotiations immediately with Baghdad and to withdraw her forces from the border if Iraq agreed to do the same. This offer has not yet been publicly confirmed by Zahedi himself.

5. The possibility of a Pakistan peace initiative, following Javari's visit to Rawalpindi, has also been mooted in the local press. But the Pakistanis are too pro-Iranian to be taken seriously as mediators, and have not gone so far as the Turks. The Jordanians seem to have dropped out of the picture altogether.

6. Speculation about the reasons behind General Ammash's visit to Ankara and the subsequent visit of Eralp to Tehran has concentrated here on the possibility that Baghdad may indeed be worried about the frontier situation. Eralp emphasised in his public statements that the Iraqi Government had declared itself "gravely concerned" about the concentration of armed forces along the border and feared lest the situation get out of control. Prominence has also been given to reports that the Iraqi delegate at the Cairo summit was insisting on withdrawing Iraqi troops from the Israeli front. In fact there appears to have been no reinforcement of Iranian forces in the south, and the military situation on this side of the frontier remains much as I reported it two weeks ago. The deployment of F5s to Tabriz has been confirmed and two F4s are on immediate readiness at Mehrabad. There has been some movement of tanks in and around Abadan, and there are signs that the Iranians are, as last year, worried about the vulnerability of the refinery. But the naval units which moved out of Khorramshahr at the beginning of the crisis have now returned, and the Iranians claim to have assured Eralp that they would not act in such a way as to provoke military incidents.

7. There is a tendency among the local journalists here to believe that the Iranians' military precautions have been enough to make the Iraqis think again about provoking Iran. One journalist has stressed privately to us the extent, as he sees it, of the opposition to the present Iraqi regime in Basra and South Iraq, and the possibility that the army units there, influenced by Iranian propaganda, might turn against the Baathists



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(this fits in, though rather after the event, with the points mentioned in paragraph 3 of Symon's letter of 31 January). But the theory that Baghdad has grown frightened and wants to climb down, has a considerable tinge of Iranian wish-fulfilment about it. Despite the Turkish intervention there is certainly no sign as yet of any concrete advance towards a detente. As Kayhan International put it yesterday, it is not only a question of the Shatt, "what Iraq is really after is to have the world conflict of the Big Powers extended to the Persian Gulf region as soon as the British have withdrawn their troops from the Arab Emirates." In other words, it is the "Pax Iranica-to-be" that is at stake.

*Yours ever*

*Donald.*

(D. F. Murray)

Cc. to:

CHANCERIES at: BAGHDAD  
AMMAN  
BEIRUT  
ANKARA

HIGH COMMISSIONS at: RAWALPINDI

POLITICAL RESIDENCY, BAHRAIN.

-3-


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(3/2)

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BRITISH EMBASSY  
BAGHDAD

14 February 1970

35

Dear Peter,

Iraq/Iran Relations

17

We were interested to read Murray's letter 3/5 of 29 January to Peter Tripp with its account of developments in Tehran since the abortive coup here on 20/21 January.

2. The main development in Baghdad has been a sharp increase in hostile press and radio comment on the Iranian régime and against the alleged concentration of Iranian forces on the Iraqi border. There have been constant stories of ill-treatment of Iranian citizens, particularly Arabs in Khuzestan, at the hands of the Iranian authorities, interlarded with accounts of the participation of Zionist officers in Iranian military planning and in the security forces, and of the settling of Iranian Jews in the border area.

3. As you will have seen from telegrams General Ammash, the Minister of the Interior, made a swift visit to Turkey to explain the Iraqi Government's position and to express Iraq's anxiety at so-called Iranian provocations. At the same time Jawari went to Pakistan for a similar purpose.

4. The Iranian Embassy here also have circulated copies of the Notes accusing the Iraqis of ill-treating their Second Secretary and of obstructing the Iranian Chargé d'Affaires in the course of his normal business.

5. The Iraqis have also been quick to refute Iranian charges of maltreatment of the Shia community here in Iraq. One of the Ulema alleged by Radio Ahwaz to have been arrested made a statement which was published in the Iraqi press denying that he or any of his colleagues had been arrested or that their homes had been searched or that the library in Fao of the Ayatullah, the leader of the Shia community, had been searched.

6. Most of the criticism of the Iranians is based on the alleged concentration of troops on the frontier as evidence of the provocative attitude of the Shah's régime towards Iraq. The Iranians are seen as the allies and co-conspirators of Israel and the western "Imperialist" countries trying to divert the Iraqi revolution from its support of the national liberation struggle by the Palestinian people.

17.

P.R.M. Hinchcliffe, Esq.,  
Near Eastern Department,  
Foreign & Commonwealth Office,  
London, S.W.1.

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BRITISH EMBASSY  
BAGHDAD

7. Most of this is fairly small beer and is by no means as virulent or as massive as the campaign which was launched against Iran at the time of the Shatt-al-Arab crisis in Spring 1969. Nonetheless the Iraqi régime is making the most of Iran's involvement in the abortive coup and of the border "confrontation". At the same time there continues to be no hint of Kurdish complicity in the plot and such press mention of the Kurds as has appeared has stressed the genuine desire of the Kurdish population of Iraq to find a solution to this country's major problem. Whether they believe their own charges of Iranian troop concentrations on the border or not is hard to tell. I think that their major fear must be that the Iranians will now go all out to block if possible the agreement now being worked out between the Ba'athists and Barzani. The fact that no statement about this agreement was made as expected on 8 February may well show that the Iranians have had some success - though the more general supposition is that Barzani has slipped in a few extra last-minute conditions which are temporarily holding things up.

*Yours ever*  
*J.H. Symons*  
J (J.H. Symons)

Copies to: D.F. Murray, Esq., Tehran.  
Chanceries at Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Kuwait.  
Residency, Bahrain.

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36

# IRAQ AND IRAN

*From the Ambassador of the Republic of Iraq*

Sir,—In his letter which you published today, the Chargé d'Affaires of the Imperial Iranian Embassy wants to have his cake and eat it too. While indulging once more in personal attacks and making unfounded allegations against a neighbouring country which has so much in common with his own country, he expresses the hope that his "response" "may bring to an end this prolonged exchange". Surely there must be something more important for a diplomat to do than to indulge in futile public recriminations? For my part, I shall try again to abide by the rules of objective argument and request you to publish these brief comments and thus enable me to exercise my right of reply.

Firstly, if I made allusion to the Iranian-American alliance, it was in the context of the joint "imperialist" schemes and conspiracies against the socialist revolutionary regime in Iraq. It goes without saying that both governments realize that popular and socialist revolutions are both dangerous and contagious, hence the conspiratorial actions of this alliance against my country.

Secondly, when the distinguished Foreign Editor of a leading British newspaper (The Financial Times) called the special relationship of Iran and Israel an "alliance even an axis", he did not make that statement lightly. In his most revealing article of June 3 of last year, Mr. J. D. F. Jones explains how he talked to the Shah in Teheran during the fact-finding trip which also took him to Jerusalem. Obviously, in anticipation of denials such as the one made by the Iranian Chargé d'Affaires today, the Foreign Editor of The Financial Times explains after giving so many examples of Iranian-Israeli cooperation that "these facts will not exact anything but categorical denials from the Iranians".

Finally, the Iranian Chargé d'Affaires tries to reassure us on the intentions of the Iranian authorities towards Iraq. I wish I could believe him, but after the recent events in Iraq and what is now very well known concerning the Iranian involvement in the abortive coup, this will need more than a verbal assurance of an Iranian official. In this respect, shouldn't we

give more serious consideration to the declaration of the Prime Minister of Iran, Mr. Amir Abbas Hovehda, on the intentions of Iran towards Iraq. Your own newspaper, The Times, reported on the 9th of this month how the Prime Minister of Iran justified the need for increases in the budget of 1970-71 by referring to "Iran's confrontation with Iraq". Whom should we believe, the Prime Minister or the Chargé d'Affaires?

I abstained in my last letter from interfering in the internal affairs of Iran and left it to the tens of thousands of Iranians living in exile abroad to explain their attitude towards the regime in Iran. I have in my possession copies of letters which have been sent in the meantime by some of these Iranian patriots to the Editor of The Times, which convey very eloquently their feelings towards the oppressive, dictatorial and arbitrary regime in Iran.

Sincerely yours,

KADHIM M. KHALAF, Ambassador.  
Embassy of the Republic of Iraq,  
21 Queen's Gate, S.W.7, Feb. 14.

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No 10  
19 FEB 1970  
NAD 3/326/1

AMH 18/2  
Al-Mahmoudi 18/2  
to Reg. Sec.



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British Embassy,  
BAGHDAD.

37

7 February, 1970.

*P. R. M. Hinchcliffe*

19/2

(12)

S.S. Rowan More/S.S. Mystic

Please refer to my letter 21/19 of 21 January.

2. I now enclose Ministry of Foreign Affairs Note No. 180/180/4 of 29 January about the contravention by S.S. Mystic of Iraqi regulations in the Shatt-al-Arab, which the Ambassador, who was called in by Dr. Daud the Director-General of Protocol on 17 January was told to express. Dr. Daud said the behaviour of the S.S. Mystic had been even worse than that of the S.S. Rowan More since the captain had refused even to accept communications from the Iraqi authorities.
3. Dr. Daud asked if the behaviour of the two British ships indicated a change of attitude by H.M.G. to the Shatt-al-Arab dispute. The Ambassador assured him that this was not the case and that H.M.G. were unable to control the behaviour of ships on charter to Arya.
4. Dr. Daud also asked for a written reply to the note on S.S. Mystic. Will you please let me know how we should reply. Is there any thing more that could be added to the guidance given in paragraph 3 of telegram Allot of 1 January?

*Yours ever*

*A. Arnold*

(A. Arnold)

*Regd by*

*MM*

20/2

P. R. M. Hinchcliffe, Esq.,  
Near Eastern Department,  
F.C.O.

c c. J. K. T. Frost, Esq.,  
Shipping Policy Division,  
Board of Trade,  
John Adam Street,  
London, W.C.2.

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*In transmitting - copy  
to London, a covering letter, which  
will show - drafting please check!*

Translation.

No. 180/180/1. ADVANCE COPY

Ministry of Foreign Affairs,  
Political Department,

Baghdad, 29 January, 1970.

Action Copy to

3x20

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq presents its compliments to Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy, Baghdad, and, in continuation of the Ministry's Note No. 6614/6614/4x of the 7th of January, 1970, and the meeting held between the Director General of the Political Department at the Ministry and H.E. the Ambassador on 17 January, 1970, about a contravention carried out by a British ship "MYSTIC" to the navigation regulations and instructions in force in Shatt-el-Arab, has the honour to inform the Embassy that this British vessel entered the waters of Shatt-el-Arab on 5th January, 1970 without an Iraqi pilot, and was hoisting the Iranian flag and the flag of the pilot, and escorted by the <sup>Iranian</sup> tug "Aslu", without hoisting an Iraqi flag. When the vessel passed the Fao district at 1200 Hours on the same day, the vessel was hoisting the British flag in the rear, and the Iranian flag on the flag of the pilot on the pilot's room, and was escorted by two Iranian military launches Nos. 52 and 55, and the Iranian tug Aslu. The Iraqi Ports Administration despatched telegram of protest to the Master of the British vessel and the Port Director, Khorramshahr, concerning this contravention and made them responsible for these illegal contraventions and actions. The vessel "MYSTIC" did not anchor at 1257 Hours on the 5th of January, 1970, at Al Haritha, to the south of Khorramshahr Port, situated in the national waters of Iraq,



and was hoisting the Iranian flag, in lieu of the Iraqi flag, on the front mast in spite of the fact that it was in the national waters of Iraq. At 1400 Hours on the 6th of January, 1970, the British vessel MYSTIC left Al Hawitha to the direction of Khorramshahr Port without an Iraqi pilot. On the 12th of January, 1970, the said vessel left Khorramshahr Port to the direction of the south of Shatt-el-Arab and laid anchor at Bawarda, an Iranian anchorage, at 1151 Hours of the same day. ~~XXXXX~~ During its plowing in Shatt-el-Arab it was hoisting the British flag in its rear and the Iranian flag on its front mast. It did not hoist the Iraqi flag and was plowing without an Iraqi pilot and under the escort of an Iranian military launch No.55. The Iraqi Ports Administration despatched telegrams of protest to the master of the British ship and the Port Director at Khorramshahr for having contravened the navigation<sup>s</sup> regulations and laws in force in Shatt-el-Arab. At 0800 Hours on the 17th of January, 1970, this vessel left Bawarda (Abadan) anchorage under the escort of two Iranian military launches Nos. 52 and 55 while hoisting the British flag in the rear and the Iranian flag on the front mast and the pilot's flag without hoisting the Iraqi flag and without an Iraqi pilot. At 0935 of the same day the vessel passed Fao in the direction of the sea and was escorted by the above-mentioned two Iranian military launches. The Iraqi Ports Administration despatched telegrams of protest to the master of the British vessel and the Port Director at Khorramshahr for the contraventions committed by them against the navigation<sup>s</sup> regulations and instructions in force in Shatt-el-Arab.

The above-mentioned British vessel left the Pilots' station in the direction of the sea.



In drawing the attention of the esteemed Embassy once more to the contravention carried out by this British vessel to the navigation regulations and instructions in force in Shatt-el-Arab, the Ministry refers to its Notes Nos. 6614/6614/4 of the 25th of May, 1969, and the 7th of January, 1970, about the necessity of compliance by British vessels plowing in the national waters of Iraq in Shatt-el-Arab to the navigational regulations and instructions in force in Shatt-el-Arab, and requests the esteemed Embassy to intervene with the competent British authorities in order to contact all lines and companies and owners of British vessels making for the Ports situated on Shatt-el-Arab and ask them to comply with the regulations and instructions issued by the Iraqi Ports Administration concerning navigation in Shatt-el-Arab.

The Ministry avails itself of this opportunity to express its highest consideration and esteem.

Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy,  
Baghdad.



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Near Eastern Department, (38)

(NEQ.3/324/1)

25 February, 1970

S.S. Rowan More/S.S. Mystic (37)

Thank you for your letter 21/4 of 7 February.

2. We are in consultation with the other departments involved about any reply to the Iraqis on these two incidents. The Iraqi Embassy here has sent us a note about the Rowan More and I should imagine that our reply to the Rowan More, could, mutatis mutandis, serve as an answer to their complaint about the Mystic.

3. We will be letting you know what to say as soon as possible.

(P.R.M. Hinchcliffe)

A. Arnold Esq.,  
BAGHDAD

c.c. J.K.T. Frost Esq.,  
Shipping Policy Division,  
Board of Trade.

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# Summary of World Broadcasts

## Part 4 The Middle East and Africa



PUBLISHED BY THE MONITORING SERVICE OF  
THE BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION CAVERSHAM PARK READING BERKS.

*n' Macfarlane (vice Long)*

*A. on  
16  
12*

The Abu Za'bal Area Bombing - Mr. Meir on  
the Cease-fire - Cairo Tripartite Summit -  
The Fida'i Issue in Jordan

Tito's Statement in Nairobi on Middle East  
Crisis - William Rogers's Meetings in  
Addis Ababa - Malawi - Zambia

### APPENDICES

- A. The Arab World and Israel
- B. Non-Arab Africa
- C. Greece and Turkey



*B. P.M.M.  
510*

*n' Henschel*

*A/13 & 14*

*key out G 142  
Iraq/Iran  
relation to the war  
Iraq is on Gulf.*

*Regy. Ans A/13 & 14 for Bahrain/Iran file*

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**Q. What about relations between the two Yemens?**

**A. We welcome all objective developments leading to Yemeni unity so that we may achieve the aspirations of the people in economic development and social justice. We are ready to meet our Yemeni brethren at any constructive level to work for the interest of the entire Yemen - North and South.**

**Q. What are your Government's foreign and economic policies?**

**A. Our foreign policy is based on the principle of achieving our internal interests in political, economic, and cultural fields. We also believe in world peace and affluence and the progress of world peoples. In our economic policy, we plan to devote the productive resources to the service of the people because the economy is the base of social construction.**

**Q. The merchants are maintaining a monopoly on commodity prices, which are beyond the reach of citizens of limited income.**

**A. Merchants work for profit and this fact cannot be changed. However, we hope that they will take into consideration the interests of the people. Therefore, we ask the merchants to behave properly and realise the contradiction between the prices they fix and the people's standard of living. We are going to create a price control section in the Economy Ministry. Other appropriate ministries should carry out their role in this field and Chambers of Commerce must co-operate to solve this problem.**

#### **Shibli al-Aysami's Address to Jordanian Students**

**Iraqi News Agency in Arabic 13.15 GMT 11.2.70**

**Text of report:**

**Baghdad: Shibli al-Aysami, the Assistant Secretary-General of the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party National Command, has warned that a dark future is awaiting the Arabian Gulf, which may turn into another Palestine unless the Arab nation deals with the Arabian Gulf issue quickly.**

**Aysami added that Iraq had been aware of this menace and was fully prepared to submit all material, military and economic assistance to the Arabian Gulf regions to repulse this menace, which is manifested in Iran's ambitions in the Arabian Gulf area, and to preserve the Arabism of the Gulf.**

**Aysami was speaking to a student delegation of the University of Jordan last night. He praised the Soviet attitude towards Arab issues and the Soviet aid to the Arab States to confront the imperialist-Zionist alliance and plotting against the Arab nation.**

**Aysami affirmed the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party's support for fida'i action, its escalation and promotion and its transformation into a kind of popular armed struggle which could benefit from the Arab nations' huge manpower and economic resources.**

**Aysami said that the Ba'th Party had called for co-operation between the progressive nationalist forces in the Iraqi region and the Arab homeland in order to establish a unified front. The Socialist Arab Ba'th Party and the Iraqi revolutionary Government had worked earnestly for progress on the road of economic, military and political unity among the Arab States adjacent to Israel and every other progressive Arab State, he declared.**

**Aysami added that the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party and the Iraqi revolutionary Government had provided the popular fighting organisations with the opportunity to act, to be active and to co-operate with the masses and their national issues.**



Aysami called on Arab nationalist organisations and forces to forget the negativism of the past and to overcome all obstacles to a unified front of all political organisations.

Speaking about the Iranian provocations, Aysami said: World imperialism and Iranian reaction have, by raising the Shatt al-Arab issue, attempted to isolate Iraq and prevent it from carrying out its escalating role of struggle. The plot buried recently in Iraq is a clear indication of the agent role of the Iranian authorities. Iran has followed the course of provoking Iraq in order to force Iraq to mobilise its forces on the Iraqi-Iranian borders and weaken the eastern front. However, Iraq has frustrated the Iranian attempt and will continue to strengthen the eastern front.

#### Arab Radio Comment 12.2.70

**IRAQ** 19.00 GMT: Denunciation of "reactionary" attempts against Resistance movement.

**JORDAN** 19.00 GMT: Purpose of Government's security measures.

**LEBANON** 18.00 GMT: Condemnation of Israeli raids on civilian targets.

**LIBYA** 13.00 GMT: Importance of tripartite conference in Cairo in confronting the enemy's intensified "aggression".

**SYRIA** 12.15 GMT (repeated 19.15 GMT): Condemnation of Israeli-US collusion and praise for role of Arab Resistance.

**UAR** 12.30 GMT: Muhammad Sharaf on dangers of the Israeli enemy, citing air raid on Abu Za'bal (see above). 18.30 GMT ("Spotlight on World Problems"): US responsibility for Israel's attempts to incite a new war.

**"Voice of the Arabs" (Cairo)** 11.30 GMT: Muhammad Abu al-Futuh on US involvement in Israeli acts of "aggression", quoting air raid on Abu Za'bal (see above). 14.15 GMT ("Palestine Service"): Israeli "terrorism" against fida'i action in West Bank of Jordan. 16.20 GMT ("Conversation with a Listener"): Praise for the trained Arab soldier as a good fighter, mentioning frogmen's operation in Eilat harbour. 17.00 GMT ("Arabian Peninsula"): Ismat Ibrahim on the ultimate victories of the Southern Yemeni people's fight against colonialism and the Arabs' fight against Israeli "aggression". 18.00 GMT: Abd al-Fattah al-Adawi on US responsibility in the Israeli bombing of Abu Za'bal.

#### Reports in Brief

**King Faysal's message to pilgrimage missions** On 12th February HM King Faysal of Saudi Arabia made a speech at the annual reception for heads and members of pilgrimage missions. In his review of events during the past year, he said that the people of Palestine, in order to try to achieve a just solution to their problem, had "gone so far as to accept the principle of coexistence in Palestine between Christians, Muslims and Jews", concessions "which none of us imagined we would ever hear". The Israeli raid on Abu Za'bal pointed "to the arrogance and haughtiness of that gang and its attempt to weaken and overthrow the influence of our brothers in the countries adjoining Israel". There was no hope of obtaining justice either from the UN or the big Powers. (Jiddah in Arabic 18.00 GMT 12.2.70)

**French Delegation's visit to Libya** (Text of joint statement) During the period 7th-12th February friendly talks were held in the Libyan Arab Republic between the visiting French delegation headed by the Director of Economic and Financial Affairs at the French Foreign Ministry, Jean-Pierre Brunet and the Libyan delegation headed by the Revolution Command Council member Maj. Abd al-Mun'im al-Huni. The delegations' discussions covered agriculture, oil, minerals, education, local [word indistinct], industries, communications and housing. The talks achieved good results on which further co-operation between the two countries can be based. (Libyan Radio in Arabic 22.30 GMT 12.2.70)



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
BRITISH EMBASSY

TEHRAN

40

(3/5)

6 March, 1970.



*John 10/3*

*Reg*

*Mr Hinchey 10/7*

*then p.a.*

*(1 am/1 am 1 am)*

New Iraqi Charge d'Affaires

We have received a circular from the Iraqi Embassy in Tehran, announcing that Mr. Farouk Sabri Al-Khatib, Counsellor, has arrived in Tehran and taken up his duties as Charge d'Affaires ad interim with effect from 26 February. Since Iraqi representation in Iran has been limited to Third Secretary level following the mutual expulsion of Ambassadors on 22 January, this represents a distinct change, whether by design or whether because of the incompetence of Third Secretaries per se, I do not know.

*Yours sincerely,*

*Charles Drace-Francis*

(C.D.S. Drace-Francis)

D. J. Makinson, Esq.,  
Near Eastern Department,  
F.C.O.

cc: Chancery, Baghdad.

*284*

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Mr. Hinchcliffe.

N.E.D

Reg str

(2 copies) 42

Brief No. 5

PM 25/

SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT TO TURKEY

5-9 APRIL, 1970

Relations between Iraq and Iran

|                                                              |
|--------------------------------------------------------------|
| RECEIVED IN<br>REGISTRY No. 10<br>25 MAR 1970<br>NEQ 3/324/1 |
|--------------------------------------------------------------|

Line to Take

We do not wish to be involved in this dispute.

Speaking Notes

2. We regret the deterioration in Iran/Iraq relations; how do the Turks see the present position?
3. Particularly unfortunate that the setback should occur at a time when relations seemed to be getting better and a workable modus vivendi was in operation in the Shatt al Arab. We have had no reports of interference with shipping; the situation on the ground seems not to be as serious as it was in April/May last year, but the ending of the Iraqi war with the Kurds (if confirmed) may have some effect on Iraqi deployment.
4. Hope that the two countries will be able to settle dispute amicably; in everyone's interests that the area is peaceful.
5. [Only if Iranian allegations of Iraqi ill-treatment of Iranian diplomats are raised] The Iranians have notified us of the allegations; all breaches of diplomatic practice are regrettable.
6. [Only if British involvement in the 1937 Treaty is raised.] We have looked into this; there is no justification in the charge that the 1937 Treaty was in some way imposed on Iran or Iraq.
7. [If Turkish mediation in the dispute is raised.] We welcome any steps which would decrease tension in the area.

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Background

Iraq/Iran Relations

These deteriorated sharply following Iraqi accusations that the Iranians were involved in the abortive coup in Baghdad on 21 January; we have reliable information that this was the case. Iraq expelled five senior Iranian Diplomats (including the Ambassador) and closed all Iranian consulates. The Iranians have retaliated. Both countries engaged in a propaganda war (not so fierce now as during late January and early February) and it is reported that both sides moved troops towards the frontier. It is, however, improbable that fighting will break out. The situation on the ground does not for the moment appear to be as serious as it was last Spring at the time of the Shatt al Arab crisis (see below). There have been no reports of interference by either side with shipping in the Shatt waterway.

2. The Iranians have alleged ill-treatment of Iranian diplomats immediately after the abortive coup. The Iranian Chargé d'Affaires called on Mr. Hayman on 30 January with an aide memoire giving details of alleged incidents. Similar representations have been made in other capitals. The Iraqis have complained that the Iranians massed troops along the frontier and a formal note to this effect was handed to U Thant on 6 February.

Turkish Mediation

3. On 4 February General Ammash (of Iraq) flew to Ankara to see the Turkish President and Prime Minister, and on 5 February the Secretary-General of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, Eralp, flew to Tehran. Both countries have denied, on the record, that these moves were anything to do with mediation. General Ammash



has claimed that his mission to Ankara was connected with the promotion of economic co-operation and Eralp said that the Turkish Government on its own initiative had decided "to brief officials of the friendly and allied Iranian Government" about Ammash's talks in Ankara. He added that Ammash had asked the Turkish Government to use its good offices to reduce the tension affecting Iranian/Iraqi relations but denied that there was any question of mediation.

4. Turkey values her relations with both Iraq and Iran. It is doubtful that she would wish to be involved in the thankless task of formal mediation but she would welcome a reduction of tension in the area. Mediation by Pakistan has also been mooted but the Pakistanis are too pro-Iranian to be taken seriously as mediators. The Jordanians who were active in this role at the time of last year's Shatt al Arab crisis do not appear to have been involved at all since then.

#### Shatt al Arab

5. Last April a series of incidents in the Shatt al Arab waterway led to an armed confrontation (but no fighting) between Iraq and Iran. Iran unilaterally abrogated the Treaty of 1937, which, inter alia, defined that part of the frontier between Iraq and Iran which runs alongside the Iranian bank of the Shatt. Iran claims that as Iraq had not observed some of the provisions of the Treaty it was accordingly null and void. Iran later alleged that the Treaty was imposed on her, to her disadvantage, by H.M.G. Research has shown that there is no truth in this. Throughout the negotiations leading to the 1937 Treaty H.M.G. refrained from putting any pressure on the Iranians, and merely



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offered advice to the Iraqis. The Iranians cannot escape from the fact that after negotiations with the Iraqis, they freely put their signature to the agreement.

- 3 -

**CONFIDENTIAL**



Mr Henrichs,

To save time I have sent  
Gordon Manzie in the Board of Trade  
the text of the draft Note and asked for  
his comments on the telephone. I have  
also asked him for the facts from the owners of the  
Rauan Moor — if they have any. I also explained  
the point about detailed records of incidents  
in the Shatt and asked which side of the  
channel the Rauan M' used. He will  
telephone the details.

Laurie Byers MA TO.  
26.2.

Mr Byers Minutes over.

not much time seems  
to have been saved! Could you try  
to stimulate Mr Manzie into  
giving his views.

RMH

23/2



Mr Hindcliffe,

Mr Laurie apologised for the long delay  
and offered no major comment. He asked why the  
'Mythic' could not be included in the same  
Note, and drew attention to the two references to Wey  
in the last sentence of the draft.

Laurie Agn MATO.  
24-3.

24-3

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24-3



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MORE/R

BRITISH EMBASSY,  
BAGHDAD.

18 December 1969

29 DEC 1969

Dear Tripp,

s.s. Rowan More

When the Ambassador called on Dr. Daud on 15 December he told him that the Ministry had received a report from the port authorities at Basra that a British ship had refused to comply with the Shatt-Al-Arab Navigation Instructions, of which copies had been circulated to Diplomatic Missions in May. The offender was s.s. Rowan More, registered in Liverpool, owned by Johnston Warren Lines Ltd. It had entered the Shatt on 2 December, apparently en route for Khorramshar, and had refused either to take on board an Iraqi pilot, or to fly the Iraqi flag, or to submit to any kind of inspection. It had been allowed to continue its journey with a warning that this would be taken up with the authorities.

2. Dr. Daud said this was the first occasion on which a British ship had not complied with the instructions. At this stage he was not putting the Government's complaint in writing, but a Note would probably follow soon.

3. You may wish to obtain comments from the owners about this incident.

Yours ever,

*[Signature]*  
for (D. F. Hawley)

J. P. Tripp, Esq.,  
Near Eastern Department,  
F.6.0.

c.c. J. K. T. Frost,  
Shipping Policy Division,  
Board of Trade,  
John Adam Street,  
W.C.2.

I have discussed w. Mr  
Cochlin who will take  
this up w. the owners. It  
may be the ship is on charter  
to Araya (Iranian) hence  
not susceptible to  
Iraqi pressure.

21.12.

3/2

14.11



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
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COVERING CONFIDENTIALMr. Egerton

The incidents involving  
British ships in the  
Shatt-al-Arab

FLAG 'A'  
 FLAG 'D'  
 FLAG 'C'

Please refer to Folio 13 which is a Note from the Iraqi Embassy referring to an incident described by Mr. Hawley in his letter of 18 December. Since then the Iraqis have complained of a similar incident involving another British ship. Mr. Arnold's letter of 7 February refers.

2. I have consulted the Departmental Legal Adviser, Marine and Telecommunications Department and the Board of Trade, and we have agreed on a form of words suitable for use in any reply to the Iraqi Notes on the earlier incident (SS Rowanmore) and which could also be used mutatis mutandis as an answer to the later Note on the SS Mystic.

FLAG 'E'

3. As a matter of tactics, I would prefer any reply, (if necessary) to go via our Embassy in Baghdad rather than to the Iraqi Embassy here. The Note ~~to~~ <sup>from</sup> the Embassy is similar to the one handed in at Baghdad. The Iraqis have not reverted to the topic recently and our Embassy may now feel that the matter should be allowed (quietly) to ~~close~~ <sup>slide</sup>. If you agree, I will draft a letter to Baghdad covering the substance of a draft Note.

(P. R. M. Hinchcliffe)  
 Near Eastern Dept.  
 31 March, 1970.

I agree that the reply should go via Baghdad. I have made a few suggestions on wording of the reply which I hope the Legal Adviser can accept (I don't understand last clause of sentence 2)

2. Baghdad sh<sup>d</sup> be allowed to judge things. But it is a mistake to think that the Iraqis (especially Dr Daud) will ever forget these incidents or let them die unanswered. When

COVERING CONFIDENTIAL



C2

The Iraqis revert to the subject,  
as they most surely will, The Embassy  
should slap in the draft we will  
have sent them.

Atterton

3/13

Mr. Kricheloffe



RESTRICTED

48

Near Eastern Department,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London S.W.1

6 April, 1970



(NEQ.3/324/1)

s.s. Rowan More/Mystic

f 38.

In continuation of my letter of 25 February I now enclose the substance of a draft note which you may, at your discretion, like to use in reply to the Notes you have received from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the two "offences" committed by the British ships on charter to Arya. The note was prepared here with the Rowan More in mind but our Legal Adviser agrees it could also serve as a reply on the Mystic.

!!?

(P.R.M.Hinchcliffe)

A. Arnold Esq.,  
BAGHDAD

RMM  
8/4

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FOHIO 48 ENCLOSURE

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SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT TO TURKEY

5-9 APRIL, 1970

Relations between Iraq and Iran

Line to Take

We do not wish to be involved in this dispute.

Speaking Notes

2. We regret the deterioration in Iran/Iraq relations; how do the Turks see the present position?
3. Particularly unfortunate that the setback should occur at a time when relations seemed to be getting better and a workable modus vivendi was in operation in the Shatt al Arab. We have had no reports of interference with shipping; the situation on the ground seems not to be as serious as it was in April/May last year, but the ending of the Iraqi war with the Kurds (if confirmed) may have some effect on Iraqi troop deployment.
4. We welcome the Kurdish settlement with the Iraq Government. How do the Turks see it? Do they think this will have repercussions in Turkey or in Iran?
5. Hope that Iraq and Iran will be able to settle dispute amicably; in everyone's interests that the area is peaceful.
6. [Only if Iranian allegations of Iraqi ill-treatment of Iranian diplomats are raised.] The Iranians have notified us of the allegations; all breaches of diplomatic practice are regrettable.
7. [Only if British involvement in the 1937 Treaty is raised.] We have looked into this; there is no justification in the charge that the 1937 Treaty was in some way imposed on Iran or Iraq.



CONFIDENTIAL

8. [If Turkish mediation in the dispute is raised.] We welcome any steps which would decrease tension in the area.

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL



**CONFIDENTIAL**

offered advice to the Iraqis. The Iranians cannot escape from the fact that after negotiations with the Iraqis, they freely put their signature to the agreement.

Kurdish/Iraqi Settlement

6. On 11 March, the Iraq Government announced the settlement of their dispute with the Kurds. This followed three months of negotiations in Baghdad during which time the Russians put considerable pressure on both sides to settle their differences. The agreement is a considerable milestone towards a settlement but its completeness is less certain - there are some (perhaps deliberate) obscurities in the document signed by both sides: for instance, the exact extent of the Kurdish "autonomous" area, the amount of development money to be allocated for it and the future of the Kurdish irregular forces will cause difficulties from the start.

7. We know from reliable sources that the Shah is particularly worried by the settlement as he fears that it will allow the Iraqis to cause trouble for Kuwait and in the Gulf generally. There are considerable numbers of Kurds both in Iran and in Turkey. They have been entirely passive in their relationships with their governments. But, if the Iraqi Kurds enjoy some measure of autonomy, this could make the Kurds elsewhere restive: and, in the case of Iran, possibly receptive to Iraqi subversion (this too is probably in the Shah's mind).

8. There are four divisions of Iraqi troops tied up in Kurdistan. If the settlement finally sticks (and we consider the chances of it doing so are about even) this will free Iraqi forces for reinforcing their contingent in Jordan and increasing



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their strength in Southern Iraq on the frontier with Iran. Since the settlement was announced we know of only one battalion having moved out of the Kurdish area and large scale troop movements are unlikely to result from the agreement as it stands at present.



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| RECEIVED IN<br>REGISTRY No. 10 |
| NEQ 3/344/1                    |

Cypher/Cat.A

BAGHDAD

Telno.289

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

14 April, 1970

R E S T R I C T E D

-38

Hinchcliffe's Letters NEQ 3/324/1 of 25 February and  
6 April : Shipping in the Shatt Al Arab.

We hope that you will defer replying to the Iraqi  
Embassy until you have seen our comments on the draft  
Note in the next bag.

Mr. Balfour Paul

BU wh  
letter owner.

F I L E S

N. EAST. DEPT.

now P.O.  
RMM  
23/4  
RMM  
15/4

R E S T R I C T E D

GGGGG



N.E.D. (2 copies)

Secretary of State's Visit to Turkey

5-9 April, 1970

NEQ 3/324/1

Brief No. 5: Relations between Iraq and Iran

Revised Speaking Notes and replacement pages 3 and 4  
for Background.

Key. A copy should  
go in the Kupper file  
& I would like no  
forming Powers. sk  
PUMA



(51)

who added that the committees would compile the conclusions reached during the three leaders' previous talks in Tripoli and Cairo. The committees will also compile the joint ministerial committees' recommendations on economic, military and cultural integration. (Syrian Arab News Agency in Arabic 15.10 GMT 16.4.70)

Rabak people's support for Sudanese revolution The people of Rabak and neighbouring areas have staged a procession in support of the victorious May revolution. At the garrison HQ the procession was addressed by Col. Ahmad Muhammad Abu Dhahab, who said that the revolution had been staged only for toiling and ordinary citizens, that the revolution was aware that the plots of colonialism would not end, and that it was therefore the duty of all to be alert and cautious. He added that the Ansar masses were part of the revolution and were now more alert and eager to preserve their gains, now that the revolution had freed them from the nightmare of reactionary agents who wanted them to lead a life of ignorance, poverty and disease. Finally he declared that the revolution would strive for the happiness of all citizens throughout the country. The representative of the Rabak national committee then made a speech in which he proclaimed the inevitability of national unity and the allegiance of the masses of Rabak and the Aba Island area to the revolution. (Omdurman in Arabic 12.30 GMT 17.4.70)

Preparations for Lenin centenary celebrations A Soviet friendship delegation arrived in Khartoum on 17th April to attend the Lenin centenary celebrations. (Omdurman in Arabic 12.30 GMT 17.4.70)

On 18th April Iraq begins a week's celebration of Lenin's birthday centenary. Functions include a special ceremony that evening in Baghdad at which the Iraqi Minister of Culture and Information will speak. On the second day of the celebrations the Youth Minister will open a Soviet art exhibition at the Iraqi Artists Society premises. On the third day the Culture and Information Minister will open the Lenin film week festival at the Khayyam cinema. On the fourth day the Rector of Baghdad University will open the Lenin book and stamps exhibition. On the fifth day the Information Minister will open the photographic exhibition of Lenin's pictures. The celebrations will end with a seminar entitled "Lenin and the national liberation movements of the Eastern peoples". (Baghdad in Arabic 11.30 GMT 17.4.70)

Reported death of Abd al-Ghani ar-Rawi in Tehran According to a report from Tehran. "Abd al-Ghani ar-Rawi, "a leader of the imperialist-reactionary plot against our revolutionary Iraq", was killed with three of his companions in Tehran when a group of Iranian nationalists attacked his car and the escorting car with grenades on 8th April. The attackers are reported to have opened automatic fire at Abd al-Ghani ar-Rawi's car after throwing three grenades. The escort tried to resist the attackers but were "eliminated". (Baghdad in Arabic 11.30 GMT 17.4.70)

NEQ 3/324/1





Shah of Iran



President of Iraq

There is evidence that the  
Iranians have been very ready  
these past couple of months for  
all-out war, and that a single  
incident could trigger full-scale  
conflict, reports MARTIN  
WOOLLACOTT

**M**OST Iranians believe the so-called confrontation between their country and Iraq to be a complete phoney, and official sources tend, obliquely, to give the same impression. But there is evidence that the Iranians have been very ready these past couple of months for all-out war, and that a single incident could trigger full-scale conflict.

It was Iran's abrogation of the treaty governing navigation on the Shatt-al-Arab River, which forms the border between Iran and Iraq as it flows into the Persian Gulf, which initiated the confrontation a year ago. Both sides moved troops to the border, Iraq expelled thousands of Iranians, both sides mounted virulent propaganda campaigns against each other.

Iran had long seen the Shatt treaty, which defines most of the river as Iraqi territorial water, as an injustice. But she acted at a time when the importance of the Shatt to Iran was declining, with the rapid development of numerous ports on the Gulf coast itself. What is ultimately at issue, it has been clear from the start, is the future of the Gulf region as a whole, and the feeling of both nations that the policies of the other represent an obstacle to their legitimate ambitions in the area.

The heat may now be off for there are indications that Iraq will transfer forces freed by the end of the Kurdish war not to the Iranian border but to the "eastern front" against Israel. Then again, it may not: there is a certain continuing bellicosity among Iranian officers.

One senior air force man told me, bluntly: "I can tell you this much: if there is another war between the Arabs and Israel, we won't be out of it." What is one to make of that? One also hears the classic arguments for war now, rather than later. "The Iraqis can only get stronger," the same officer told me.

Of course officers don't make policy, particularly in Iran. But

it is a fair guess that the decision has been taken that Iran, with her valuable oil installations at risk in any conflict, cannot afford to hope that any small outbreak of fighting would remain minor. Common sense suggests that there can be little room in the Iranian war plan for meeting limited aggression with limited force. And the influence of the Israeli example is considerable.

So, given cause, Iran is likely to make an attempt to destroy as much as possible of the Iraqi air force, in the faint hope of saving her oil installations at Abadan and Kharg from serious damage, and, also, of course, of aiding the progress of her ground troops.

To an outsider, there are plenty of reasons for believing that this would not work: the Iranian air force is not as good as the Israeli air force, the principal Iraqi air bases are well to the West of the country, and the general geography will not allow the Iranians to work the kind of flanker or Iraqi radar cover that the Israelis worked on the Egyptian cover. Nevertheless, a major blow at the enemy air force is bound to be the centrepiece of Iranian war planning.

## Alert state

All this, of course, is speculation, but there is some evidence pointing in this direction. There is nothing fake, to begin with, about the alert state of the Iranian armed forces. The air force has not been stood down now for almost a year, even though the state of full alert is extremely tough on both personnel and sophisticated equipment.

In addition, the air force is reportedly very anxious to provide full radar cover for the capital. Along the border with Iraq, Iran has only two stations, and, in the Persian Gulf, just one mobile radar at Bushire. A second mobile radar is being shipped from Britain to Iran at this moment, and its swift deployment in the Tehran area seems to be regarded as a

matter of urgency by the air force. And troops of the Third Army in Khuzistan, the principal ground force ranged against the Iraqis, appear to have been on extra alert recently.

Most significantly of all, the orders of the Third Army are believed to be to retaliate instantly, without reference to Tehran, should there be any aggression, even of a minor kind, by the Iraqi forces on the other side of the disputed waterway of the Shatt al Arab. This, in a country where everything goes through headquarters, suggests the existence of a worked out plan of attack on a large scale.

The Shah and his Government are certainly determined not to fire the first shot. The former commander-in-chief of the Iranian armed forces, General Aryana, was sacked last year reputedly for putting forward a plan to invade Iraq, take Baghdad and install a new government. Whether the story is true or false, the Shah's desire not to be the aggressor is not at issue.

The irony of confrontation is that there can be no military solution to the Iran-Iraq conflict, which is ultimately a reflection of the deep ethnic hostility that divides Iranians and Arabs. One peaceable and distinguished Iranian told me: "I have never touched a gun in my life. But if I heard the Iraqis were coming I would go and get one."

Having rejected a solution by war, Iran then apparently decided to try to fix things in Iraq by subversion. There is hardly a Western diplomat in Tehran or in Baghdad who doesn't believe that Iran was involved in the recent abortive coup in Baghdad.

The tape recordings made public in Baghdad are, in the view of most diplomats, genuine. In them there is talk of Iranian air support for the plotters on the day after the coup, and it is an interesting fact that Iranian squadrons were moved to their forward airfields a few hours after the coup.

In the event, the failure of the coup strengthened the Ba'athist Government in Iraq, and that Government is now even more firmly in position as a result of its settlement of the Kurdish war — a settlement which itself is a further knock in the eye for Iran.

So Iran is back to the pre-coup situation where her army and air force are on constant and expensive alert, and there is no clear way of ending it by working, as in the past, to weaken or even overthrow the Baghdad Government. The cost and worry of the military alert Iran has maintained now for almost a year can only build up to a point where there either has to be a settlement, or there is going to be fighting.

## Settlement?

Certainly the most likely outcome is a settlement. The Iraqis may believe that the bases of Iranian strength are a lot more fragile than Iran supposes and that the setback of war would dissipate all Iran's ambitions in the Gulf region. But a formal Iraqi decision to fight is impossible. Their very real preoccupation with Israel alone would indicate that.

The danger that remains is war by accident. Even some minor hostile act by the Iraqis, not intended as an act of war, could start it: an attempt to board an Iranian ship, for instance. If the Iranians did then "win" they would do so Israeli style by the swift establishment of air supremacy and by as rapid a war on the ground as they could manage. That might take them to Baghdad, or they might be content with physical control of the Shatt.

But these would be negative victories, not worth the risk. Iran can better serve her aims in this region by diplomacy and, if need be, by subversion. She knows it, and yet it may be that technical military requirements and national prestige will combine to demand that, in answer to even a small blow, Iranian retaliation should be massive.



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NEQ 3/324/1

A. THE ARAB WORLD AND ISRAELBaghdad Radio on Anglo-US-Iranian Plotting in the GulfBaghdad home service in Arabic 19.00 GMT 27.4.70

Excerpts from commentary:

The visit of the British Minister, Evan Luard, to the Arabian Gulf area represents a new stage in implementation of the reactionary-imperialist plots aimed at detaching new parts of the Arab territory. Iran is playing the role of the cat's-paw in the plots.

This suspect visit - which has been termed a fact-finding mission to ascertain the Bahraini people's desires - clarifies the extent of collaboration between the expansionist and imperialist interests at the expense of the Arabs.

Iran is attempting to display force in the Arabian Gulf to replace Britain when the latter withdraws from the Gulf area, and to intimidate the Arab people into achieving its ambitions in Bahrain. One glance at the sequence of events in the area clearly reveals the base Anglo-US-Iranian plans to share spheres of influence in the Arab area...

The Anglo-US-Iranian alliance in the Arabian Gulf area has a double purpose closely linked with US plans for Palestine. The first is to surround Iraq with imperialist-reactionary alliances in order to put pressure on it militarily to withdraw its units from the eastern front - thus facilitating the imposition of surrender on the Arabs - and to overthrow the revolutionary Iraqi regime and replace it with a regime sympathetic to the West regarding Iran's ambitions in the area, or at least able to keep quiet about those ambitions. The second purpose is to make Iran an advanced imperialist base to replace Britain in the Arabian Gulf area. That is why a psychological propaganda campaign has been started to portray Iran as a force capable of controlling the Arab nation's destiny and to portray the Arab force as still incapable of rising to the level of imperialist challenges...

Sisco stated that Iran must be strong to play its part in the area. This statement implies more of a threat to Iraq than US promises to Iran. Iran, which attempted to imply during Sisco's visit that it intended to attack Iraq, knows better than anyone the black fate awaiting any attempt to trespass on Iraq's sovereignty...

Britain is trying to leave behind a problem in the Arabian Gulf area after her withdrawal to find a justification for returning. In this way it is playing its natural part of obstructing liberation movements in the world. The British Minister's visit is only a veil to find new ways of maintaining the British presence in the area and of protecting British interests there...

Richard Wood's Meeting with BuwaysirLibyan Radio in Arabic 05.30 GMT 28.4.70

Text of report:

Tripoli: The Unity and Foreign Minister, Salih Buwaysir, last night received the British Member of Parliament, Richard Wood, the Conservative Party's official spokesman on foreign and commonwealth affairs. They discussed Anglo-Arab relations with particular reference to Anglo-Libyan relations, the Middle East situation and the Palestine question. Buwaysir explained that the establishment of a secular State in Palestine, in accordance with the Palestinian call, in which the three religions of Islam, Christianity and Judaism would coexist, could not be regarded as a victory for the Arabs



because Palestine was an Arab territory. This call, he added, demonstrated a genuine desire to find a solution for the Palestine question. They also reviewed the history of the Palestine question and Israel's attitude to UN resolution.

Richard Wood expressed a desire to visit Libya again, with other members of the British Parliament, to resume the dialogue with the Government of the revolution.

#### Cairo 'Al-Akhbar' Reply to Mrs. Meir

Cairo home service in Arabic 05.25 GMT 27.4.70

Excerpts from press review quotation of 'Al-Akhbar' editorial:

Golda Meir has said the United States had not asked Israel to withdraw, that it was Israel's greatest friend, that Sisco's visit had not changed the situation, that Israel refused to declare its intention to withdraw, and that Israel must adhere to its present plan - to define its demands only at the negotiating table.

Meir's statement could not be more frank in portraying the Israeli situation and the situation in general. Let us therefore disregard everything to the contrary. It is true that the United States is Israel's greatest friend, that Sisco's visit brought nothing new, that Israel will not disclose what it means by secure borders, and that it will define its demands only at the negotiating table. This only means that the Arabs should surrender and yield to Israeli demands. It also means that everything being said about the talks and meetings of the four big Powers, about their agreements and disagreements and about their intention to resume meetings, as often reported in the press, is meaningless and ineffective. Furthermore, it means that such meetings and talks are only a deliberate waste of time, designed to damp down anger and ease tension, and intended to weaken Arab determination or to entangle the Arabs in time-consuming disputes...

We thank the Israeli Premier, for although she said nothing that the Arabs did not know she confirmed the suspicions of the few people who still had faith in the US position or still believed that there were hawks and doves in Israel. She also confirmed for the Arabs the concept they have adopted and the course of action in which they believe - that strength is the only way to drive the enemy off and that the enemy will give up his arrogance and deceit only when forced to do so, when he realises that the growing Arab military strength is capable of driving him off.

The enemy has seen some of this strength in the past few days, and he will see a lot more in the future. Only then will the enemy awake from his arrogance and realise the truth about his situation and his strength.

#### Amman 'Ad-Dustur' on the Cease-fire Issue

Amman home service in Arabic 05.15 GMT 27.4.70

Excerpts from press review quotation of 'Ad-Dustur' article:

Israel asserts on every occasion its rejection of the UN Security Council resolution and its insistence on retaining the occupied Arab areas, and the Zionist military establishment continues its acts of aggression on Arab civilian areas and military positions. At the same time, the Tel Aviv rulers try to appear on the international scene to be carefully adhering to the cease-fire agreement. They try to do so by accusing Jordan of violating the agreement. The purpose of this attempt is definitely to mislead the UN at a time when Israel is violating the UN Security Council and General Assembly resolutions.



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ENCLAIR  
ROUTINE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 492

TO BAGHDAD  
1 JUNE 1970

(~~NE~~ 3/324/1)

UNCLASSIFIED.

SYMON'S LETTER 21/4 OF 18 APRIL.

YOUR TEXT OF NOTE AGREED.

PLEASE NOW PRESENT NOTE AT YOUR CONVENIENCE.

STEWART

FILES

N.E.D.  
M.T.D.  
MR. HAYMAN

*pe*  
*Don*  
*5/6*







NNNN

CCA145

CK 0046

CCA146 EPA626

0047 : FOURTH LEAD HIJACK 2 TEHERAN:

THE JET, WITH PRINCE SHAHRYAR (CORRECT) ABOARD TOUCHED  
DOWN HERE AT 0105 LOCAL TIME (2135 GMT).

THE BOEING WITH 91 PASSENGERS ABOARD, WAS SEIZED AT  
MIDDAY AS IT FLEW BETWEEN TEHERAN AND ABADAN.

MORE DN/TB



NNNN

CCA147

0100

CCA148 EPB316

0101 : FOURTH LEAD HIJACK 3 TEHERAN :

ARTHUR KEMP, AN AUSTRALIAN PASSENGER, SAID THE THREE HIJACKERS ENTERED THE PILOT'S CABIN FROM THE ECONOMY CLASS SECTION OF THE AIRCRAFT.

TWO OF THEM, AGED ABOUT 19 OR 20, WERE ARMED WITH PISTOLS.

THE 12-YEAR-OLD BOY WAS CARRYING TWO BOTTLES OF PETROL WHICH HE SPRAYED ALL OVER THE CABIN.

THE THREE THEN THREATENED TO SET THE PLANE ON FIRE IF THE PILOT DID NOT CHANGE COURSE IMMEDIATELY FOR BAGHDAD.

(PICK UP AS REQUIRED)

REUTER DN/BJW

NEQ 3/32411



NNNN

CCA177 EPB328

0251 : DAYLEAD HIJACK :

TEHERAN, JUNE 22, REUTER -- A 12-YEAR-OLD HIJACKER SPRAYED PETROL AROUND THE PILOT'S CABIN OF AN AIRLINER CARRYING THE NEARLY 100 PEOPLE, INCLUDING THE NEWPHEW OF THE SHAH OF IRAN AND THREATENED TO STRIKE A MATCH IF THE PILOT DID NOT CHANGE COURSE FOR BAGHDAD.

THE CHILD AND TWO ARMED STUDENTS TOOK OVER THE IRANIAN BOEING 727 YESTERDAY AS IT FLEW BETWEEN TEHRAN AND ABADAN. ALL THREE WERE GRANTED ASYLUM IN IRAQ BEFORE THE AIRLINER WAS RELEASED AND ALLOWED TO RETURN HERE LAST NIGHT.

PRINCE SHAHRYAR, SON OF PRINCESS ASHRAF, THE SHAH'S TWIN SISTER, IS AN IRANIAN NAVAL OFFICER COMMANDING A GULF HOVERCRAFT UNIT.

MORE DN/BJW

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CCA178 EPB329

0253 : DAYLEAD HIJACK 2 TEHERAN :

THE AIRLINER WAS FLYING TO KUWAIT VIA ABADAN WITH 91 PASSENGERS AND SEVEN CREW WHEN THE HIJACKERS STRUCK.

PASSENGERS LEAVING THE AIRCRAFT AFTER ITS RETURN HERE LAST NIGHT TOLD HOW THE YOUNGSTERS RUSHED TO THE PILOT'S CABIN FROM THE ECONOMY CLASS SECTION OF THE AIRLINER.

MR. ARTHUR KEMP, A 49-YEAR-OLD AUSTRALIAN MANUFACTURER, SAID THE BOY HAD TWO BOTTLES OF PETROL AND THE OTHER YOUNTHSC, WHO GAVE THEIR AGES AS 19 AND 21, CARRIED PISTOLS.

PASSENGERS SAID THE BOY SPRAYED THE PETROL ALL OVER THE PILOT'S CABIN AND ONTO THE SEATS. THEN THE THREE ORDERED THE PILOT TO CHANGE COURSE FOR BAGHDAD, THREATENING TO FIRE THE PLANE IF HE REFUSED.

MORE DN/BJW



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CCA181 EPB330

0259 : DAYLEAD HIJACK 3 TEHERAN :

FIRST CLASS PASSENGER ABDOLLAH NASSR OF THE IRANIAN OIL AND PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY, SAID THE YOUNGEST HIJACKER HAD TOLD HIM HE WAS IN THE SIXTH GRADE AT ELEMENTARY SCHOOL, THE OTHER TWO WERE OF COLLEGE AGE.

THE HIJACKING WAS A "SHOW OFF", HE SAID.

WHEN THE PLANE LANDED IN BAGHDAD THE BOYS APOLOGISED TO THE PASSENGERS FOR THE INCONVENIENCE THEY HAD CAUSED.

"PLEASE EXCUSE US FOR ALL THIS TROUBLE...WE HAD TO DO IT.. WE WANT TO SEEK ASYLUM OUTSIDE", THEY SAID.

THE IDENTITY OF THE HIJACKERS HAS NOT YET BEEN DISCLOSED HERE.

MORE DN/BJW

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CCA182

CK 0301

CCA183 EPB331

0301 : DAYLEAD HIJACK 4 TEHERAN :

SOME PASSENGERS IN THE ECONOMY CLASS SECTION OF THE PLANE HAD NO IDEA WHAT WAS GOING ON.

BUSINESSMAN HASSAN REJWANI SAID HE ONLY REALISED WHAT WAS GOING ON WHEN THE PILOT ANNOUNCED THAT THE PLANE HAD LANDED AT BAGHDAD.

PASSENGERS SAID THEY WERE WELL TREATED BY IRAQI AUTHORITIES WHO TOOK THEM TO THE AIRPORT TRANSIT

LOUNGE AND SERVED REFRESHMENTS DURING THEIR FOUR-HOUR STAY.

AN OIL COMPANY EMPLOYEE SAID STRICT SECURITY MEASURES WERE ENFORCED AT BAGHDAD AIRPORT. THE AIRLINER WAS CORDONED OFF AND ALL PASSENGER LUGGAGE WAS SEARCHED BEFORE THE PLANE WAS ALLOWED TO LEAVE.

PRINCE SHAHRYAR PRAISED THE AIRLINER'S CREW. THEY WERE IN COMMAND OF THE SITUATION THROUGHOUT THE HIJACKING, HE SAID.

REUTER DN/BJW



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B36 IRANIAN PLANE HIJACKED TO BAGHDAD: PASSENGERS SAFE

(TEHRAN RADIO) AN IRANIAN NATIONAL AIRLINE 727 PASSENGER JET LEFT TEHRAN AT 1800 HOURS TONIGHT FOR ABADAN. THE AIRCRAFT LOST CONTACT WITH THE AIRPORT AFTER IT TOOK OFF. HOWEVER, AT 1910 HOURS THE PILOT NOTIFIED THE NATIONAL IRANIAN AIRLINES HQ IN TEHRAN THAT THE PLANE HAD LANDED AT BAGHDAD AIRPORT AND THAT ALL PASSENGERS WERE SAFE. THE PILOT ADDED THAT HE COULD NOT FURNISH ANY FURTHER INFORMATION.

MF BBC MON 21/6 ZA 1953 TVN

B36 HIJACKED 2

ALL INDICATIONS POINT TO THE PLANE HAVING BEEN HIJACKED TO BAGHDAD. IMMEDIATELY AFTER RECEIVING THE NEWS, THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT INSTRUCTED ITS EMBASSY IN BAGHDAD TO TAKE ALL THE NECESSARY MEASURES WITH THE IRAQI OFFICIALS FOR THE RETURN OF THE PLANE AND ITS PASSENGERS TO IRAN. THE FOREIGN MINISTRY IN TEHRAN HAS CALLED THE IRAQI EMBASSY CHARGE D'AFFAIRES TO THE MINISTRY.

END BBC MON 21/6 ZA 1955 TVN

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B37 BAGHDAD SKYJACK: PLANE TO RETURN TO TEHRAN TONIGHT (WITH B36)

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(TEHRAN RADIO) THE NATIONAL IRANIAN AIRLINE BRANCH OFFICE IN BAGHDAD ANNOUNCED TONIGHT THAT THE AIRLINE'S 727 JET H

Reg. Po. PLANN 22/6  
Mr. Mayhew  
(59)

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| RECEIVED IN<br>REGISTRY No. 10<br>7/7/53 |
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B37 BAGHDAD SKYJACK: PLANE TO RETURN TO TEHRAN TONIGHT (WITH B36)

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(TEHRAN RADIO) THE NATIONAL IRANIAN AIRLINE BRANCH OFFICE IN BAGHDAD ANNOUNCED TONIGHT THAT THE AIRLINE'S 727 JET H

B37 BAGHDAD SKYJACK: PLANE TO RETURN TO TEHRAN TONIGHT (WITH B36)

(TEHRAN RADIO) THE NATIONAL IRANIAN AIRLINE BRANCH OFFICE IN BAGHDAD ANNOUNCED TONIGHT THAT THE AIRLINE'S 727 JET WHICH HAD BEEN SKY JACKED TO BAGHDAD THIS AFTERNOON HAS BEEN RELEASED, AND THAT IT WOULD TAKE OFF FOR TEHRAN AT 2300 (ED: LOCAL).

END BBC MON 21:6 CP (TVN) 2045 (TVN)

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\*\*\*\*\*U R G E N T\*\*\*\*\*

B38 BAGHDAD : THREE IRANIAN SKYJACKERS SEEK POLITICAL ASYLUM (WITH B36, B37)

(BAGHDAD RADIO) THREE IRANIAN'S HIJACKED A CIVILIAN IRANIAN PLANE AND FORCED IT TO LAND AT BAGHDAD INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT THIS EVENING. THE IRAQI NEWS AGENCY (INA) HAS LEARNED THAT THE PLANE, A BOEING 727, HAD 91 PASSENGERS ABOARD, MOSTLY IRANIANS. THE PLANE WAS FLYING FROM TEHRAN TO KUWAIT BY WAY OF ABADAN. THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES HAVE PLACED THE PLANE UNDER GUARD AND STARTED INVESTIGATING ITS CREW AND HIJACKERS.

MF BBC MON 21:6 CP (TVN)

B38 ASYLUM 2: PLANE TO RETURN

INA HAS LEARNED THAT THE THREE IRANIANS HAVE REQUESTED POLITICAL ASYLUM IN IRAQ. THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES HAVE DECIDED TO ALLOW THE PLANE AND THE PASSENGERS TO RETURN TO IRAN WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE HIJACKERS, WHOSE REQUEST FOR POLITICAL ASYLUM IS NOW BEING CONSIDERED BY THE IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTRY.

END BBC MON 21:6 CP (KY) (TVN) 2054



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RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No. 10  
23 JUN 1970  
NEQ 3/324/11

Mr. Hucheliff  
Mr. Fenton  
The Iraqi Resistance  
machine getting  
into gear!

CUDAR RADIO

Penn Hills

BAGHDAD RADIO REPORTS THAT THE IRAQI NEWS AGENCY (INA) HAS LEARNED THAT THE THREE IRANIANS WHO SKIJACKED AN IRANIAN AIRLINER SAID THEY FORCED THE CREW TO FLY TO BAGHDAD BY THREATENING THEM WITH PISTOLS. THEY SAID THEY WERE MOSLEMS AND THEY BELIEVED THE SHAH GAVE AID TO ISRAEL, AND THEREFORE THEY WANTED TO FLEE TO IRAQ FROM THE SHAH'S RULE.

MF BBC MON 0915 22/6 LF

Reg'do.

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B6 SKYJACK - 2: DEMMMONSTRATION

A SKYJACKER SAID THAT THEIR ACTION WAS A DEMONSTRATION TO PROTEST AGAINST THE REACTIONARY IRANIAN RULE AND ITS FIRM ASSOCIATION WITH WORLD IMPERIALISM AND ZIONISM. HE ADDED THAT THEIR DUTY AS CIVTIZENS FORCED THEM TO MAKE A DEMONSTRATION AGAINST THE PERSECUTION, MALTREATMENT, AND EXPLOITATION PRACTISED BY THE SHAH'S RULE AGAINST THE STRUGGLING IRANIAN PEOPLE.

END BBC MON 0919 22/6 LF (KY)



Build-Up Of Iranian Forces Along Iraq Border; Iraqi Treatment Of Iranian Officials; Incident With British Ships At Shatt-Al-Arab. Political Relations Between Iraq And Iran. 4 Feb. 1971. MS Middle East Online: Iraq, 1914-1974: Selected files from series AIR, CAB, CO, FCO, FO, PREM, T, WO, The National Archives, Kew, UK FCO 17/1253. Newspaper Cutting And Maps. The National Archives (Kew, United Kingdom). Archives Unbound, [link.gale.com/apps/doc/SC5107475809/GDSC?u=webdemo&sid=bookmark-GDSC&xid=2ceea2d4&pg=1](https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/SC5107475809/GDSC?u=webdemo&sid=bookmark-GDSC&xid=2ceea2d4&pg=1). Accessed 11 Apr. 2022.